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Abstract
Richard M. Nixon served as Vice President under Dwight Eisenhower 
from 1953 to 1961. During this time, he worked to portray him self to the 
public as an international affairs expert and integral advisor within the 
Administration. Drawing on experiences as a Congressman and his close 
relationship with John Foster Dulles, Nixon made every effort to gain a 
meaningful advisory and decision-making role. His actual success was 
limited. The Vice President was motivated by his love o f  international 
affairs, desire for respect and vision o f his position as a possible jump off 
point to the presidency in 1960. This last goal proved his most enduring 
accomplishment. Nixon improved public awareness o f the vice presidency 
and added political overtones to the office that previously had not been 
evident.
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Nixon - Vice President Unexplored
Richard M. Nixon is remembered by most people for his presidency: Watergate, 
Vietnam, Kissinger and his resignation. His eight years as Vice President to Dwight 
Eisenhower rarely come to mind. The 1950s are less well remembered by people than the 
sensational events from 1968 to 1974. Pick up a book about Nixon and chances are good it 
will dramatize Nixon's downfall and ignore the rest of his life.
Our perception of the thirty-seventh President is reinforced by most Nixon historians, 
who concentrate on his presidential terms also. When they look at the earlier period, they 
typically emphasize elements that foreshadow Nixon's later problems. Although the vice 
presidential tenure in office was far less spectacular than Nixon's later incarnation, it 
nonetheless can stand on its own. In 1953, Nixon certainly was not preparing for the 
calamitous events of Watergate.
Scholars largely ignore Vice President Nixon because his importance in the 
Eisenhower Administration has always been in doubt. They ask did Nixon do anything 
significant as Vice President and did he make an impact on the decisions? Historian Stephen 
Ambrose concludes "As Vice-President, Nixon had no important influence on policy 
decisions. Nor could he, nor can any Vice-President."1 In fact, Nixon's influence in the
Administration has never been fully examined. And, more importantly, the amount of
2
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3influence Nixon gained is less interesting than the amount that he attempted to exert on policy 
decisions. Although his actual success was limited, Richard Nixon made every attempt to 
build a reputation inside and outside the Eisenhower Administration as an integral, 
knowledgeable and admirable member of the government. His efforts transformed the Vice 
President from the constitutionally mandated second in command, to the publicly 
acknowledged presidential successor. Before Nixon, the vice presidency was a political dead 
end. By 1960, he had turned it into a launching point. Concurrently, he sought to gain an 
influence on policy decisions. Nixon expanded the vice presidential role as he pursued his 
particular ambitions.
As Vice President, Richard Nixon worked toward three goals. First, he hoped to 
pursue his interest in foreign relations. He genuinely enjoyed the field. Second, whenever 
possible, he exploited his growing international relations experience to increase his influence 
on Administration decisions and/or give him more sway when he presented his advice.
Finally, he demonstrated his foreign policy expertise and reputation to the populace as a 
qualification for succeeding to the presidency in 1960. These goals were completely 
intertwined, and thus pursued by Nixon simultaneously. Sometimes one might be better 
served than the others, but always Nixon pursued them all. The Vice President pressed for 
roles that would give him a significant place within the Administration, thus presenting his 
leadership abilities to the widest possible audience.
But, he found the vice presidency did not bring with it a great deal of autonomy.
Often unable to follow his own inclinations, two men generally determined his roles, Dwight
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. Each had a different agenda for Nixon.
While the Vice President looked to his own interests, these two set Nixon to tasks of 
their choosing. Eisenhower saw Nixon only as a political advisor and presidential aspirant.
He used Nixon primarily as a congressional liaison, frequently putting Nixon in charge of 
recruiting votes in Congress for support of Administration legislation. But, Ike held Nixon's 
political aspirations in low regard and therefore did little to help the Vice President in that 
area. Ironically, while Nixon preferred international exposure, his grassroots campaigning 
and constant congressional activities had benefits when he finally ran for the presidency.
Dulles' assignments fell somewhere in between those coveted by Nixon and those 
mandated by Eisenhower. He wanted to help Nixon realize his objectives, but recognized the 
limits Ike imposed. Like the President, Dulles took advantage of Nixon's congressional 
skills. Foster Dulles, however, appreciated Nixon's international relations abilities. He 
allowed the Vice President to advise him on most foreign topics and used Nixon as a 
surrogate Secretary of State. Nixon delighted in both of these roles.
This dissertation analyzes Nixon's progression from Representative in the House to 
presidential candidate in 1960. It begins in the late 1940s with his earliest foreign relations 
experience. Nixon developed an insatiable interest for international affairs as a Congressman 
appointed to the Herter Committee. The committee existed to assess the economic aid needs 
of Europe after the Second World War. Out of this episode, Nixon confirmed and formulated 
much of the international relations perspective on which he later based his expertise. The 
Herter Committee acted as a catalyst for Nixon, propelling him toward foreign relations,
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5which in turn led to his presidential bid. He enjoyed this assignment and also discovered 
foreign affairs enhanced his resume.
Nixon's experiences in Congress brought him into contact with John Foster Dulles, a 
top Republican foreign affairs consultant. From the beginning of their relationship, Nixon 
viewed Dulles as a powerful ally. In time, they became friends. The friendship and 
consultation they shared gave Nixon a critical link to the inner circle of presidential advisors 
in the Administration. It was thanks in large part to Dulles' appreciation of the Vice 
President that Nixon had any foreign relations role at all. Dulles acted as a patron to Nixon, 
helping him gain experience and build his reputation.
The Vice President, however, sought ways to improve his position in the 
Administration beyond Dulles' help. Nixon needed to display some independence from the 
Administration, if he were to avoid the fate of most previous vice presidents, unknown and 
unelectable. He used every opportunity to influence decisions, or at m inim um , create the 
appearance that he did.
Despite his efforts, and those of Dulles, Nixon faced an incredible impediment because 
of Eisenhower. The President did not see him as a foreign relations expert and failed to 
consider seriously Nixon’s advice. To Ike, the Vice President was a political advisor at most, 
and usually just an attack dog to be set on the Democrats. While Nixon performed both roles 
well, he preferred the more glamorous foreign relations work. Eisenhower's resistance to any 
expanded role for Nixon greatly reduced Nixon's ability to achieve his goals.
Stanley Kutler points out "that after 1946, Richard Nixon was a public man. His
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
history thereafter is a matter of record, and consists of conscious and unconscious deeds, as 
well as both calculated and accidental incidents, that together form a complex mosaic of 
explanation of the man and his actions."2 It is therefore appropriate to begin where the public 
record starts.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7ENDNOTES:
1. Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon The Education of a Politician 1913-1962. Volume I. Simon & 
Schuster Inc.: New York, 1987: 617.
2. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. W.W. Norton 
and Company: New York, 1992: 37.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Chapter 1:
Beginning a Career - The Herter Committee
In 1946 Richard Nixon's foreign relations experience consisted only of his overseas 
assignment during World War II. As he prepared to return to his native California that year, 
Lieutenant Nixon received an offer to run for the House of Representatives on the Republican 
ticket. He agreed and managed to unseat the five term incumbent of the twelfth district, Jerry 
Voorhis. In January 1947, Nixon joined the 80th Congress and began his steady rise within 
the party ranks. His ascent was helped by superb timing. His party gained 56 seats in the 
House and 13 in the Senate making, for the first time in fifteen years, a Republican controlled 
Congress. With the newly regained strength came an ability to place Republicans on 
committees of their choice. Nixon wrangled a pair of coveted committee seats and an 
opportunity to adopt foreign policy as a career cornerstone.
Representative Nixon asked to be assigned to the Education and Labor Committee and 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). He received both posts thanks to 
the help of an influential supporter.1 To his credit, he distinguished himself on both 
committees through exceptionally hard work. On the first, he helped convince constituents 
and Congressmen to support the Taft-Hartley bill.2 As a member of HU AC, he effectively 
questioned witnesses who came before the committee, with his most famous prosecution being 
the Alger Hiss case in 1948. But, during his first year in Congress Nixon had already made a
8
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9name for himself.3
From the start, Nixon had connections enough to warrant the attention of Speaker of 
the House, Joseph Martin. At the end of July, Martin appointed the freshman Congressman 
to the Foreign Aid Committee, better known as the Herter Committee. The committee 
borrowed its name from its chairman, Christian Herter. Their task was to ascertain the 
necessity of the huge economic aid package for Europe, that eventually became known as the 
Marshall Plan. The Committee would sail to Europe and make a first hand assessment of the 
situation. Members were divided into subcommittees, each responsible for an in-depth 
investigation of a specific region.
Nixon attributed his inclusion on the roster to Martin's search for a geographically 
balanced membership. Thanking fellow freshman Congressman Charles Kersten for a 
congratulatory wire, Nixon wrote "I think one of the reasons I might have been picked was 
that I happen to be the only Westerner who was selected and from the news stories, it appears 
that they wanted a cross-section of the whole country. In any event, as you of course know I 
am very pleased at the opportunity to go. . . ."4 While Nixon’s assessment had veracity, 
Martin also chose him because of the Californian's willingness to exert himself for whatever 
cause he supported. One of those causes was the Marshall Plan.3
Once aware of his appointment, Nixon set out to educate himself. He sought as much 
information as possible on areas he expected to visit. This became a standard operating 
procedure for Nixon when preparing for foreign trips. His search for every scrap of paper 
and bit of advice never diminished, although his sources for information expanded when he 
attained higher office. In this case, because he was assigned to the Italy-Greece-Trieste
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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subcommittee, he directed research toward those Mediterranean zones.6
Before Nixon began his own search for information, he received offers of help in the 
mail. The first assistance came from John Phillips, another Republican Representative from 
California (22nd district). Phillips wrote Nixon on Friday, August 1, to recommend Dr. 
Frank B. Gilgiotti as an expert on Italy. The following Monday, Nixon responded "I know 
very little about the Italian situation and a little briefing in advance should be most helpful." 
He planned to consult with Dr. Gilgiotti and added this was especially important because of 
his sub-committee assignment.7 Although he knew the committee would be briefed by 
government experts, he searched outside the standard sources for any additional information.
Along with official documents provided by Herter, Nixon accepted help from a private 
group called the America Friends Service Committee. Founded by the Quakers in 1917, the 
AFSC was committed to humanitarian services. The Herter Committee purported to embrace 
similar ideals. On August 2 James Reed, the Secretary of the Foreign Service Section of the 
AFSC, offered a list of the organization’s representatives in Europe. Nixon expressed an 
interest in the list and had a copy of it within a week. Reed mentioned that Christian Herter 
was the only other committee member with a copy of the list.8 Whether Nixon's peers 
declined the offered names or were not given that option is unclear. In any case, they did not 
directly receive help from this source. Quite probably, Reed knew of Nixon's Quaker 
background and selected him as an appropriate recipient of the information. While Herter 
could have shared his copy with other committee members, Nixon gave no indication he did. 
The limited circulation of these names probably appealed to Nixon because of his expediency 
and ego. He saw the contacts as an opportunity to establish an overseas network. Even this
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early in his career, Nixon attached importance to increasing his associations. The more 
people who he knew, the more people who knew him, the greater his name recognition and 
resources.
Nixon's desire to expand his knowledge of European affairs was revealed as he 
responded to a letter from a constituent, John J. Garland. To Garland he explained that the 
Herter Committee needed to maintain an "independent attitude in considering the needs of 
Europe and our ability to satisfy those needs." The Executive branch held too much foreign 
relations power. "The Congress has more or less had to go along because we haven't had 
access to the facts. The Foreign Aid Committee [a.k.a. Herter Committee], in my opinion, 
has a great responsibility to reverse this trend. . . ."9 Nixon worked hard to learn those facts 
when in Europe. He did so for the party - his comment about Executive dominance in foreign 
policy was a not so subtle criticism of the Truman and Roosevelt Administrations - and for his 
own benefit. There was a bright future to be made in foreign relations if he could establish 
himself in the field.
These examples are probably the first illustrations of Nixon's continued search for 
contacts abroad. His preparation was an adaptation of a practice he had utilized on both of 
his domestic committee assignments. Nixon consistently sought to expand his own knowledge 
to better deal with every possible situation. To that end, he increased his circle of associates 
to enlarge the resources from which he could collect information. Nixon's interest in foreign 
relations blossomed during this trip to Europe. His experiences helped cement his perception 
of the world and determine the course of his political career.
On August 26, the entire Committee met in New York City for a pre-departure
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briefing. Charles "Chip" Bohlen led the presentation. The State Department’s foremost 
expert on Russia, Bohlen had been in foreign affairs for twenty years. Fluent in Russian, he 
served as Roosevelt’s translator at Yalta. Now he discussed the latest developments in 
Europe. Lewis Brown, a business man who had just returned from Europe, followed with a 
second briefing. The next day the Committee boarded the Queen Mary and sailed from New 
York Harbor, destination England.10 Upon reaching Europe, the Congressmen spent nearly a 
month inspecting and assessing. They traveled sometimes as a group, but more often in their 
subcommittees. All of the Committee members were affected by the war tom landscape of 
Europe. Despite the later perception of Nixon as unfeeling, the Congressman from California 
was no exception.
Nixon spent his life taking prodigious notes. This first non-military trip abroad was 
no exception. But, unlike any of his subsequent trips, on this early visit to Europe, Nixon 
also wrote a 37 page personal journal recounting his experiences. It was, he noted a decade 
later, "not made public and it was not used officially. These are my own recollections — 
dictated from notes I had jotted down on the trip at the end of each day." 11 This document 
provides a close and rare portrait of Nixon's mentality and perspectives. Unlike so many of 
his later reports, Nixon wrote this without the input of aides either in drafting or revising. It 
was for himself, not for publicity or partisanship. As such, it is particularly revealing about 
his early lessons in foreign relations.
Nixon's unofficial log documents his trip from England to the continent and then to his 
subcommittee’s assigned region. The paper reveals some basic foreign affairs principles and 
tactics that Nixon developed during his trip. It also illustrates some character traits that
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would later determine his reactions on the international tours he made during Eisenhower's 
Administration (and his own).
The Queen Mary docked in Southampton. From there, the Herter Committee 
members boarded a train to London. Once in London the group met with various members of 
the British government.12 Among them, Nixon seemed most impressed with Stafford Cripps, 
the top economic advisor for the Labor Government. Although he was generally opposed to 
the policies of Labor, Nixon mentioned two character traits displayed by Cripps that he 
admired and attempted to emulate.
First, Nixon commented that during an hour of questioning from Committee members 
Cripps responded without relying on notes or "his corps of advisors." By the time he was 
Vice President, Nixon had made speaking without notes - either off the cuff or from memory 
- a hallmark. Ignoring the advice of advisors came naturally to Nixon. As Nixon’s positions 
in the government increased in power, it became easier for him to pick and choose whose 
advice he considered. The difference was one of political position. When Nixon was a 
Congressman he listened to most offered opinions, regardless of where they originated. As 
Vice President he followed the suggestions of Adm inistration experts and his superiors, and 
less so those of his subordinates or constituents. Cripps' ability to rely only on his own 
knowledge appealed to Nixon because it showed his independence and authority. Nixon 
admitted this admiration for Cripps' style and the example probably affirmed his own 
preferences.
Even more telling was Nixon's praise for the practical and tough stance Cripps 
expressed for dealing with England's economic woes. The Englishman informed the
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Committee that" 'We will meet our export quotas in every case in which we will be able to 
take it out on the hides of the British people.'" That kind of no-nonsense statement appealed 
to the freshman Congressman. The Californian was equally impressed by the feet that Cripps 
repeated the comment to the British media.13 Given Nixon's general dislike of the press and 
his penchant for seeking the "tough" stance, the examples provided by Cripps reinforced 
similar traits in Nixon and remained integral aspects of the Nixon persona, reappearing in 
profusion later in his career. They reflected his attraction to decisiveness and unyielding need 
to lead.
While in England Nixon began another practice that became part of his foreign 
relations repertoire - a constant effort to talk to the commoners of every nation he toured. He 
explained in the report that "in order to round out a picture" one had to talk to people besides 
politicians. It was a tactic that possibly related back to his domestic campaigning style. He 
met with all comers on the campaign trail and learned the mood of the country through his 
efforts. His goal was similar in this circumstance. Thus, in England, Nixon talked with dock 
workers, farmers and shop keepers. As Vice President and President, his efforts to "reach 
the people" proved popular internationally with both press and public.
In 1947, Communism was already an important theme for the Congressman. His 
report reflected that fact. He concluded that England would never go Communist because its 
roots in democracy were so deep. But, in France he saw a greater problem. Complaining 
about the weakness of the French political structure, Nixon wrote "the Comm unists control 
the labor unions and also are the second strongest party in France, and the French government 
is plagued with the multi-party system which does not place responsibility on any political
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party." He concluded that without U.S. aid "France would undoubtedly end up with a 
totalitarian government - probably of the Communist variety."14 Nixon's anti-Communism 
remained ardent to the end of his political career.
Besides aid from the United States, the best hope for France would come from a 
strong leader with a good plan. France had the former in Charles DeGaulle. DeGaulle's 
independent nature hindered the formation of a plan. The French leader "too often acts upon 
impulse rather [sic] upon a predetermined plan which is needed by the country if it is going to 
recover." DeGaulle "refused to work with other people in developing programs for the 
country."15 Nixon's critical comments also contained an ironic element.
Without admitting it, he admired the strong leadership example. At least 
unconsciously he appreciated impulse, since he acted on his own regularly. He illustrated as 
much during the latter parts of this trip. And, the longer Nixon stayed in political office the 
more he reflected DeGaulle's refusal to work with others. He came to rely only on himself 
and a few trusted advisors.16 Like Cripps, DeGaulle's personality appealed to Nixon because 
Nixon sought to manifest those same characteristics. DeGaulle's example bolstered Nixon in 
his desire to be a man of action and a man who made his own decisions.
While Nixon failed to mention any contact with the public in France, he definitely 
moved among the German populace. As he did, Nixon revealed that not only did he seek out 
and talk to members of the public, but he also sought out adventures. Nixon's willingness - 
even desire - to take risks in foreign relations never decreased. He recognized it as a flaw in 
DeGaulle, but employed it as a model for himself.
Nixon enjoyed risk taking. He saw it as an integral part of taking action. In the field,
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he combined both by creating opportunities for exploration. He made his first unplanned 
excursion in Germany and followed it with several more in his subcommittee's region.
While other members of the Committee remained in relative isolation from the 
German people, Nixon and another Congressman obtained a guide and a driver. They 
proceeded "down into the ruins of Essen." The city was filled with people in overcrowded 
cellars, living in atrocious conditions. Nixon witnessed tuberculosis in every living quarter. 
Dresden contained similar squalor. Visiting a hospital amongst the bombed out ruins, he 
found 200 children "suffering from advanced stages of tuberculosis."17 This undoubtedly 
affected him. His brother Harold died after a long battle with TB. According to historian 
Fawn Brodie, Nixon never recovered from that traumatic loss.18 If nothing else, Nixon's 
exploration of Essen and Dresden would have made him sympathetic to Germany’s plight.
He certainly gained an intimate picture of the horrific conditions there.
Before Nixon had left the country, he gained additional reasons to support German 
aid. His notes documented his ever deepening belief in German redevelopment. As Vice 
President, he would find allies for this cause in Secretary of State Dulles and President 
Eisenhower, but in 1947 Nixon was willing to support German manufacturing alone, if 
necessary.
His advocacy arose partly because of a special briefing made to the Committee by 
General Lucius Clay, then Commander of United States Forces in Europe and Military 
Governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany. Nixon came away from that meeting firmly 
believing that "if the American taxpayers are going to get the German people and the rest of 
the people of Europe off their backs, it is essential to increase German production of
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peacetime goods." Much of Europe traditionally relied on German manufacturing and 
without it recovery could not succeed.19 Clay’s briefing reinforced Nixon's support for the 
Marshall plan. It also helped cement Nixon's unwavering defense of foreign aid. He had 
concluded that such aid improved America’s prestige and influence, while reducing potential 
Communist advances.
From Germany, Nixon's subcommittee traveled to Italy. In Rome, Nixon and his 
three subcommittee colleagues used the U.S. embassy as a base camp. From there, the 
Congressmen took reconnaissance trips through their assigned regions, Italy, Trieste and 
Greece. Nixon began his discourse with Greece.
In Greece, Nixon's report took on a new level of detail and analysis. His 
subcommittee's responsibility for the region undoubtedly led him to report in greater depth 
than England, France or Germany. He concentrated on Communist influence there, relating 
his first meeting with Communist operatives, in a foreign country. He continued to interview 
peasants, managed another adventure and talked with Greek government officials. Nixon's 
commentary on his experiences provides an excellent view of his solidifying foreign policy 
beliefs and tactics.
As in Germany, the Committee had the benefit of a briefing by the resident expert. 
Nixon excluded this conversation from his personal report, but the minutes, presented in a 
memo, retell what happened at that meeting. Nixon's mindset going into the briefing was 
highlighted by an exchange between himself and staff consultant L. J. Cromie. Cromie 
asserted that a Communist take over in Greece would cause a "political chain reaction against 
the United States . . . should the United States fail to live up to its moral commitment to
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defend Greek independence and territorial integrity." Nixon asked "whether there would be 
any difference between our 'moral failure' to protect Greece and our 'moral failure' to protect 
the countries of eastern Europe now integrated into or dominated by the Soviet Union." To 
this Cromie replied that leaving aside moral questions different political consequences arose 
from "being obliged to recognize a fait accompli . . . and the weakness that would be implied 
by relinquishing something we hold to the adversary."20
The exchange illustrated several things about Cromie and Nixon. First, Cromie 
revealed he was not a politician. Nixon identified "moral” as the defining word in Cromie's 
statement, but as the response indicates, Cromie used the term loosely. He wanted to 
emphasize the serious repercussions to not halting Communism. Nixon’s response pointed to 
his political training. He put Cromie on the defensive, probably not maliciously, but by 
instinct. His questioning of U.S. moral failure in Eastern Europe reflected his partisanship. 
The loss of that region could be blamed on the Democrats.
Cromie clarified the stakes for Nixon, when he realized his poor word choice. He 
dismissed the moral issue as a means of analyzing the Communist threat and instead 
concentrated on the political cost of additional losses. Nixon's question stands in interesting 
contrast to his later statements, which have a tone similar to Cromie's answer. And, it is safe 
to conclude that Cromie’s argument convinced Nixon of the dangerous situation in Greece.
The conversation showed Nixon shifting from his political side to his developing international 
mantle. He would learn to integrate the two more smoothly before much longer.
After Cromie’s warning, the subcommittee ventured away from Athens "and to the 
north of the country where the fighting is going on between the Greek government and the
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guerrillas." Not satisfied with getting close to the area controlled by guerrilla forces, Nixon 
and Congressman James Richards flew to Fiorina, a town on the Yugoslav border,
"completely surrounded by guerrillas." In comparison to Essen, this adventure proved for 
more exciting. Before reaching the ground the danger had begun. Their Greek pilot expected 
to land his twin engine Douglas airplane on a 2,500 foot runway. Both Nixon and Richards 
were sure the plane needed 32,000 [sic] feet to stop. With all assurances the Greek 
successfully brought the plane down.21 Once safely on the ground, Nixon and Richards began 
interviewing local officials, captured guerrillas and town residents. His experiences in 
Fiorina would influence his perception of Communists and his reactions to Communism for 
all future confrontations.
In Fiorina, Nixon learned that Communist propaganda portrayed the guerrillas as 
nationalists fighting for a democratic Greece. One captured soldier told Nixon that the 
guerrillas were being supplied by the "democratic" countries of Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria. 
His leaders claimed they would be fighting soon side by side with Russians to conquer the 
United States and Great Britain.22 These deceptive and manipulative tactics fit extremely well 
into Nixon's own image of Communist operatives. Nixon also heard the story of a woman 
who claimed Communist guerrillas had "sliced off her left breast when she refused to tell 
them where her brother was hiding."23 Whether or not the story was true, Nixon recorded it 
as fact. This type of barbarism surely disgusted Nixon and increased his hatred and distrust 
of Communism.
Analyzing his observations, Nixon concluded that Greece could be saved simply by 
taking action. He advised that "if the United Nations were to step in and assume the
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responsibility of policing the Greek border and keeping out help from Communist dominated 
Albania and Yugoslavia for the guerrillas, that the Greek Army would dispose of the guerrilla 
situation in Greece within a matter of weeks." His optimism was based on the proposition 
that by eliminating Communist demagoguery and intervention, Greek inclinations toward 
democratic ideals would reassert themselves. He continued "It is only the support from the 
outside which is being received by guerrilla forces that allows them to disrupt the entire 
recovery program of Greece, which the United States, of course, is financing." He was 
confident that "this is simply another case when the Communists by force are attempting to 
impose upon the people of a country the system of government which they are unable to 
impose upon them legally through ballot."24
Nixon's conclusions applied to every comer of the world. A firm supporter of 
containment, his Greek adventure reiterated the basic soundness of that policy in an extremely 
personal way. He saw first hand how Communists operated. Action, definite and direct, 
would solve the problems. This was a formula Nixon called upon again and again.
Italy and Trieste also were important markers in Nixon's lessons on how to deal with 
Communists. With the headquarters for the subcommittee in Rome, Nixon was able to spend 
enough time there to do some in-depth research. He arranged for interviews with many of the 
top political leaders of Italy, Communist and otherwise. These were Nixon's first recorded 
debates with leading members of the Communist party, and he made the best of the 
opportunities.
The Congressman from California interviewed three high ranking Communists party 
leaders in Italy. Umberto Terricini, according to Nixon, held a position parallel to Joseph
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Martin's (Speaker of the House). Terricini wore "the red flag of Moscow in the button hole 
of his coat and significantly enough, his beautiful office was decorated in red velvet." Nixon 
missed the irony of referring to the office as beautiful, then hinting its color implied a 
Com m unist affiliation. He noted Terricini was suave and smooth, the "brain of the Italian 
Com m unist Party." In Terricini, Nixon saw a formidable opponent positively tied to Russia, 
as evidenced by the pin.
Nixon next described Palmiro Togliatti, head of the CP in Italy. Togliatti exiled 
himself to Moscow during Mussolini’s reign. He used nationalism to win adherents by 
linking the Communist party to the nineteenth century Italian hero Garibaldi.25 At an 
adversarial level Nixon probably admired Togliatti's clever methods, and may have taken note 
of them so as to be able to react to such tactics later. He observed these same tactics 
repeatedly during his career, including among the Greek Communists who also displayed an 
aptitude for misrepresentation.
The third Communist whom Nixon interviewed was Giuseppe De Vittorio. This 
meeting was the most notable of the three, assuming Nixon's more detailed account of the 
event is an indication of the importance he placed on it. In some ways, it was a precursor to 
the famous kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev. At the meeting Nixon and De Vittorio 
verbally sparred about the merits of their respective political credos.26 The exchange appealed 
to Nixon's self-created tough guy image and to his desire to learn more about Communist  
thought.
Nixon first asked his adversary "what kind of government he favored in relationship to 
the labor unions in Italy." De Vittorio replied he preferred one that gave the right to strike.
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Nixon retorted that this described the United States, but not the Soviet Union. De Vittorio, 
according to Nixon's account, responding with a doctrinal diatribe. He claimed U.S. workers 
had to "obtain rights from the Capitalist reactionaries and employers" and thus needed to 
strike to gain anything, but Soviets were not capitalistic and so had no need to strike. De 
Vittorio also explained, in response to further questions from Nixon, that U.S. foreign policy 
was imperialistic because of Capitalism. He reapplied the reasoning about strikes stating that, 
lacking Capitalists, Russia's foreign policy could not be imperialistic. However, when Nixon 
countered the arguments, De Vittorio complained that "the gentleman and I are not speaking 
the same language." While probably the literal truth, figuratively the Italian meant he and 
Nixon did not see eye to eye. That was the only point on which the two politicians agreed. 
Nixon gained from this conversation lessons he would never forget.
First, the inflexibility of Communist dogma did not escape Nixon. De Vittorio 
rejected any position that did not support his own. The only result of such a conversation 
could be disagreement. The next time Nixon debated a high ranking Communist, he did so in 
public. At least then the audience might be swayed, since the Communist would not be.
Nixon came away from the experience having no doubts about a Communist's 
allegiance. Analyzing the discussion Nixon wrote "From this conversation it can be seen that 
the Italian Communist, despite his protestations of loyalty to his own country in the event of a 
struggle of that country and Russia would be bound to be on the side of the Communist 
country, because by definition the foreign policy of the Communist country is always right 
and the foreign policy of a non-Communist country is always wrong in the eyes of the 
Communist." Nixon provided further proof by claiming he had had an identical conversation
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in Great Britain with a member of the miners' union. This was enough evidence to convince 
him that Moscow controlled international Communism.27 The inflexibility of their doctrine 
kept Communist operatives in line.
In Rome Nixon gained important experience in verbally confronting Communists. He 
expanded his intellectual understanding of Communism. Trieste, the third region assigned to 
the subcommittee, presented Nixon with a physical understanding. There he encountered, 
first hand, the violence of their aggression.
Nixon performed a bit of deception in making Trieste the final section of his report.
He placed it after the discussion of Greece and Italy, when he actually visited Trieste before 
Greece and possibly before his Italian encounters.28 But, Nixon's experiences in Trieste were 
far more dramatic and potentially dangerous than in Italy or even Greece - as he told the 
story. A politician and showman, he probably saved the best for the last. Even though this 
report was never made public and there is no evidence the document circulated among more 
than a few close associates, Nixon wanted to present the events in the most enticing order. In 
Trieste, Nixon experienced his first taste of Communist inspired mob rioting and his first 
images of the people who instigated it. If the De Vittorio escapade was a precursor to the 
kitchen debate, Trieste was the pilot for Lima, Peru and Caracas, Venezuela.
Nixon's party arrived in Trieste on Wednesday, September 17. As he settled into his 
hotel room, Nixon heard a commotion outside. The Californian claimed that, looking out the 
window, he saw a parade of 500 people waving red flags and singing the International. They 
gave a clenched fist salute to "Moscow" as they passed the Communist Party Headquarters, 
adjacent to the subcommittee's hotel.
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Nixon, the risk taker, could not resist this opportunity. He reported "Immediately, 
two of us obtained an Italian interpreter and went down into the street to see what the 
situation was. Just as we reached the street we heard an explosion at the end of the block." 
According to Nixon’s account, the explosion was a hand grenade tossed from the second story 
window of the Communist HQ. It landed amongst a group forming to protest the Communist 
parade. Now a young man of about 20 was dead, his head blown off by the explosion. In the 
street Nixon saw a pool of blood.
As he made his way toward the town square, residents became more aggressive. "We 
moved up on the street with the crowd and by this time it was getting out of hand. People 
were gesticulating wildly shouting at the top of their voices and gathering at the town square." 
As the rioting and violence continued through the night, 5 people died and 75 were wounded. 
The Communist instigated demonstration illustrated their inhumanity. This became more 
evident when Nixon witnessed a large CP member run down a 75 year old woman, while 
being pursued by the police.29 In such an atmosphere, Nixon gained a new appreciation for 
the violent methods of Communists and the warlike battle that had to be fought for the 
survival of Democracy. His dramatic retelling portrayed his courage and impressed its reader 
with the gravity of the situation.
Nixon's repon of the explosive events in Trieste was frightening. He intended it that 
way. The veracity of his report, however, comes into question after examining his 
handwritten notes, made just after the incident. His notes made no mention of many of the 
details he included in his report. The location of the Communist headquarters, paraders 
carrying red flags and singing the International, the clenched fist salute and the physical
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description of the head blown off, were not written down at the time.30 It is impossible to 
know whether he fabricated these details or simply remembered them while rereading his 
comments. But, because these details add much of the drama to Nixon’s story, one cannot 
help but suspect he embellished events to some extent. His penchant for manipulating facts, 
apparent later in his career, probably had a place in this story.
However embellished this report was, additional evidence corroborates that Nixon did 
not fabricate the entire adventure in Trieste. After the committee returned to the United 
States, the chairman of Nixon's subcommittee, Thomas Jenkins (R-OH), created gag 
stationery with the heading Jenkins Raiders. Nixon was listed on the left margin as a 
commando. On the right edge, under engagements, Jenkins included "Nixon's Charge, 
Trieste."31 That accolade supported Nixon's claim of running from his hotel into the mob 
filled street.
From either version of the events - notes or report - Nixon would draw the same 
conclusions about the Communist menace and the dangers it posed to the free world. He had 
witnessed distressing violence in Trieste. Not surprisingly, he applied and refined the lessons 
learned from these experiences again and again.
Nixon's party spent several days in Trieste, then returned to Italy. After his visit to 
Greece, the group traveled to Paris. From Paris, the subcommittee flew to London and on 
October 4 all the Herter Committee members boarded the Queen Mary and sailed back toward 
the United States. The entire European journey took over a month.32 In that rime Nixon's 
opinions about Communism were confirmed and his foreign affairs experience expanded. As 
a bonus, he made the acquaintance of intelligence expert Allen Dulles, a contact that would
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prove to be extremely important to his future.
Historian Fawn Brodie admitted Nixon became "something of an internationalist" 
because of this trip. She claimed that Nixon's primary concern remained containment of the 
Communists and that he saw the Marshall Plan as the best means to that end.33 The report 
supported Brodie's conclusion, since it concentrated on the Communist threat and revealed 
Russia's influence in Europe. Concurrently and contradictorily, Nixon’s report also down 
played the Communist threat. In that respect it showed his true concern for humanitarian 
issues, especially with Germany. This juxtaposition of Communism and social issues 
remained a constant with Nixon. Communism was important, but Nixon consistently 
examined the grassroots side also. His political instincts attracted him to themes that stirred 
public interest.
During the trip, he remarked on the improbability of England, Germany and Greece 
going Communist, regardless of how terrible conditions became. Upon his return from 
Europe, he concluded that Italy was almost out of danger. He found danger in Trieste, but 
remarked "in free elections [they] have overwhelmingly voted against a Communist form of 
government." With firmness Trieste would survive. Only in France was the "danger of 
Communist domination of the country . . .  a great one." France also had the best chance of 
recovery because of its near self-sufficiency.34 That raised the possibility of Communist  
influence, since a recovery independent of U.S. supervision opened doors to non-democratic 
infiltration.
Despite Nixon's concerns about Communism in Europe, a careful analysis of the 
report revealed a de facto acceptance that Western Europe was relatively safe from Red
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domination. Also, whatever level of concern he maintained about Europe's freedom, it was 
not so great as to eclipse his distress about Europe's plight. Nixon did not ignore the 
hardship and need.
The Congressman made numerous sympathetic remarks about the destruction in 
Europe, and especially the physical devastation of Germany. He expressed his disgust at the 
hunger in each country and the lack of material goods. In Essen, he retold how 
Representative Edward Eugene Cox (R-GA), who "had never previously been noted for being 
particularly emotional" gave clothing, soap and candy to the children he met by the train.
Cox said he could not help himself. Nixon described a woman in Verona whose child 
suffered from rickets. She had no fuel to heat her house. When Nixon asked what they did 
in the winter she replied, "'We go to bed."'35 Nixon did not paint an appealing picture.
At the same time, the Communist issues were not ignored. Nixon did not justify the 
Marshall Plan only on humanitarian grounds. He saw the tremendous need in Europe as an 
opportunity which Communist infiltrators sought to exploit. He wrote in an article in the 
Spring of 1948, "The only chance for the forces of Communism to succeed in their attempt to 
dominate the still free peoples of Europe and Asia is for the United States to discontinue its 
aid program. Communism thrives on misery, hunger and desperation, and where a political 
vacuum exists the Communists are there. . . ."36 There was an unspoken confidence that 
Western Europe was safe from Communist rule. There was also the explicit warning that 
U.S. aid had to continue to maintain that security.
Nixon's post trip correspondence concentrated on Communist threats, rather than the 
humanitarian needs. The former was a political issue, much harder to predict and control
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than the tangible flow of supplies and food to Europe. Communist aggression required 
constant counter-action. Humanitarian aid did not. This mail represented the final element in 
Nixon's foreign trip methodology - the follow-up. As with any campaign, after the vote was 
in, a series of letters went out discussing any outstanding details and rehashing the issues. 
Probably because he stayed at the US embassy in Rome, his messages were limited to a few 
foreign service officers stationed in Italy. In subsequent years, his post-trip correspondence 
significantly increased.
The most informal advice came from a woman identified only as Rosette R. She must 
have been associated with the foreign service, since she wrote on foreign service stationery. 
Her comments sound whimsical, as though she were attracted to the young Congressman.
She bade him not to think her a revolutionary, because she was just teasing some, "though I 
still hold the opinion that certain things like the danger of Communism in Italy are very much 
exaggerated. "37 Nixon read the letter, but did not answer her. Or if Nixon replied, a copy 
did not end up in the files. Despite this, evidence suggests he agreed with her conclusions.
Rosette's second letter lacked the playful tone of the first. She held to the notion that 
Communist Party influence had waned in Italy. As she saw it, those who had joined the party 
now discovered that the Communists would not fulfill their promises of reform. Young and 
moderate members were leaving the CP as they became increasingly disillusioned.38 Nixon 
seems not to have answered this letter either. In both, however, Rosette provided a 
moderate's view of the situation in Italy. More analytical, the second memo contained a 
perspective Nixon could not ignore. Her themes paralleled Nixon's later conclusions. 
Communist  deceptions could not be concealed indefinitely. Rosette believed they were being
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discovered in 1947.
The Congressman also maintained a brief correspondence with Foreign Service 
officer, J. Wesley Jones. Before leaving Rome, Nixon had asked for biographical sketches of 
the top ten Italian government officials - several of whom Nixon had met. On October 14, 
Jones satisfied Nixon's request. It is difficult to know whether Nixon had made more or less 
of an impression on Jones than he had on Rosette R. Jones opened his memo "Dear Nick," 
which was either a typo or a reference to Nixon's Navy nickname.39
Whichever, five weeks later Nixon asked Jones to confirm his own opinion on Italy. 
"The recent disturbances in Italy have been very interesting to all of us who were there and, 
in my opinion, indicate that the Communists realize they are defeated and are simply making 
a last ditch stand. If your opinion is otherwise I would appreciate your dropping me a note to 
that effect."40 Nixon did not mention Rosette R.'s comments - also made during November - 
but his message contained the essence of her conclusions. Italian Communism was on the 
decline.
Why Nixon chose to discuss this with Jones, and not Rosette, can be surmised. First, 
the gender discrimination of the time made it probable that Jones held a higher position in the 
embassy than Rosette. Nixon's practice was to consult with the upper echelon whenever 
possible.
Also, his reply to Jones alone implied he did not fully trust Rosette’s analysis. Brodie 
claimed that Nixon was hostile to women who spoke out, were adept at politics or who went 
beyond their accepted station, as he defined it. "The women Nixon openly resented were 
those gifted at attack."41 He could easily interpret Rosette's comments as an attack. She
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offered an opinion with which he must have disagreed, at some point. Why else would she 
begin by defending herself as not a revolutionary? Added to that was the apparent flirtatious 
nature of the first note. One can assume that for Nixon, Rosette's opinions did not carry the 
same weight as those of Jones.
While Nixon failed to respond to Rosette's comments, he nonetheless adopted her 
conclusions. Communism could not represent a tremendous threat, if the Italian CP was 
disintegrating. In December, Nixon received a final confirmation of Italy’s safety from 
Henry Tasca, a senior Foreign Service officer. Tasca commended the speed with which 
Congress had approved interim aid and jubilantly reported "the Italian picture shows 
considerable signs of vitality and ability to resist Communist violence. . . . "  Tasca attributed 
his optimism also to the Truman Doctrine which was "making Moscow think twice before 
ordering its Italian wing to go into action."42 For partisan reasons, Nixon may not have 
agreed with Tasca's praise of the doctrine, but Tasca did end at the same point as Nixon - 
democracy would prevail over Communism. Tasca also confirmed the Congressman's 
conclusion that humanitarian relief could counteract Communist propaganda.
Nixon's communication with Foreign Service officials recalls his unending search to 
increase his knowledge. He studied prior to the trip and continued to educate himself 
following it. By the time of his vice-presidency, international relations education like this had 
become an ongoing occupation. In 1947, it exposed him to a subject he found intriguing and 
exciting.
Nixon's report carries with it an aura of relative inexperience, naivet6 and youth. It is 
unlike any official paper he wrote after this trip, being both less formal and less dogmatic.
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Through his comments, Nixon unintentionally revealed some of his infamous character traits. 
He appreciated action, risks and toughness. He also hinted at an already developed distrust of 
the media. More importantly, the nature of this document allows a rare glimpse at the 
dawning of Nixon's foreign relations interest and the formation of his tactics.
Visiting Europe as a member of the Herter Committee he quickly established a 
regimen he followed on all subsequent trips abroad. In many ways, this formula mimicked 
his campaigning tactics. He met with countless people, including government officials and 
commoners. He debated his opponents by confronting Communist sympathizers. He took 
bold actions, going on adventures where ever he could.
The trip also gave Nixon first hand experience with Communism. From his exploits 
in Greece, Italy and Trieste, Nixon developed his conclusions about Communist infiltration, 
methods and operatives. He integrated those components into his foreign policy philosophy. 
The Communist threat attracted him to international relations.
Nixon's next extended exposure to foreign relations would not come until he joined 
the Eisenhower Administration. In the meantime, he returned to his congressional duties.
But, he did not leave the foreign arena all together. Instead, he built his reputation among 
international affairs experts in the Republican party.
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Service Democrats.
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Chapter 2:
An Uncommon Bond - Nixon Dulles Relations
Nixon's initial attraction to foreign relations was personal. He enjoyed travel, he 
appreciated the challenges and he adored the attention. But, the Congressman soon began to 
consider international relations in professional terms, as well. He developed contacts on the 
Herter Committee which he maintained and expanded to eventually include Eisenhower's 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Nixon and Dulles would become close Mends after 
1953, but their initial contact predated the Eisenhower presidency. The two had met and 
consulted in 1948. In fact, Foster Dulles probably recognized who the Representative from 
California was even before their first meeting. Dulles’ younger brother Allen had been a 
consultant to the Herter Committee, the previous year. He and Nixon became Mendly during 
the trip. Since the Dulles brothers frequently talked, it would be reasonable to assume that 
Allen mentioned the young Congressman to Foster.
During the Second World War, Allen pursued a successful career in the Office of 
Strategic Services. After the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, however, he 
resigned. Dulles family biographer Leonard Mosley claimed that Allen left because the 
Democratic administration would not allow him to retain a position in the CIA that reflected 
his accomplishments and experience. Despite his exclusion from the CIA, Allen maintained 
contacts in the intelligence community by taking advantage of any opportunities he had for
37
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European travel. According to Mosley, Allen used his status as Herter Committee advisor to 
join the Congressmen on the Queen Mary. Once on the continent, he could refresh his 
European associations. Allen's presense was especially suspicious because the trip itinerary 
listed him as a "home consultant," implying he might brief the Congressmen before they 
embarked, but probably would not travel with them.1
Mosley noted that Allen and Nixon became close friends during the trip.2 Nixon made 
no mention of his new familiarity with Allen in his report or notes, but then Allen probably 
did not accompany Nixon, while in Europe. He did not specialize in Nixon’s subcommittee 
region. More likely, Nixon and Allen struck up an easy repartee during the cruises to and 
from Great Britain. The Queen Mary took about seven days to cross the Atlantic Ocean.3 
That provided them with two weeks to become well acquainted. Their friendship continued 
after the trip. And, in time, it expanded to include Foster Dulles.
Taking advantage of his acquaintance with Allen, Nixon initiated a relationship with 
Foster. The two corresponded intermitently after the Herter trip. Nixon immediately 
recognized the utility of connecting his name and Dulles'. Dulles held an influential position 
among Republicans and stood as heir apparent to head the State Department. On June 2,
1948 Dulles wrote the Representative about supporting legislation Nixon was associated with 
- probably the Nixon-Mundt bill. "I was a little bit embarrassed by the press handling of my 
letter to you, particularly in Oregon, where headlines apparently gave the impression that I 
had unqualifiedly endorsed the Bill in every particular."4 Chances are Nixon planted the 
notion that Dulles whole heartedly supported his bill by referring to the letter. Dulles' note 
mentioned at least one previous letter to Nixon and implied a response from Nixon. Dulles
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and Nixon were not total strangers when they met for their first documented face to face 
conversation on August 11, 1948.
This initial consultation concerned the Hiss Case. As a member of the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Nixon listened to the testimony of Whittaker 
Chambers, a self-acknowledged former Communist party member. Chambers accused the 
respected foreign relations expert Alger Hiss of pre-World War II espionage against America. 
After hearing secret testimony given by Chambers, Nixon wanted to pursue the case in 
earnest. But, before he followed this instinct, he asked for a meeting with John Foster 
Dulles. Dulles chaired the Carnegie Endowment, a foreign policy think tank that employed 
Alger Hiss. Nixon sought Dulles' blessing, particularly because Hiss had asked Dulles for a 
letter of support in regard to the HU AC case.5 Nixon did not want to upset or embarrass 
Dulles.
On that second Wednesday of August, Nixon met Foster Dulles in Manhattan's 
Roosevelt Hotel. The meeting included several of their mutual acquaintances. When Nixon 
arrived, he found along with Foster, brother Allen, Christian Herter and New York Banker, 
Douglas Dillon (appointed Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration).6 
Whether Nixon knew Dillon cannot be determined, but he did know Allen, Herter and Foster. 
These four men formulated much of the Republican international relations platform.
Nixon made a good impression on Foster by carefully and methodically presenting his 
evidence against Hiss. Dulles valued a well defended argument. A few years later an 
Assistant Secretary of State noted "if he [Dulles] determined that you could hold your own, 
then he would permit you to say anything you wanted to, without any real dressing down or
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embarrassment. "7 Nixon held his own. By the end of the meeting he had the group's support 
for an in-depth investigation of Hiss' Communist connections. The Hiss trial introduced 
Dulles to Nixon's style and gave Nixon a prominence he previously had not had. Nixon’s 
career benefited from both factors.
In Six Crises Nixon claimed that the Hiss case, as his first major political crisis, taught 
him an important lesson. "I would never forget that where the battle against Communism is 
concerned, victories are never final so long as the Communists are still able to fight. There is 
never a time when it is safe to relax or let down. When you have won a battle is the time 
when you should step up your effort to win another - until final victory is achieved."8 Nixon 
would press his advantage.
Of course, Nixon had actually adopted this perspective as a Herter Committee 
member. The Hiss case simply reiterated and reinforced his conclusions. The debate with 
De Vittorio, and conversations with Greek guerrillas, had illustrated the necessity for constant 
vigilance. The dangers in France and Trieste revealed the importance of a strong defense and 
an active offense. The Hiss case, while important in bringing Nixon to greater prominence in 
the political scene, did little to further his foreign relations career. In that respect, the more 
important effect of the case was his personal introduction to the future Secretary of State.
From this first meeting, Nixon recognized Dulles' expertise and ability. Dulles 
presented the younger man with an opportunity for further education and access to powerful 
people. Nixon pursued these avenues, while maintaining deference and loyalty to the man 
who accepted the role of patron.
Building on the positive impression he had made, Nixon made it a point to keep Dulles
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informed on the HUAC proceedings against Hiss. On September 7, he sent Dulles two letters 
pertaining to the case, one general and the other specific. First, Nixon had to maintain 
Dulles’ confidence. In the general letter he answered Democratic charges that the espionage 
hearings were a "red herring." He stated Elizabeth Bentley was a viable witness, despite 
questions about the veracity of her testimony and claimed Truman should "forget politics and 
. . . cooperate with the Congress in getting the Communists out of the government." The 
second letter appealed to Dulles’ prediction for the law. It could have been the closing 
argument against Hiss. Nixon explained the latest testimony in the case and asked Dulles to 
reconsider Hiss’ position on the Carnegie Endowment.9 His effort to keep Dulles informed 
about the trial recognized Dulles' position as a top ranking Republican. From these contacts a 
foundation on which the two Republicans built stronger ties was created.
Even after the Republican candidate for president, Thomas Dewey, lost the 1948 
presidential election - ending Dulles’ immediate chance to be Secretary of State - Nixon 
continued to provide Dulles with information about the trial. At the end of 1948, he sent 
Dulles a transcript of the espionage hearings with the noteworthy sections underlined.10 At 
the year's end, Hiss was indicted on two counts of perjury. The indictments ended Nixon's 
main excuse to write to Dulles and a year long lapse in correspondence followed.
Undoubtedly, in 1949 they had some inter-action but it was not documented.
That year proved a particularly busy one for Dulles. Dewey, then governor of New 
York, offered Senator Robert Wagner's seat in Congress to Dulles. Near the end of his term, 
Wagner had resigned because of poor health. Dulles reluctantly agreed to take the position 
for the six remaining weeks, but made no commitment to run for the seat that Fall. Dulles
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wanted a position that allowed him to work on international relations, not legislative 
jockeying. But, once in Washington, he changed his mind. Although a freshman Senator, 
Dulles immediately spoke on the floor - in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Senate 
gave him a public forum to discuss international affairs. With the help of Dewey's political 
advisors, he tried to retain Wagner's seat. It was to no avail. His opponent, Herbert 
Lehman, won the election."
While Dulles tried his hand in the Senate, Nixon continued his activities in the House. 
He worked diligently on HUAC and attended to other House duties. His responsibilities kept 
him busy. With both men members of Congress, it is probable they communicated less 
formally than by letter.
As such, it was not until February 1950 that Dulles sent Nixon another letter. While 
they had left no record of contact in 1949, Dulles had been watching Nixon. He wrote on the 
heels of Hiss' perjury convictions: "I often think of our long talk together at the Hotel 
Roosevelt and I think that the result justifies your perseverance in this matter."12 Nixon 
welcomed Dulles' support. About to run for retiring Senator Sheridan Downey's seat,
Dulles' compliment could only bolster Nixon's confidence. Although the compliment might 
have been pro-forma, it also reflected Nixon's rising star. The young Representative's 
success earned him respect and influence in the Republican party.
Nixon campaigned against Helen Gahagan Douglas for the seat and won. Soon after 
the victory, Dulles took time from his now full schedule - he was negotiating the Japanese 
Peace Treaty - to contact Nixon. Again Dulles recalled the Hiss case and complimented 
Nixon. His formal letter of November 15 opened: "Dear Mr. Nixon: I am delighted at your
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4 3
election to the United States Senate." Dulles expressed his regret that he could not personally 
welcome Nixon into the Senate chamber, but noted "I recall very well your sound and sober 
judgments as a member of the Committee on Un-American activities and am very happy that 
this will now be available in the Senate." Nixon had made an indelible impression on Dulles 
at the Roosevelt Hotel, and with his subsequent prospectution of Hiss. Dulles' repeated 
compliments indicate that he respected and admired the Californian. His letters foreshadowed 
the later decision to take Nixon under his wing.
The Nixon-Dulles communications lapsed yet again after this note. Through most of 
1951 Dulles was either negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, or arranging for its 
international and domestic support. Not until March 20, 1952 did the Senate ratify the treaty 
and provide Dulles with an opportunity to send Truman his resignation. The day before the 
vote, Nixon confirmed with his collegue William Knowland that General McArthur approved 
of the treaty. Knowland claimed, when he asked McArthur if he would vote for Dulles' 
treaty, the general replied, "’I would."' This convinced Nixon to vote yea on the treaty.13 
By then, the Republican party was gearing up for the 1952 presidential campaign. Dulles and 
Nixon crossed paths once more as both became involved in the election.
During 1952, Nixon and Dulles formed a more personal association. They wrote to 
each other repeatedly about campaign issues and tactics. The most interesting aspect of these 
letters was not the topics discussed, but the increasing geniality of relations. Previously, 
Dulles and Nixon had carried on a stiff and formal correspondence. By January 1952, Nixon 
addressed his notes to "Foster" instead of Mr. Dulles and signed them Dick or Rich. Dulles, 
accordingly, began to respond "Dear Richard" and, within several months, "Dear Dick."14
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Their increased contact reflected their expanding roles in the campaign, as well as Nixon’s 
efforts to court the man who would likely be Secretary of State. This increased contact 
further paved the way for Dulles’ patronage of the Vice President. Nixon reciprocated 
Dulles' earlier praise with notes complimenting Dulles on speeches. He asked for a copy of 
the talk Dulles delivered at the National Conference of Christians and Jews because "I would 
like to have the views of a man I respect as an expert!" Nixon did not over exaggerate his 
respect, but at the same time he clearly fed Dulles' ego.15
The solidifying relations were not only a result of Nixon's efforts. Roderic O'Connor, 
one of Dulles’ top State Department assistants, claimed that Dulles was intrigued by political 
power. It was what attracted him to Eisenhower. By extension, Dulles would have been 
attracted to Nixon. Nixon had used his exposure on HU AC and his monumental efforts for 
the party to climb the rungs of the Republican party with amazing speed.16 If Dulles wanted 
to watch a master political strategist at work - and a self-promoter - Nixon was the man.
Hence, by 1952, Nixon’s interest in Dulles was mirrored by Dulles’ interest in Nixon. 
They pursued each other in hopes of developing a stronger relationship for their own 
individual self-interest. In the process each profited, creating by the end of Ike's first 
Administration an almost symbiotic relationship, in which each man manipulated and was 
manipulated, largely to the benefit of both.
The Nixon-Dulles correspondence prior to Eisenhower's election was intermittent, at 
best. It tended to center on official and mundane topics and therefore does not reveal a great 
deal about their relationship between 1949 and 1953. Yet, it does illustrate their interest in 
one another and a growing mutual respect. They were not close before the Eisenhower
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Administration, but these few letters show that each had a working knowledge of the other 
and sought to maintain a positive impression. Their limited association in the late forties and 
early fifties provided them with a good basis for the ensuing close interaction during Ike's 
presidency.
Richard Nixon's role in the Eisenhower Administration was dichotomous. He was, 
without question, the most well informed, involved Vice President America had seen to that 
time (and possibly since). Concurrently, he was excluded from Eisenhower's inner circle of 
advisors. Ike failed to consult with the VP about priority policy options, except in terms of 
domestic political consequences. Furthermore, despite his status as outsider, Nixon managed 
to obtain inside information. He developed a means of breaching the closed circle through his 
increasingly close association with John Foster Dulles. Dulles aide, John Hanes, once 
commented that his boss was an expert in diplomatic negotiations, but a novice at cocktail 
party small talk. Hanes said Dulles "was a very shy man in private. . . . [who] was not good 
in light conversation. . . .  He had trouble relating to people not of his generation, especially 
those who lacked his experience in foreign relations."17 Nixon shared Dulles’ discomfort with 
small talk. And, because of his unfailing interest in foreign relations, he proved the exception 
to the generational rule.
Nixon and Dulles formed a strong bond during the Administration, despite the twenty 
five year age difference. In 1953, they began regularly consulting each other on a bevy of 
official subjects including speeches, post assigments and legislation. More than that, in a city 
where neither man had many close associates, they formed a strong friendship. Dulles shared 
with Nixon information on U.S. policy toward its allies, enemies and neutrals and updated
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Nixon on summit negotiations. During crises like Quemoy and Matsu, Suez and Sputnik, the 
Vice President turned directly to Dulles for his briefings. By consulting with and advising the 
Secretary, Nixon gained an influence on Administration decisions.
While the Nixon-Dulles relationship has not been closely examined by scholars, some 
historians have delved into the post-election period and noted Nixon's appreciation for Dulles. 
They universally concluded that Nixon respected the Secretary. He considered Dulles, not 
Ike, the foreign relations expert of the Administration and worked to learn from the master. 
Nixon acted as his un-official advisor/assistant, in Herbert Parmet's words, "as an adjunct to 
the Secretary of State, doing those things that Dulles thought he should not do for himself." 
While Nixon served as Dulles’ alter-ego, Dulles served as Nixon's informant. But, none of 
this interaction could have been possible, had Nixon and Dulles not discovered early on that 
they shared many interests and from these commonalities forged their relationship.
Historian Stephen Ambrose pointed out that Nixon had few close friends in Congress 
or the Cabinet "except for Dulles, with whom he continued to exchange almost daily calls and 
often visited at home for a late-night drink or a weekend meal." When they had the chance 
Mr. and Mrs. Nixon liked to join the Secretary and his wife for a relaxed dinner. Dick and 
Foster shared family news with each other and talked sports together. Nixon might invite 
Dulles to join him for a New York Yankees baseball game. While Dick left Pat at home, 
Foster usually brought Janet to the game.18
Nixon consistently claimed Dulles as one of his closest friends in the Eisenhower 
Administration. In Six Crises, he referred to Dulles as "one of my warmest friends and 
supporters in government." Twenty five years later Nixon still maintained "he was closer to
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John Foster Dulles than to any other member of the cabinet."19 While Nixon and Dulles grew 
significantly closer in 1955, as a result of their consultation immediately after Eisenhower’s 
heart attack, they had formed a definite friendship during the preceding two years.20
Their relationship was built on similar beliefs and working styles. Both men studied 
hard to prepare for overseas trips. They read and reread briefing books and situation papers. 
They listened to oral briefings with great care and interest. And, they processed every scrap 
of information with calculated efficiency. Dulles and Nixon were ardent anti-Communist 
crusaders, fully steeped in the Cold War ideology. They believed that America could only 
persevere if its policy-makers refused to submit to the Soviets. A tough stance would keep 
the Communists in line. At the same time, both men wanted to keep their options open for as 
long as possible. Closed doors were difficult to reopen, and they saw no reason to limit the 
direction in which they might next move.21 Both men had a drive for power that made them 
crave the wrangling so prevalent in politics and diplomacy. It was a lifestyle for which, 
incidentally, their respective wives harbored serious misgivings.22
The expanding relationship between Nixon and Dulles can be traced through an 
examination of their respective letters during the Eisenhower Administration. The bulk of 
this correspondence consists of congratulatory notes and general praise of each other's 
accomplishments. However, enough of the documents illustrate the Nixon-Dulles 
consultation, shared perspective and genuine mutual concern, to gain an understanding of how 
these men related to one another.23 I will leave it to the next chapter to examine how they 
manipulated each other.
Dulles was not content to rely on providence to expand his relations with Nixon.
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Taking advantage of Nixon's eargemess, the Secretary of State regularly assigned three duties 
to his prot£g£. All ensured Nixon an increased role, but also served a purpose for Dulles. 
First, Dulles sometimes asked Nixon to help meet or entertain foreign dignitaries. In 
addition, he used Nixon to support his positions in meetings, the Administration and on 
policy. This probably was not a formalized arrangement, but an incidental consequence of 
their relationship. They agreed on many tactics, in any case. And, it was in Nixon's best 
interest to support the Secretary when he could, since Dulles acted as his patron. Finally, 
Dulles combined his use of Nixon with Eisenhower's. He employed Nixon as congressional 
liaison for the State Department. In this capacity, Nixon gained a hand in foreign policy 
discussion and still acted in a position Eisenhower considered appropriate.
Just two months into the new Administration, Dulles went out of his way to give the 
Vice President press exposure and an opportunity to meet a foreign dignitary. On March 24, 
Dulles called Nixon to ask if he cared to greet French Foreign Minister Georges Bidualt at the 
airport. Nixon could accompany Dulles after that morning's National Security Council 
meeting. "The Vice President said he would be glad to do so. The Secretary said that they 
would draft up a little statement for him." While the Secretary may have invited Nixon to 
accompany him in order to increase the number of US officials waiting for Bidualt, the tenor 
of the conversation implied additional motivation. Dulles specifically offered a ride and a 
speaking role to Nixon. In fact, neither of these gestures were necessary to enhance Bidualt's 
arrival. Coming from Dulles, a man who ignored most social niceties, the offer can only be 
seen as an effort to ingratiate himse lf to Nixon.
On July 13, 1954 - about six months after Nixon returned from an extended trip to
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- Dulles asked the Vice President to host a luncheon for Prince Wan, an Asian dignitary.24 
Dulles would be flying to Paris for the Indochina Peace talks then. The Secretary chose 
Nixon over one of his undersecretaries. As second to the President, Nixon brought more 
prestige to the affair than anyone under Dulles. Whether or not the luncheon required 
someone of the Vice President's caliber was determined by Dulles. Undoubtedly, Nixon 
relished the chance to practice his statesmanship.
While Dulles found Nixon to be a reliable diplomatic aide, the Vice President 
discovered he and his mentor shared similarly partisan visions of the government. Nixon 
detected in Foster deep suspicions concerning the Democrats. This paranoia allowed them to 
envision a conspiracy directed against the Republican Administration by their foes.
The conspiracy extended to many civil servants in the State Department. Thus the 
Vice President and the Secretary of State concluded that most of these veterans were "Middle- 
aged New Dealers." Both Dulles aides, John Hanes and Roderic O’Connor, agreed that 
Dulles believed a large portion of State Department staffers were not loyal to the Eisenhower 
Administration. Relics from the Roosevelt-Truman era could not be trusted to support the 
new initiatives or assist in the implementation of policy. Nixon expressed his distrust when 
he made disparaging remarks to the Secretary about American diplomats who had served in 
the Truman Administration, and carried over after 1953. "This gang is constantly 
undercutting. You sat with them in Manila and they leaked. This proves his [Nixon's] point 
above re talking too much." Nixon referred to a claim he had just made that the more people 
Dulles brought to an upcoming meeting, the more probable someone - implicitly a Democrat - 
would talk to the press. The Vice President felt certain 75 percent of State's Planning Board
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Department was against the Secretary. In Nixon's view, it was him and Dulles against the 
entire Planning Board Department. The odds were stacked against them, but this challenge 
appealed to Nixon's tough guy image and the bi-polar analytical system he employed.25 In a 
world of Democracy challenging Communism, Republican opposing Democrat,
Administration versus media, it was not surprising that Nixon relied on a confrontational 
scenario. Dulles frequently applied the same basic formula, although he allowed for more 
subtle distinctions.
Nixon's comment illustrated that a fear of leaks to the press was a second suspicion 
shared by these men - unless they had themselves sanctioned the disclosure. For example, on 
June 5, 1953 they discussed Nixon's fall travel plan, his first overseas trip as Vice President. 
Dulles suggested a destination of Asia, since the Secretary had just returned from the Middle 
East and Milton Eisenhower was about to visit Latin America. Notwithstanding the region, 
Nixon and Dulles dismissed Eisenhower’s idea of taking Senators along for the ride. While 
some of these legislators would have been Republicans, Nixon realized from his experiences 
as a Congressman, that regardless of the party affiliation, they could not be relied on to 
remain silent. "They would be anxious to report back and get in the news and would 
probably leak everything." In a similar situation Nixon would have.
A month later, Nixon complained that Robert Allen's latest column had leaked his 
proposed trip. Nixon suggested to Dulles "Since it has apparently leaked out it might be 
better to announce it.” If ignored, the media would ask Eisenhower about the rumor at his 
next press conference.26 Nixon's famous anti-media stance during his own presidency was not 
a distrust that developed out of Watergate and Vietnam. As Vice President, he privately
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derided the news industry for unfair stories about him, the Administration and the State 
Department. He charged that reporters wanted to trap him in inaccuracies or contradictions, 
and that they overemphasized minor statements in order to misrepresent his actual intent.27 
His dislike of leaks may have been encouraged by Dulles. But, his extreme hostility toward 
the media - although a logical extension - was not shared by his mentor.
Both of Dulles' assistants maintained  that the Secretary decried the leaks, but 
appreciated the power of the press. O'Connor noted that Dulles enjoyed the sparring and 
debating of a press conference. He and Hanes agreed that Dulles attempted to foster positive 
relations with reporters because "a great many people in the Department had close relations, 
very often with rather unfriendly sectors of the press." Those personnel would leak to their 
friends. It was essential for Dulles to win over as many media people as he could to avoid 
embarrassing leaks. But, O'Connor pointed out Dulles "never attempted to try to stop them 
in any formal sense. He recognized that would have been a grave mistake."28 Any such 
program to crack down on leaking would only have made more enemies within the 
Department, and among the press corps. Nixon never comprehended that subtlety.
Hane’s and O'Connor's comments imply that the Secretary had a more reasonable 
grasp than Nixon, on the problem of leaking. While Nixon hoped for a vendetta against 
leakers, Dulles accepted unauthorized leaking as par for the course. He took a more relaxed 
perspective on leaks, so much so, that he actually joked about the topic. In a meeting with 
Chancellor Adenauer on May 29, 1956, he reported "We discussed the problem of leakages 
and Chancellor Adenauer expressed the opinion that it was very wrong and dangerous to 
make memoranda of conversations [because they could be leaked]. Therefore, this is a
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memorandum to end all memoranda." This was an uncommon glipmse of Dulles' often 
noted, but rarely recorded, sense of humor.
While Dulles' remark poked fun at the overly cautious stance, there was no doubt that 
he shared Adenauer's displeasure with leaks. Two weeks later, Adenaur asked to visit 
President Eisenhower, who had checked into Walter Reed Hospital after an ileitis attack. 
Dulles stated that if Ike was up to the visit, Adenauer could proceed, but "there should be 
absolutely no advance leakage of this possibility."29 When Dulles perceived national security 
risks he was as disturbed by leaking as Nixon. He made it clear that he did not want the 
media present while Adenauer talked with the bed ridden President. Generally, however, his 
concerns - and those of Nixon - centered on unauthorized leaks. Both men detested leaks 
from the opposition, but they were willing to use the same tactic to benefit personal or 
Administration interests.
On April 16, 1954 Nixon made an off the record comment advocating American troop 
intervention in Indochina, in the event of an imminent Communist victory. He claimed the 
US would have to "send in the boys" to head off such a defeat. The remark, which came 
dining a luncheon with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, immediately leaked. It 
was viewed as a trial balloon for the Administration. Evidence suggests, however, that Nixon 
was at most expressing Dulles' view, and probably only voicing his own opinion. In any 
case, Nixon claimed he had been double crossed by the press. He never explained what he 
expected would happen when he made a controversial statement to a room full of newspaper 
editors. A savvy politician like Nixon assumed the comment would get out and his actions 
displayed his own willingness to leak information when it suited his purposes.30
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Nixon's "send in the boys" comment illustrated a deceptive method for presenting his 
unofficial opinion as one with an authoritative aura. Just by saying it, he gained national 
attention and bolstered his reputation in foreign relations. Indeed, many of the leaks Nixon 
approved during his presidency were intended to improve the public's perception of him. He 
had the same goal in mind when he grabbed headlines after the American Society of Editors 
speech.
Because Nixon's role in foreign policy was largely determined by Dulles, it was no 
surprise that Nixon sought to improve Dulles' public reputation when he could. Making the 
Secretary look good through well crafted leaks earned him Dulles' gratitude and fit with 
appproved tactics. The seasoned statesman also released unofficial statements to benefit his 
reputation. Nor were Nixon and Dulles above jointly planned leaks.
An excellent example of this came on March 11, 1955. Dulles had just returned from 
a trip to South East Asia. There he consulted with King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and 
Chaing Kai Shek of Taiwan. That afternoon Nixon and Dulles discussed the situation 
between Nationalist and Communist China. Nixon suggested that he leak some positive 
statement about Dulles. Dulles’ secretary transcribed the conversation: "N. asked if it would 
be helpful if an authoritative source said that the President has been very greatly impressed by 
the Sec. 's briefings on his return and is solidly united behind the Sec. 's policy. The Sec. said 
he thinks it would be good. They agreed N. would do it with Drummond."31 The comfort 
with which Nixon recommended, and Dulles approved, an authorized leak implied the process 
was neither distasteful nor unprecedented.
Nixon also recommended strategic leaks as a means for improving the State
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Department's public image. In an animated discussion about department performance, Dulles 
claimed "each in his Dept, should be thinking in terms of not just doing a competent job but 
do things out of the ordinary and provide a basis for showmanship." In support, Nixon added 
they should "do it the right way. Leak stories and meet with off-the-record groups. . . ."32 
Nixon's experience with off-the-record groups proved they were just another means of 
delivering unofficial information.
Such shared characteristics attracted these men to one another. In addition, the 
circumstances and events of the early 1950s brought them together. Every Administration has 
cliques competing for the President's attention. The Dulles-Nixon partnership was one such 
alliance. Nixon and Dulles worked together to thwart Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, 
White House advisor Sherman Adams or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Administration rivalries particularly strengthened the alliance between Nixon and 
Dulles immediately following Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack. During the crisis, Dulles 
advised Nixon on his conduct and statements. After Ike recovered, the Secretary took a more 
personal interest in Nixon's political career. Dulles backed his man when he could. And, 
Nixon needed the help in 1956.
During the 1956 presidential campaign Nixon contended with Ike's obstinacy. The 
President refused to state for the record that he wanted Nixon as his Vice President. Publicly, 
he claimed Nixon had to choose his own road. Away from the media, Eisenhower hinted that 
Nixon should take a Cabinet position instead of remaining Vice President. Eisenhower sensed 
Nixon's presidential aspirations and did not appreciate them. He believed Nixon needed 
better administrative skills to be a good president. As head of a department, Nixon could
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gain that experience. But, even behind Oval Office doors, Ike would not definitively tell 
Nixon to stay on or get off the ticket. He hoped Nixon might take his cue. And, because Ike 
had no better vice presidential candidates, his efforts to exclude Nixon were not constant or 
exhaustive.
Ike’s ambivalence allowed a "dump Nixon" movement to develop, making Nixon's 
place on the ticket appear precarious. Dulles came to his friend’s aid when Eisenhower 
remained aloof. The Secretary of State was enough of a patron and friend to look for 
opportunities to increase the Vice President's prestige and also offer him well considered 
advice.
Helping Nixon, however, placed Dulles in a potentially awkward position. He sought 
to simultaneously promote Nixon's ambitions, advocate Eisenhower's preference, and protect 
his own relationship with the President. Dulles succeeded in his triangular balancing 
maneuver, although he did not achieve any compromise between Nixon and Ike.
Dulles talked separately with the Vice President and the President to try to find a 
satisfactory resolution. First, he advised Nixon to take some Cabinet post. Dulles informed 
his friend that, in American history, vice presidents rarely succeeded to the presidency.
Nixon could and should be a US President, but first the Vice President needed to prepare via 
an important Cabinet position.33 His argument paralleled Eisenhower's, except in that Dulles 
had more confidence in Nixon’s ability to perform the duties of a president.
From the other side, Dulles attempted to convince Eisenhower that he should offer 
Nixon a more prestigious slot than Secretary of Commerce. Dulles had in mind his own 
assignment, Secretary of State. If the research of historians Ambrose and Parmet was
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correct, Dulles twice suggested to Ike that Nixon replace him. Ambrose wrote that on 
February 9, 1956 Dulles and Ike discussed Nixon’s predicament. "Dulles doubted that Nixon 
would take it [Secretary of Commerce], and suggested that Nixon succeed him as Secretary of 
State. Eisenhower laughed and said Dulles was not going to get out of his job that easily, 
then added that 'he doubted in any event that Nixon had the qualifications to be Secretary of 
State.'" In Parmet's account, Dulles brought up the subject two weeks later. He stated the 
Secretary "somewhat whimsically" suggested that Ike make Nixon his next Secretary of State. 
Neither historian presented Dulles' suggestion as serious. Parmet wrote, "If Dulles was, after 
all, truly prepared to step down at that point, there were far more seasoned potential 
candidates. While Parmet's conclusion appeared viable, it ignored too much of Dulles’ 
character and experience. Several factors point to the idea that Dulles made the comment in 
earnest.
First among them is the importance that Dulles placed upon language. He wrote and 
revised his own speeches to help clarify his thoughts. Similarly, he drafted, edited and re- 
edited his press statements before delivering them. In Cabinet meetings, Dulles was known to 
start talking, stop in mid-sentence while he formulated the exact meaning he wanted and then 
resume his thought.35 In short, he did not speak without thoroughly considering each word.
It is improbable that Dulles would "whimsically" suggest to the President of the United States 
that he be replaced in the next term unless he intended to retire.
Further, Dulles did not joke about foreign policy issues. He had been raised to 
understand the implications of international relations because his grandfather and uncle both 
had diplomatic careers. His maternal grandfather, John Watson Foster, had enjoyed a foreign
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relations career spanning from the mid-1870s to 1910. John Foster served as minister to 
Spain, Russia and Mexico and also spent a short time as Secretary of State under Benjamin 
Harrison. Dulles' uncle, Robert Lansing, was Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State during 
World War I. Dulles himself attended the Versailles Peace Conference. A man raised on 
international relations, and devoted to the secretaryship, would not nominate his own 
replacement without considering the consequences. Had Ike accepted his suggestion, Nixon 
could have become Secretary of State. Dulles recognized this possibility and he would not 
have introduced the subject had he not considered Nixon a suitable successor.36
In addition, Ike's final comment in the Ambrose quotation illustrated that he took 
Dulles seriously. The President gave a direct reason why Nixon would not be an acceptable 
replacement as Secretary of State - inexperience. Eisenhower did not change his mind.
Rather than just trying to amuse Eisenhower, Dulles probably had an involved game 
plan. He hoped to subtly manipulate both Nixon and Ike into accepting his compromise. The 
Secretary recognized that Eisenhower occasionally latched onto ideas that were presented in 
an informal setting. The President sometimes heard an off-the-cuff suggestion and 
immediately adopted it. If one assumed Dulles was considering retirement (this will be 
addressed below), he might have hoped to secure the position for Nixon. That would provide 
Nixon with a Cabinet post sufficiently prestigious for him to leave the ticket and still be in a 
position to launch a presidential campaign in I960.37 Dulles possibly mentioned Nixon as his 
own successor intending to gauge Eisenhower's response. In the best case, Ike would like the 
idea and pursue it. In the worst, he would laugh it off as a joke. Neither reaction could 
jeopardize Dulles' working relationship with the President.
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As long as he was Secretary of State, he needed to maintain Ike’s confidence. But, if 
Dulles saw Nixon as a suitable replacement, one must ask why he was looking to name his 
heir. Was he ready to retire?
On February 25, 1956 John Foster Dulles would be 68 years old. Grandfather Foster 
had been 57 when his term as Secretary ended. Robert Lansing had been 56 at his term's 
end. On top of that, the average retiring age of all twentieth century Secretaries of State 
through the Truman Administration was 62. If Dulles retained the secretaryship through a 
second term he would be 72 before he retired, older than all but Secretaries Cordell Hull and 
Frank Kellogg. And Dulles was aware of the age issue. In 1953, he refused to reappoint 
Joseph Green - a Princeton classmate - to the Ambassadorship of Jordan because he believed 
Green was too old.
In addition, there was his own life expectancy to consider. He was far from perfect 
health. And, of the family males with an immediate connection to Dulles, only Grandpa 
Foster lived a bit past age 80. Dulles' father was 76 when he passed away and his paternal 
grandfather had died in 1886, at age 63.38 If family history revealed anything, it told Dulles 
that he could not expect to live more than a few more years. A man like Dulles wanted to 
have time to write his memoirs (as his Grandfather had). If he stayed on another four years 
as Secretary his chances of completing an autobiographical work would be significantly 
reduced.
Eisenhower might have accepted Dulles' recommendation, had it come ten months 
later. On November 2, Dulles was hospitalized for severe stomach cramps that mimicked 
appendicitis. Exploratory surgery revealed it was actually cancer of the colon.39 Doctors
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removed the cancer, but it would return within two years and cause Dulles' death in 1959.
From this analysis, one can conclude that Dulles probably did consider Nixon as a 
viable replacement after 1956. He and Nixon discussed the international situation. If Dulles 
saw Nixon as his protege, perhaps he was ready to pass the torch in 1956. Although 
inexperienced in comparison to Dulles or Ike, Nixon had shown his competency to the 
Secretary's satisfaction. They shared a similar world view, with America as the preserver of 
democracy and Russia the destroyer. Dulles knew Nixon would work to maintain the same 
principles he upheld. He knew the Vice President would not fold in the face of Communist 
aggression. And, he knew Nixon would continue to consult him often. Nixon was the 
perfect successor because he ensured Dulles maintained a hold on foreign policy. Nixon 
could cement Dulles' legacy. Of course, he never found out how Nixon would have handled 
himself, since Eisenhower refused to accept the suggestion.
That Dulles recommended Nixon at all, illustrated his own respect for and confidence 
in the younger man's foreign relations abilities. Dulles' suggestion also reflected his 
friendship with the Vice President. At the tender age of 43, Dulles believed Nixon could take 
on the responsibilities of Secretary of State.40 When his efforts to obtain the position for 
Nixon failed, he dropped the subject. Ike would not consent, so there was no reason to 
pursue the topic. Dulles remained the Secretary of State, died in office and never published a 
page of memoir.
While it is possible Nixon would have accepted an appointment as Secretary of State, 
his real objective was the Oval Office. He had sipped the presidential nectar following 
Eisenhower's coronary in 1955. Given Ike's health and age, Nixon's chances at a promotion
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were better than ever. Pundits commonly wondered if the General would live through 
another four years. If Ike died in Office, Nixon advanced to the presidency without even the 
trouble of a campaign.
He also declined a Cabinet position because he assumed his chances for winning the 
Republican party presidential nomination in 1960 were higher coming from the VP spot than 
any other. Nixon was evolving the role of Vice President. Using his political connections, 
public recognition and expanded duties, Nixon transformed the vice presidency into the 
position he envisioned - a jump off point for the top slot. Historically that was not the case. 
From 1956 onward he worked to present himself as a viable and capable candidate for 
President. However, he had to be cautious to balance his presidential aspirations against his 
subservient position in the Administration.
Although Dulles could not secure his secretaryship for Nixon, he could offer advice on 
the Californian’s quest for the presidency. And, despite his battle against terminal cancer, 
Dulles remained focused on world affairs. Nixon continued as his confidant and pupil. After 
1956, their consultation still included official and personal issues, but expanded to cover 
Nixon's political prospects as well.
In November 1958, Dulles and Nixon discussed the recently held congressional 
elections. The Republicans had lost 50 seats in the House, but both men concluded Nixon's 
heavy campaigning before election day had kept the results from being a complete Democratic 
triumph. Looking forward, Dulles mentioned to the Vice President that "we need to be 
thinking pretty hard pretty soon about 1960. . . . "  They decided to meet on Saturday to 
assess the situation and discuss options. The Secretary mentioned that he also wanted to talk
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about his own future plans, but did not give any details.41 Exactly what they discussed on 
Saturday, November 8, was not recorded. It probably covered Nixon's strategy for the 
immediate future, his chances at the Republican nomination and the potential competition in 
1960. Both men understood Nixon had to remain in the public eye and maintain his contacts 
in the Republican party.
A memorandum from January 1958 hinted at what Dulles' personal plans might have 
been. The Secretary and Nixon were discussing some type of transfer of responsibility in the 
State Department. For national security reasons, the subject matter could not have been 
widely discussed. The transcribed conversation, as often happened, used the preposition "it" 
in place of the topic at hand. But, the subject can be determined even if the exact plan being 
considered cannot.
Dulles explained to Nixon that "he talked to AWD [Allen Welsh Dulles] about the 
matter they discussed and he is very much opposed to it. He said there could not be such a 
transition without giving an impression of weakness." Dulles stated that his brother did not 
see a way to change the current State department structure "that would not be misinterpreted." 
Nixon concluded that the plan could only work if it were tried "from scratch” - probably 
meaning in a new Administration. The implication was that Dulles wanted to reduce his work 
load. He hoped to transfer some of his responsiblities - knowing Dulles, probably the 
onerous administrative duties - to a subordinate. Undoubtedly, his advancing illness played a 
role in this proposal. Nixon tried to support Dulles' goal despite Allen's advice. He was 
concerned for Dulles' welfare. "N still thinks we can explore ways in which the Sec can call 
Herter in and have him take greater responsibility in certain areas. "42 That Dulles formulated
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his plans with Nixon - the memorandum makes it clear they had previously discussed these 
issues - illustrated the personal trust and the valued judgement that he placed in the Vice 
President.
Allen Dulles, as brother and CIA director, was a person with whom to confide. But, 
Nixon, as Vice President, had no business knowing Dulles' plans, unless Dulles determined 
Nixon would provide constructive and sound advice. Perhaps Dulles still believed Nixon 
might be convinced to succeed him as Secretary of State. He certainly maintained an interest 
in Nixon's political course.
Dulles reiterated his concern for Nixon's political future on Saturday, January 24,
1959. The two discussed the merits of a reorganization plan Eisenhower had revealed at the 
Cabinet meeting that week. Neither Dulles nor Nixon was pleased with the scheme which 
called for, in Dulles’ words, "two 'Assistant Presidents,' one dealing with more or less 
domestic affairs and the other dealing with international affairs. ” The greatest concern they 
voiced revolved around how the proposal might appear to Congressmen and the public.
Nixon complained that unless there was "broad support in the Congress for this and not great 
debate about it, it would very likely play into the idea of the President wanting to get rid of 
some of his duties." Just as Dulles could not pass any of his work to a subordinate, Ike could 
not assign his tasks to assistants. To implement such a modification so late in the 
Administration had domestic ramifications in addition to international consequences. And, in 
terms of Nixon's future, the reaction could disrupt the party, increase desire for change, and 
"make Nixon's prospects [in 1960] pretty dim."43 This prognosis did not comfort either man
Dulles' interest in the political future of Dick Nixon reflected his concern for the
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younger man. By January 1959, it was clear that Dulles could not remain Secretary of State 
to the end of the Administration. The only question was when he would resign. He entered 
Walter Reed Hospital with terminal cancer in February and so had no personal stake in the 
1960 election.44 While he wanted a Republican to remain in the Oval office, his choice of 
Nixon was not a foregone conclusion. Eisenhower had a list of five or six men whom he 
believed qualified to take up the reigns. Nixon was on the list, but not at the top of it. Yet, 
Dulles concluded that the Vice President was the best choice. His close association with, and 
observations of Nixon, helped confirm this conviction.
In the Spring of 1959 Dulles’ poor health became a higher priority than Nixon's 
election prospects. On April 13, Dulles called Nixon. Presumably discussing his own 
resignation, Dulles noted he had made no decision yet, "although the Sec recognizes the 
inevitable more or less.” Dulles planned to wait another week, while Nixon encouraged him 
to "give it every chance." The Secretary mentioned that he would start a new treatment the 
next day and the conversation ended. He resigned two days later.45
Dulles was dying, new treatment or not. In under a month and a half he would be 
gone. But, Nixon continued to meet with the Secretary in his room at Walter Reed Hospital. 
And Dulles continued to advise Nixon on his political predicament. On May 2, they 
discussed the Vice President’s upcoming trip to Moscow. In addition, Dulles offered the 
names of various Republican party members whom he believed could be helpful in Nixon's 
pursuit of the presidency. Dulles, only three weeks from death, "urged the Vice President to 
keep in touch with Mr. Dewey. . . . The Secretary also suggested that Mr. Arthur Dean has 
an influential, although inconspicuous, role in Republican affairs."46 Dulles' death bed advice
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was concerned and paternalistic. Nixon knew the Republican party better than almost anyone. 
And he understood who he could rely upon as allies. Dulles could not offer anything greater 
by then, however, and for his part Nixon graciously accepted the suggestions.
John Foster Dulles died on May 24, 1959. Nixon wrote a tribute about the Secretary 
of State two weeks later for Life magazine. In it, Nixon not only expressed his deep 
admiration and respect for Dulles, he revealed their close relationship by way of a personal 
comment Dulles had made to him. Days before his death Dulles described his last 
negotiations. The dying man admitted to Nixon "I never felt any pain while the negotiating 
was taking place. Then at the end of the day it would come down on me like a crushing 
weight. "47 His statement reflected more than an ability to control excruciating discomfort. It 
was a confession that admitted his weakness and described his hardship. Dulles, a reserved 
man, did not share such intimate details about himself with most people. But, Nixon was not 
just anybody.
Dulles' death brought to an end what Ambrose referred to as "a solid team. . . [that] 
had helped each other as occasion demanded . . . "  since 1953. Their similar beliefs and 
methods attracted them to each other. The friendship and trust that ensued was rare for 
Dulles and even more so for Nixon. It allowed them to discuss both private and 
Administration topics with great ease. Nixon admired Dulles' great experience in the realm 
of foreign policy and Dulles respected Nixon's grasp of the issues and desire to learn more. 
They had a genuine concern for one another that was manifested in their personal association 
as well as their professional consultation.
The Nixon-Dulles relationship went much further than friendship and respect. They
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maintained a close working relationship which although hinted at in this chapter, has not been 
fully examined. Nixon took full advantage of Dulles' inner circle status, while Dulles probed 
Nixon for advice on numerous decisions. The image of Nixon as uninformed about 
Administration policy disregards Dulles' frequent willingness to brief Nixon on the most up 
to date information. Their professional relationship, the mutual consultation they shared, will 
be the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
An Unequal Partnership - Nixon and Dulles in the Administration
After Dulles' death, Vice President Nixon recalled "at least four occasions when he 
[Dulles] was under attack he asked for my advice.”1 In truth, Dulles sought Nixon's advice 
often, irrespective of any outside criticism. To do that, the Secretary regularly briefed Nixon 
on a host of subjects, sharing with Nixon his thoughts on domestic and international topics. 
Nixon gained an insider’s knowledge of foreign relations because Dulles fed him information 
on the Middle East, Far East, Soviet strategies, State Department appointments, content of 
speeches and Nixon’s own role in the Administration.2 By examining the consultation 
between Nixon and Dulles, beginning in earnest about 1955, and continuing up until Dulles’ 
death in May 1959, Nixon's actual role in the Eisenhower Administration becomes clear. His 
efforts to adapt the vice presidency to suit his political ambitions also appear.
Dulles assistant John Hanes reported that the Secretary often conferred with 
individuals in private 15 to 30 minute interviews. He met with his Undersecretaries for such 
meetings early in the morning, but these mini-conferences extended beyond State Department 
staff. Allen Dulles often came in for short briefings. Hanes noted "whoever it might be, 
would come in and just the two of them would sit down and go over things. . . . And he 
would do it with others that he was close to — have long personal conversations. Most of 
those things he never recorded, of course. He would record things, only if he felt there was a
72
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reason to."3 Although Hanes did not mention Nixon, he was undoubtedly one of the "others." 
Dulles kept transcripts of many of the phone calls and meetings he had with Nixon.
However, there are nowhere near the number of memoranda of conversations to match the 
number of discussions that Nixon and Dulles had. Hanes admitted that Dulles only kept notes 
on official conversations. Since many of the talks between him and Nixon were personal, 
they did not get transcribed. The professional exchanges, however, shed light on their 
consultative relationship.
From early in the Administration, Dulles and Nixon consulted on speeches. Dulles 
regularly circulated his drafts for comments from trusted associates. Nixon was among those 
consulted. In deference to his mentor, Nixon cleared many of his speeches with Dulles and 
asked for guidance on the content. He wanted Dulles to synthesize the Eisenhower-Dulles 
policy. Or Nixon asked Dulles if he should emphasize any particular foreign policy topics.4 
Such dialogue was frequent, typically involving suggestions about word choice or syntax. 
Rarely did their discussions about speeches move beyond literary criticism, although 
sometimes they talked of political ramifications.
Dulles and Nixon also conferred about candidates to fill vacant State Department 
positions. Dulles' reason for asking Nixon about these choices might have been the Vice 
President's political savvy. However, Dulles also seemed to value Nixon’s assessment of the 
abilities of these candidates. At least twice, Dulles asked for Nixon's nomination advice 
without any consideration of politics.
In August 1954, the Secretary called Nixon to discuss a replacement for outgoing 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Henry Byroade.
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Nixon argued that it would be difficult to find a candidate who would be impartial about the 
Middle East. Most were either pro- or anti- Zionist. Reacting to an unrecorded statement by 
Dulles, Nixon advised against the appointment of George Allen. The Vice President 
complained Mr. Allen was too flexible. However, as the conversation ended Nixon seemed 
to sense Dulles' advocacy of the candidate, and admitted Allen "will be very loyal to any 
principles the Sec. laid down." Nixon's advice came in a non-conffontational package. He 
disliked Allen, but did not dismiss him. Perhaps Nixon was trying to avoid a disagreement 
with the Secretary. Just as probable, the Vice President expressed his true assessment of 
George Allen. The man did not fit Nixon's ideal, but a loyal subordinate was hard to find. 
Dulles agreed and Allen assumed the position in January 1955. Nixon’s concern centered on 
how Allen would perform his duties, not the political efficacy of nominating a Republican.
In the Spring of 1957, they again talked about a high level appointment to the State 
Department. On the morning of April 18, Dulles asked Nixon about a replacement for the 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Nixon immediately suggested Deputy Director of the 
Office of European Regional Affairs, Joseph Palmer n. Dulles asked the Vice President to 
call him if he had any names to add. At the end of May, Dulles and Nixon again talked about 
who to appoint to the position. Dulles mentioned two candidates: Julius C. Holmes (Special 
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) and Ambassador James P. 
Richards. Nixon preferred Holmes and claimed that Richards did not "have the subtlety 
necessary to deal with the kind of problems that arose in South Africa. . . . "  Presumably, 
partisan requirements were not at issue in this case, since Richards was a Democrat.5 The 
Secretary did not need Nixon to advise him on the political suitability of a nominee. The
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Vice President instead offered an assessment of Richards' capabilities. Who filled the 
position is not clear, but neither man named that day.
Although Nixon had a role as the Administration’s political workhorse, Dulles often 
asked for his advice on non-political issues. The patron genuinely respected the Vice 
President's opinion. Certainly Dulles' confidence in Nixon was unprecedented between any 
other Secretary of State and Vice President. The relationship that they shared helped 
transform the vice presidency from obscurity to celebrity.
Given Nixon's political specialization, however, Dulles did not ignore him as a 
partisan tactician. For example, when planning the tenth anniversary United Nations 
conference, Dulles asked if Nixon thought it would be acceptable to invite major participants 
of the 1945 U.N. conference. He mentioned several well connected Democrats, including 
President Truman and Eleanor Roosevelt, and one or two Republicans (Harold Stassen being 
the most prominent). Nixon immediately affirmed the appropriateness of inviting them. Had 
Dulles been concerned about the partisan consequences of inviting Truman and Roosevelt, 
Nixon's nonchalant reply laid his mind to rest. Nixon instantly understood the major 
participants of 1945 could not be excluded because of their party affiliation.
More overtly political were Dulles-Nixon consultations on gaming congressional 
support for Executive initiatives. A veteran Senator and Representative, Nixon used his many 
contacts to sound out members of both houses. As Vice President, he presided over Senate 
sessions adding to his effectiveness in guiding legislation through Congress. Nixon 
represented a direct line to the Executive branch, a factor that made him important to Senators 
seeking the President's ear. Throughout the Administration, Dulles and Nixon discussed how
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
76
to help their legislative program survive Capitol Hill.6
Richard Nixon’s input on political issues does not come as a surprise to anyone. But, 
his international involvement with Dulles is less familiar. The Secretary treated the Vice 
President like a foreign policy advisor, rather than a powerless appendage of the Executive 
branch.
On April 26, 1954, representatives from Europe and South East Asia met in Geneva, 
Switzerland to begin negotiating an end to hostilities in Indochina. As the conference neared 
its close, Nixon and Dulles recognized that the Geneva settlement probably would not parallel 
American goals for the region. When Dulles admitted he might join the American 
representatives for the closing ceremonies, Nixon advised against it. He believed "the line 
will be that Geneva is a sell-out - a failure of diplomacy." Dulles' presence at the meeting 
would serve to increase the US stake at Geneva, and he did not "like to see us give 
respectability or be a part of a deal which we don't believe in." Nixon abhorred the US being 
associated with an agreement that left Ho Chi Minh's Communist government in power. He 
may also have recalled the stigma attached to the Democrats who negotiated the Yalta 
Accords. Making deals with Communists led to domestic political vulnerability. Dulles 
undoubtedly agreed with his friend's assessment, but he could not act otherwise. Despite the 
risk of legitimizing the negotiations, as Secretary of State he could not ignore such 
proceedings.7
This was neither the first nor the last time Nixon and Dulles consulted on American 
foreign policy. Although Nixon's suggestion could not be followed, Dulles supported the 
principle behind it. At the conference, he refused to shake hands with Chinese Foreign
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Minister Chou En Lai, resulting in a diplomatic slight that would not be rectified until Nixon 
went to China in 1972. Dulles' insult left no doubt that the United States viewed the 
settlement as a capitulation to Communist forces.
In November of the following year, Dulles was again in Europe. In between visits to 
Franco in Spain and Tito in Yugoslavia, Dulles sat in on security talks with the Soviets, again 
in Geneva. On the fifth, the Secretary sent Nixon a detailed description of the negotiations. 
"The original Soviet proposal on security was a moth-eaten draft which had first appeared at 
Berlin two years ago. . . . "  Dulles complained that it lacked any substance. But, "under 
pressure of our proposal and argumentation about it, the Russians then came up with a new 
proposal which coincides in most important respects with our own proposal." Unmentioned, 
was the diplomatic maneuver of visiting and wooing neutralist governments away from Soviet 
influence. Dulles included a long exposition detailing how the Soviets had been forced to 
abandon the position that their security depended on a reunified Germany. The Secretary 
claimed that the Soviet argument for reunification now rested on the weaker ideological and 
political concepts, rather than strategic considerations. This modified Soviet position helped 
clear the way for what Dulles anticipated would be the eventual reunification of Germany.8
Dulles was under no obligation to keep Nixon briefed on the negotiations in Geneva, 
let alone explain how the proceedings were moving forward and provide as well a personal 
analysis of the progress. Such a report might have gone to Eisenhower, but not to the Vice 
President. Dulles' message could only have been motivated by his desire to keep Nixon 
informed because he was a friend and protege.
In October 1957, Dulles asked for Nixon's advice for dealing with an official from
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Ghana - presumably because Nixon had stopped in that West African country during his 
Spring trip. The issue was one of form, rather than policy. Dulles had entertained the 
Ghanaian minister at his home and now wondered whether or not it was appropriate for the 
man to breakfast with Eisenhower in the White House. Nixon thought it was and noted that 
the official "was a very sensitive fellow. All those people were." Somehow Dulles 
interpreted a political aspect to such a breakfast also, since he asked "if it would be regarded 
as playing politics. . ." The Vice President replied candidly, "everything was regarded that 
way."9 Since the Vice President could see politics in every government action, he assumed 
the Democrats could also.
Often during phone calls either Dulles or Nixon suggested they meet. Dulles would 
ask Nixon to drop by, or Nixon might suggest that they "get together and talk about current 
developments." During these conversations they discussed treaty negotiations, economic aid 
issues, international events and the Cold War in general. These were informal meetings - like 
those Hanes mentioned - that occurred after standard working hours.10
During the last year of his life, Foster Dulles spent many hours evaluating the dangers 
of Soviet economic warfare; the potential for the Communists to disrupt the global economy. 
The Soviets employed two tactics. Primarily, the U.S.S.R. disbursed economic aid to 
developing countries as a means of gaining political influence. Russia's willingness to finance 
the Aswan Dam project in Egypt stood as the most prominent example of these efforts.
Second, Dulles feared any Communist government's ability to ignore profit. Russia 
could bribe foreign nations by arranging trades that had no economic benefit to itself. By 
bartering or selling commodities below cost, the purchasing country became indebted to and
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dependent upon the U.S.S.R. And, because Russia had a totalitarian government, the 
domestic effects were not an issue. Dulles held similar concerns about the People’s Republic 
of China's influence in Asia. At the beginning of 1958, he shared these concerns with the 
Vice President.
At the Cabinet meeting on January 3, 1958, Dulles and Nixon both recommended that 
Eisenhower include something about economic warfare in his State of the Union address.
"Sec. Dulles saw some possibility that the message would be criticized as being on the 
complacent side and he called attention to the various forms of the Russian threat, especially 
economic warfare." "The Vice President hoped the message would contain at least a sentence 
on the great increase in Russian economic efforts." As it turned out, Ike devoted two 
paragraphs to the subject. But the President's speech greatly emphasized the military threat 
over the economic one. As such, it was not surprising to find Dulles again discussing this 
issue with Nixon, after the speech. Ike had included a passage about economic warfare, but 
he had not given it the weight Dulles thought it deserved.
Dulles privately broached the topic with Nixon on January 8, during a morning talk at 
the Secretary’s home. Nixon had not arrived expecting to discuss the Soviet economic 
offensive. He initially "referred to a talk which he had just had with the President dealing 
with possible 'inability'. He referred to an exchange of letters [outlining when Nixon would 
assume command] between him and the President along the lines of a draft which the 
President had shown me and on which I had made comments the day before." Eisenhower 
had consulted with Dulles before he talked with Nixon about a matter concerned specifically 
with Nixon, not the Secretary. But, Dulles did not reveal this to the Vice President. The
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secret arrangement was of great interest to Nixon because it put in writing Nixon's role as 
leader in the event of Ike's incapacitation. Not even Nixon could justify leaking that 
agreement, but his reputation as a leader would have benefited had the media been informed. 
Uninterested in discussing the arrangement, Dulles changed the subject to economic warfare. 
As senior partner, he typically determined the content of meetings. On topic, Dulles 
immediately proposed the formation of a "Cabinet level group to study possible Soviet 
Economic Warfare." Although he feared the potential Soviet economic aggression, he did not 
detect it readily enough to dispense with a study group.
In a formal memorandum on January 10, Dulles presented Nixon with his plan for a 
Cabinet investigation. His fears stemmed from "the ability of the Western-fashioned 
economic system of private enterprise, the operation of which depends on profits, to survive 
in the event of all-out economic warfare by the Sino-Soviet industrialized totalitarian state 
system, which operates without regard to profits and which can channel the economic efforts 
of its people into international economic warfare."11 Dulles saw dangers in Communist 
natural resource barter deals, intentional manipulation of staple markets and advocacy of 
nationalization of foreign investment. His concerns were that the U.S.S.R. could negotiate 
transactions far more beneficial to small countries in Asia and Africa, than America could 
manage. With trade came influence over a vast sector of non-aligned nations.
Economic warfare, although important, was still a single weapon among many in the 
Communist  arsenal. Dulles visited the Vice President's residence in the early evening of 
Saturday, January 11, to discuss Cold War strategies in macro terms. He was troubled by the 
current "organization of cold war activities on the part of the United States." Nixon
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maintained that that organization had to be improved. Typical of Dulles memoranda, the 
Secretary excluded all specifics, except to write that "We reviewed the problem in 
considerable detail, weighing the pros and cons and possibilities. I suggested the Vice 
President should give this matter further thought, and he said he would do so." Their 
discussion almost certainly covered US foreign aid, military preparedness, allied policy and 
America's reaction to Soviet global influence, including its economic presence. Once again, 
Dulles' trust in Nixon's foreign policy expertise prompted him to consult.
The Secretary actively sought Nixon's advice on issues that concerned and determined 
America's international policy. Because of this, the Vice President was able to mimic 
Eisenhower's hidden hand maneuver and maintain an influence on policy while the illusion 
persisted that he had none. He exploited a situation that brought him into the policy making 
circle, without actually stepping inside the ring. In fact, however, Nixon would have 
preferred to publicize the role.
On Tuesday, January 21, Dulles again mentioned a Cabinet subcommittee 
investigation of economic warfare. The Secretary expected to give Nixon a copy of his 
proposal by the end of the week. Nixon updated Dulles on his efforts to gain support for the 
program. He had scheduled, for the following day, a meeting with Clarence Randall (one of 
Ike's special economic advisors) and C. Douglas Dillon (advisor, Ambassador to France and 
soon to be Undersecretary Of State for Economic Affairs).
Dulles brought Nixon into his campaign to examine economic warfare for several 
reasons. First, he understood that Nixon was a loyal ally on this topic. Nixon agreed with 
Dulles' analysis and fears. He had always - especially after the Herter Committee - supported
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foreign aid initiatives to counteract Soviet economic intrusions. Dulles' answer to Russia's 
economic warfare was increased US aid. In addition, Dulles knew Nixon could help recruit 
the support of other Administration officials, not yet convinced of the efficacy of Dulles' 
plans. The Vice President undoubtedly met with Dillon and Randall to gain their approval of 
Dulles’ proposed study group.
In February and March, Dulles and Nixon continued to discuss the ramification of and 
possible defenses against economic warfare. On Saturday, February 8, they met at the 
Secretary's house. "We discussed at some length the project for a study of economic 
warfare." They again concluded that the Soviet Union could potentially disrupt the capitalist 
economy. In terms of meeting the Soviet threat, Nixon and Dulles determined that US 
economic aid programs "and meeting the Soviet bloc competition of the less developed 
countries" were important tactics. Nixon expressed his belief, with Dulles’ agreement, that 
there remained room for "greater unity and efficiency . . .  in this field of foreign aid." 13 The 
conversation reiterated much of what Dulles and Nixon had been discussing for a month. 
Dulles' concern was high, as is apparent by his repeated broaching of the subject with Nixon. 
But, it was not until the beginning of March that the Cabinet actually discussed Sino-Soviet 
economic warfare.
During a lunchtime conversation at the State Department, the two associates talked 
about a possible summit conference, future dates for Nixon to travel to Europe and economic 
warfare. Dulles reported that they had "discussed the possibility of looking into the economic 
threat from the Soviet Union along the broad lines that had been discussed at Cabinet and our 
conversation at my house on February 8."14 His comment illustrated three facts. First, the
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Cabinet had at least examined the topic. Next, the conversation of February 8 must have 
been in-depth and significant. It had occurred a month before and Dulles still cited it as an 
example. And finally, Dulles still was not satisfied with the Administration's efforts in 
regard to economic warfare. He continued to want an investigation of the economic threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. He continued to seek Nixon's assistance. He continued to debate 
the issues with the Vice President.
Nixon's close consultation with Dulles gave the impression that he worked for the 
Secretary, rather than the President. No past Vice President had enjoyed nearly the contact 
with the Secretary of State that Nixon shared with Dulles. Just the consultation with Dulles 
about overseas trips marked a notable departure from previous administrations. Up to that 
point, Vice Presidents simply had not traveled extensively, domestically or internationally. In 
a revolutionary evolution of the vice presidential office, Nixon gained a role as policy advisor 
to Dulles, as well.
Immediately after Gamal Nasser’s 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal, Dulles phoned 
Nixon to discuss the situation. During the conversation the Secretary admitted "it is bad.
The British and French are really anxious to start a war and get us into it etc. The Sec. said 
he is doing his best to make them realize they [British and French] may have to do it alone 
etc."15 Nixon expressed an interest in talking about the situation in person, and Dulles agreed 
that they should. Events, however, did not allow them to consult at length about the Suez 
crisis. Within a few weeks Dulles was incapacitated by his first battle against cancer, and 
Nixon became distracted with a battle of his own - against Democrats in the 1956 presidential 
campaign.
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The Vice President and the Secretary both won their respective engagements of 1956. 
And Nixon's involvement with Dulles during the second Administration remained constant, if 
not greater. Perhaps as Dulles' illness returned and increased following the election, he relied 
more on the advice and talents of the Vice President.
In 1957, Dulles arranged for another departure from the traditional vice presidential 
role. Nixon requested, in February, that Dulles assign him some substantive task. The Vice 
President claimed he wanted a low publicity job, and "had in mind such tasks as disarmament, 
international economic development, or possibly such tasks as the development of the OAS." 
Dulles responded positively to this request, stating "I was confident that things of this sort 
would come along and promised the Vice President that I would be on the lookout for 
opportunities of public service of this character which he might perform." The Secretary 
proved true to his word, although it took him six or seven months to offer the expanded role, 
and it was not what the Vice President had envisioned. Instead of a greater foreign policy 
role, Dulles expanded Nixon's congressional relations function.
Dulles once complained that "the Secretary of State nowadays doesn't have nearly 
enough time to really create policy. He is tied up on Administration and he is always going 
to congressional committees." Dulles resented the hours that congressional hearings took 
from his schedule. Nixon's new assignment meant Dulles could concentrate on foreign 
relations.16 It amounted to the formalization of an ad hoc chore Nixon already performed, 
since the Vice President had participated in State-Congress relations from the first months of 
the Administration.
At dinner on August 24, Dulles and Nixon "spoke at some length about the possibility
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of a more active role of the Vice President in relation to congressional affairs, having in mind 
the fact that he was the only official having constitutional and legal authority both with the 
Executive as a statutory member of the NSC and in the Congress as a presiding officer of the 
Senate." Dulles conceived of an assignment that took advantage of the few responsibilities 
given to someone in the vice presidential office, and therefore also met the parameters Ike set 
for Nixon's administrative duties.
Dulles' recollection of this conversation failed to mention one important aspect of the 
plan. The Secretary intended to allow Nixon to handle international affairs legislation in 
Congress, not just domestic. This made an otherwise unwelcome chore palatable for Nixon.
The Secretary carefully aligned supporters before approaching Eisenhower with his 
proposal. A week after discussing the enlarged role with Nixon, he broached the subject with 
Ike’s close friend, Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Dulles told Brownell "Nixon should 
play a greater role as an intermediary between the Executive and the Congress . . . "  adding 
he "did not think that the Vice-President would take the responsibility unless he had a clear- 
cut [presidential] mandate."17 The Attorney General agreed with the idea, thereby providing 
Dulles with a strong ally and legal clearance when he approached the President. Dulles knew 
that the additional voice would bolster his case and help him obtain the mandate. The 
directive served two purposes. First, it gave added prestige to the assignment, something 
Nixon always appreciated. Second, it gave the Vice President no choice but to accept.
On September 2, Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that Nixon be given "a greater role 
in preparing our congressional plans." He clarified his position further by noting "I did not 
of course think in terms of the VP doing liaison work and dealing with members of Congress,
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but merely functioning at the upper strategy level." Dulles presented upper strategy level as 
something less crucial than front line liaison work in Congress. But Eisenhower’s military 
career had been as a strategic planner, not a trench soldier. The value Eisenhower placed on 
liaison work versus planning was apparent in the fact that Nixon already performed the 
former for the President.
Ike expressed reservations, explaining he did not want to give Nixon a hand in all the 
programs. But, Dulles convinced Ike to accept Nixon's help in planning strategy for Mutual 
Security Assistance, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and the Bricker Amendment.
That same day, Eisenhower dictated a draft letter to Nixon. He presented the Vice 
President with a bounded version of Dulles' plan. He began "My basic thought is that you 
might find it possible — and intriguing — to be of even more help in our whole government 
program with affairs abroad than you have been in the past." Eisenhower praised Nixon's 
"inestimable assistance to the Secretary of State and me" and his "unusual and 
comprehensive" knowledge of US foreign affairs. The President then relayed Dulles' plan for 
Nixon to take a greater role in steering Executive legislation through Congress. He limited 
the Vice President to "strictly State Department legislation. . . . "  Ike told Nixon the "main 
mission I would see for you would be helping the State Department plan its legislative 
presentations." To ensure Dulles did not expand Nixon’s role, Eisenhower insisted that the 
Vice President consult with the White House staff in charge of congressional relations "so that 
the entire legislative program could be presented in the most advantageous manner."18 While 
correlating State and White House efforts was a sound procedure, the directive also allowed 
Ike to monitor Nixon's actions.
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The letter appealed to Nixon with rare presidential praise. Eisenhower, however, 
avoided any reference to strategic planning and implied Nixon would not commence an 
advisory position in State. Still, the President's coolness did not inhibit Dulles from using 
Nixon as a congressional relations consultant. And, while Nixon longed for a greater 
influence in foreign policy decisions, he recognized that openly advising Dulles on 
international legislation in Congress was an important advancement.
Dulles repeated the tactic he had used when he recommended Nixon for the position of 
Secretary of State. His plan included elements that appealed to both Nixon and Eisenhower, 
but was motivated by enlightened self-interest. He lost no time in consulting with Nixon 
about how to push the 1958 legislative program through Congress. And, Nixon quickly 
appropriated the Development Loan Fund issue, a project acceptable to Eisenhower.19
Congressional relations was by no means the only interaction Dulles and Nixon shared 
after the 1956 election. The Secretary continued to rely on Nixon's advice. During a term 
plagued with international crises, Dulles included Nixon in the deliberations concerning at 
least three: the Soviet launching of the first man made satellite, Sputnik, the US intervention 
in Lebanon and the second mainland Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu.
On October 4, 1957, Russia launched Sputnik. The orbiting satellite shocked 
Americans in every walk of life. For the Administration, it raised questions about the 
adequacy of US missile development, scientific education in schools and security from 
surprise attack. On top of these issues came the problem of dealing with the psychological 
blow dealt to the American people by losing the race into space to their nemesis. The 
November 3 launching of Sputnik II intensified all the US reactions. This second Russian
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satellite carried a live dog into space.20
In the midst of this crisis, Nixon fell prey to Dulles' revised agenda. With his new 
legislative aide, the Secretary's willingness to send Nixon abroad waned. On October 15, 
Dulles withdrew support for a trip to Europe he and Nixon had discussed for several months. 
Instead, Dulles claimed he needed Nixon for the legislative program. As they discussed 
Congress and the reaction to Sputnik, the Secretary, suggested "We have to break down the 
[congressional] insolidarity which is imposed upon us so we can have a larger measure of 
cooperation on nuclear weapons among our allies." Dulles wanted to expand missile 
programs. Nixon advised that the Administration had to seize the initiative, before Congress 
opened an investigation on why America had not launched a satellite first. He offered his 
analysis, but did not abandon his travel request. Ignoring Dulles' initial suggestion to sideline 
the trip, Nixon restated his willingness to tour Europe, only adding that if Ike wanted him to 
stay home, he would.21 The Vice President did not go abroad.
Sputnik spurred high level meetings throughout the Administration to discuss the US 
reaction. Dulles, the new Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy (appointed October 9), his 
Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles, Nixon, presidential assistant, Sherman Adams, and 
unnamed "others" came together for one such meeting on November 27.22 The situation 
required that Dulles and Defense department officials consult outside of regular Cabinet 
meetings. However, the reason behind Adams' and Nixon's inclusion was not immediately 
clear.
Adams maintained that White House staff members rarely took part in policy 
discussions, yet he sat in on this critical meeting. He never would have attended had the
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President not fallen ill two days before. Eisenhower suffered a minor stroke on November 25 
and he was not yet up to attending meetings. He spent that Wednesday working on papers in 
his private rooms. If not ill, he would not have missed a meeting that dealt with the national 
security of the United States. Adams undoubtedly acted as Eisenhower's representative.
Nixon's inclusion also was unexpected. While he went to most Cabinet and National 
Security Council meetings, he seldom attended this type of inter-departmental session. Like 
Adams, his presence at this meeting might best be explained by Eisenhower's lack of 
attendance. With Eisenhower briefly out of commission, it was appropriate that his technical 
second in command attend an important meeting. Appropriate or not, however, Dulles did 
not have to invite Nixon because Eisenhower had not been fully incapacitated and Adams 
represented the President. Nixon's presence was a result of the good will of Dulles. The 
Secretary took advantage of the situation to bring Nixon, at least this once, into the inner 
circle of advisors.23
Dulles chaired the event, if not officially, then by default. McElroy was new to his 
position and Dulles outranked everyone else, except technically Nixon. The discussion 
centered on two issues. First, was the need to accelerate work in the long range missile 
program. Second, the question of the psychological importance of deploying intermediate 
range missiles in NATO countries as a response to Sputnik. Russia’s ability to orbit a 
satellite was taken as a sign that the US had fallen behind in rocket science. Thus, America's 
missile program instantly became a national concern.
At the meeting, Dulles explained that he favored a single missile program instead of 
the current double efforts with the Thor and Jupiter projects. He admitted, however, "other
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factors were controlling and that there was an irresistible pressure to accelerate the program 
and demonstrate our capacity as rapidly as possible." The participants appeared to be in 
accord.24 There was little to disagree about. The United States had to illustrate its own 
technological aptitude or concede to Soviet superiority.
Despite the small role Nixon took during this meeting, his participation represented a 
rare chance for him to join directly in the foreign policy decision making process. The next 
time Dulles included Nixon in a national security concern, the Vice President was unable to 
come directly into the fold. They reverted to their standard method of unofficial consultation.
In 1958, the Administration detected increasingly disturbing trends in the Middle East. 
American intelligence perceived Nasserite subversion in Iraq and threats to the pro-US 
monarchy in Jordan. In July, concerns compounded when Lebanese President Camille 
Chamoun requested an American military intervention to help stabilize his government and 
end a coup against him. Examining the region using domino theory logic, Administration 
members feared the loss of one anti-Communist or pro-westem regime would weaken 
resistance among the other Arab countries and lead to Communist domination. They were 
faced with three possible defeats in the Middle East.
Chamoun's request for US intervention presented Eisenhower with a perfect 
opportunity to increase America's presence in the Middle East, and protect its interests. On 
the morning of July 14, the President gathered his advisors to discuss the US response to 
Lebanon's plight. Eisenhower wanted an invasion force. That afternoon he explained the 
situation to a bipartisan group of Congressmen. The following day marines were on the 
beaches of Lebanon. The US force, consisting of at least 5,000 troops, remained  in Lebanon
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until October.
The historical importance of the Lebanese landing generally has been downplayed. If 
mentioned at all, historians include only a few sentences about the event. The marines found 
beautiful beaches and surprised vacationers, but little more insidious. Yet, at the time, 
Administration officials considered the action with a greater urgency. This is evident both in 
Eisenhower's recollection of the events - discussed in Waging Peace - and in documents 
relating to the intervention.
It is therefore of some significance that Nixon knew about the operation from the 
beginning. This was an operation that would become public abruptly - when the marines 
landed - so perhaps Dulles felt it prudent to keep Nixon informed. In any case, he and the 
Vice President talked on the phone just minutes before the marines went ashore. Nixon 
predicted "if it works we are all heroes and if not we are bums and it will probably be 
something in between." Dulles noted "in 7 minutes they [marines] should land. The Pres 
will issue a short statement as soon as we get a flash and Lodge will speak at the UN at 10." 
Without Dulles, it is doubtful Nixon could have amassed as much information as he did 
before the landing.25
A second telephone conversation between Dulles and Nixon illustrated both the 
importance of the intervention, and Nixon's line to the Oval Office through Dulles. At 6:49 
in the evening on July 15, Nixon called Dulles to discuss current affairs. They touched on 
two subjects - the Sherman Adams scandal and the situation in Lebanon.26 The Vice 
President's interest in Adams' predicament rested on two factors. Since Eisenhower’s heart 
attack in 1955 their rivalry for Ike's attentions had become more definite. Nixon rarely came
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out ahead. Also, with a touch of irony, Eisenhower ordered Nixon to convince Adams to 
resign. So, it was no surprise that Nixon talked about the Presidential assistant. In regard to 
the decision-making about Lebanon, however, Nixon had no direct involvement. Both Dulles 
brothers were officially consulted about the intervention, Nixon was not. Nevertheless,
Nixon and Dulles discussed the situation in detail.
Nixon advocated a strong US position in the Middle East. He feared that Eisenhower 
might vacillate, despite having taken the initial step. While Jordan and Iraq still faced anti­
western influences, Nixon concluded that Great Britain could take the lead in those areas.
But, he maintained  that America had >o support any British action in those areas "in the event 
[of] similar circumstances [to Lebanon]." Dulles cautioned that the US did not want to "get 
bogged down like the Br in Suez and have to pull out. We have assets in Lebanon we don't 
have in other places." Dulles, hesitant to commit to Jordan and Iraq, did not sway Nixon.
He ignored the caution and addressed what he saw at the heart of the issue. "N said the point 
is Lebanon is not too important and the Sec agreed. The Sec said Jordan is unimportant."
They agreed that "Iraq is the big thing" - probably because of oil interests. Dulles mentioned 
that British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd might come to Washington to discuss the 
situation.27
This after-hours conversation revealed how Nixon gained access into the decision 
making process. Without Dulles, he acted only as Eisenhower's messenger boy, as in the 
case of Sherman Adams. Dulles provided Nixon with opportunities to expand his knowledge 
of the Administration's foreign relations activities. The Vice President made the most of 
those opportunities.
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Another international incident broke a month later. On August 23, 1958, mainland 
China began shelling two islands claimed by Chaing Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. Four 
years earlier the islands Quemoy and Matsu first had been attacked by the Communist regime. 
In response to that assault, Eisenhower proposed and saw passed the Formosa Resolution, a 
congressional act authorizing the President to protect the area from Communist aggression 
using whatever means he deemed necessary. When the Chinese Communists attacked again 
in 1958, Eisenhower had the ability to respond instantly and did. He sent the Seventh Fleet to 
protect supply convoys from Taiwan to Quemoy.28
Nixon's first recorded briefing on the situation in Asia came during a lunch 
conversation with the Secretary on September 5. Dulles "discussed with the Vice President 
the situation in the Taiwan Straits and briefed him on what we are doing about it." The Vice 
President wondered whether certain Congressmen should be briefed. Although Nixon 
recommended a standard tactic - Ike used it with the Lebanese intervention - Dulles probably 
rejected it in view of the blanket authority provided by the Formosa Resolution.
The upcoming congressional elections gave Nixon a valid excuse to pester Dulles for 
up-to-date information on the crisis. The Vice President had speeches to make and media to 
inform. He used the situation to broach foreign relations topics in terms of domestic politics. 
On September 25, he asked how to handle Quemoy and Matsu at an upcoming press 
conference.29 Although not prompted to, the Secretary launched into a detailed explanation of 
the situation, laid out his position and gave Nixon the opportunity to present his own 
viewpoint.
Dulles first explained why America had to protect Quemoy, despite a common belief
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that US involvement was not worth risking a Sino-American confrontation. Dulles said "we 
don't want to fight for them but the problem cannot be simplified in that way." He 
complained that Chaing would not give up his island bases, regardless of US wishes.
Further, if American aid stopped the islands would be captured and Communist China could 
continue its aggression until it conquered Taiwan. "The broad challenge is are we going to 
keep the Western shores of the Pacific in friendly hands or not?" Working in the domino 
theory mindset, Dulles saw no choice but to defend Quemoy and Matsu to prevent Formosa 
from succumbing to China. As China's influence expanded, Dulles envisioned Japan 
eventually being forced to make terms with this foe. The Secretary's analysis mirrored 
Eisenhower's own conclusions, and thereby provided Nixon with an accurate understanding 
of top policy decisions.
Nixon assumed he "would be on firm ground to take the same firm line." Dulles 
replied that the Administration was "flexible on the offshore islands. We would take any 
solution short of retreat or surrender so these islands would cease to be provocations." What 
Dulles intended as an alternate solution is not clear. But, it was apparent that he did not want 
Nixon to publicly espouse a plan that the Administration might later renounce. By advising 
Nixon against  the firm line approach, he protected his ability to change his policy without 
media or partisan recriminations.
By reputation, flexibility was not Dulles' hallmark, but in fact he opposed one track 
responses. In public he favored simple, judicious remarks. Historian Frederick Marks, 
however, noted that Dulles' "straight forward public statements were totally at variance with 
the wealth of distinctions and qualifications that regularly informed his private thought." The
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Secretary believed the public did not have the sophistication to deal with the nuances of 
foreign relations and simplified his public remarks to present a concise, easily digestible 
product. Yet, he also recognized the dangers of the exaggerated statements which appealed to 
Nixon. He reminded Nixon of the need for cautious comments, with the hope of maintaining 
his policy options.
Dulles' response also provided Nixon with a little more insight on American aims in 
the region. The Secretary wanted to end this confrontation quickly because he feared it might 
expand inadvertently. Already a recurring problem, he hoped to find a solution that would 
remove Quemoy and Matsu as contentious factors. To most inquirers Dulles probably would 
not have dispensed this detailed analysis. But then, Dulles did not invite most people to 
Sunday dinner as he did Nixon, when their conversation ended.30
About two weeks later, Nixon asked for another briefing on Quemoy and Matsu - this 
time in regard to a speech the Vice President had scheduled. When Nixon asked for advice 
Dulles responded in kind. Discussing Red China's decision to bombard the islands every 
other day, Dulles asked for Nixon's guidance, but did not present the Vice President with any 
policy questions. Instead, he described the situation in full and waited for Nixon to respond. 
"The Sec said it is an extraordinarily interesting development. We had always hoped that 
there would come about not through our talks in Warsaw but through force of events a de 
facto cease-fire. . . . "  Now, during off days, ships could resupply the outposts as much as 
desired. China had effectively closed the doors on an invasion. The Secretary expressed his 
disbelief and satisfaction with the new Chinese policy. By unilaterally withdrawing, China 
had submitted to world pressures and limited its ability to reinitiate hostilities. "Unless they
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[PRC] can get some pretext from the Nationalists it does not make much sense. They would 
take the onus of starting it again." Renewed shelling would create an international outcry 
against the Communists. The US just had to ensure Chaing did not provoke an attack from 
the mainland.
The Secretary assumed that global opinion would keep the PRC in check. He 
recognized that the size of mainland China precluded its isolation from world affairs for more 
than a few decades. In fact, he welcomed their participation. He reasoned that for mainland 
China to gain acceptance, it would have to renounce its more aggressive philosophies and 
accept international laws. The Red Chinese retreat signified an acknowledgment that world 
opinion influenced mainland China. Dulles guessed that "they have decided the better line is 
to try at the moment to work on internal dissension in Taiwan . . . ." That tactic avoided the 
international forum. Eisenhower joked that the revised bombarding schedule resembled a 
"Gilbert and Sullivan war." Certainly, the face saving tactic of shelling on odd days was 
unimpressive to the vast majority of global spectators.
When Dulles finished, Nixon replied. He considered both his immediate question of 
how to deal with the upcoming speech and, by implication, provided Dulles his counsel. 
Trying to determine guidelines, he asked if "a [dependable] de facto cease-fire would be 
sufficient to allow a reduction of forces." Nixon also wondered "if the Sec had no objection 
to his continuing to say our policy of firmness in rejecting the concept of the use of force to 
accomplish international objectives and with our willingness to negotiate in the event force is 
not used. . . ."3I These two positions were not contentious and therefore satisfied Dulles. In 
voicing them, Nixon also offered the Secretary a practical policy stance. A de facto cease-fire
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meant Dulles could advocate a decreased role for American forces (and probably a troop 
reduction of Chaing's garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu). Plus, Nixon noted the US 
willingness to negotiate, after Red China ended its aggression. The PRC would then be 
working within the free world's moral framework. Nixon’s analysis implied a previous 
familiarity with Dulles' conception of how to deal with the Red Chinese.
Nixon consulted with Dulles almost to the last day of the Secretary's life. On April 4, 
less than two weeks before Dulles resigned as Secretary of State, they discussed a bevy of 
topics. Nixon asked whether or not he should meet with the newly empowered Cuban leader 
Fidel Castro. Dulles recommended it, but only after thorough consultation with R. Richard 
Rubottom - Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs. The Vice President also mentioned 
his reluctance to head the American delegation to the Inter-American Conference, "in view of 
the experiences of his last trip to South America" - although Eisenhower had already raised 
the subject. Whether or not Nixon feared a return to Latin America, or just raised the topic 
for dramatic effect, he did not go to the conference. And, in fact, by April Dulles probably 
did not have any influence on that decision.
Finally, Nixon wondered if Dulles had any misgivings about him visiting the Soviet 
Union during the summer. To Nixon’s great pleasure, Dulles supported the initiative. "The 
Secretary. . . said he would have no objection to the Vice President raising the matter with 
the President."
On May 2, Nixon talked with Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital. By this time, Nixon's 
trip to Moscow had been approved. Dulles advised the Vice President not to stop in Great 
Britain, Germany or France before he visited Russia. Instead, Nixon could consult with the
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allies on his way back if "during his visit to Moscow the Vice President learned something of 
real significance. . . . "  On May 20, four days before Dulles died, they met again to discuss 
the trip to Russia. Dulles advised his friend to let Khrushchev know that America would not 
allow the Soviets to compete in the Capitalist world, while banning competition in the 
Communist world.32 His comment harkened back to his fear of economic warfare. Whether 
Nixon listened to this advice out of respect for his dying mentor, or to gain an edge with 
Khrushchev is unknownable. With the loss of his strength, Dulles also lost his influence. 
Nixon's incentive to follow Dulles’ suggestions over his own instinct waned. When the Vice 
President reached Moscow, he largely ignored the Secretary's concerns.
However, throughout most of their association Nixon valued the consultation he and 
Dulles shared. In appreciation, he developed a fierce loyalty for the Secretary - defending 
Dulles, when the Secretary could not do so himself. During the June 15, 1955 NSC meeting 
- over which Nixon presided - the Vice President revealed this allegiance. After listening to 
various Council members discuss "what we should and should not do with respect to getting 
rid of outmoded military concepts. . ."he noted they were overstepping their bounds. Nixon 
remarked that Dulles (probably absent from the meeting because Chancellor Adenauer was in 
Washington) "may well have something to say about what is feasible and what is not feasible 
from a political point of view with respect to dumping old concepts and defense strategies."33 
Invoking Dulles' authority, Nixon brought the discussion to a halt. He assumed the Secretary 
would not support the line of reasoning that these NSC members were following. The 
interruption made it easier for Dulles to argue against their positions later, since they had no 
chance to draw conclusions, or make recommendations. It also bestowed authority on Nixon
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
99
as the Secretary’s representative. He specifically avoided mention of Ike because he could not 
claim a close association with the President.
Recognizing Dulles' patronage, Nixon used whatever opportunities he found to 
support the Dulles position. He admitted as much during a telephone conversation at the end 
of August, 1955, while consulting with Dulles about a speech. Dulles instructed Nixon to 
deny the talk was cleared by State. The Vice President accepted that. An un-sanctioned 
speech gave the illusion of some independence from the Administration. With that came a 
modicum of perceived foreign relations authority assigned by the media. Nixon added "he 
likes to say things the Sec. might want to say but can't himself." This remark revealed the 
adroitness of his scheme. The authority Nixon gained by speaking independently of Dulles 
was reinforced by the fact that he was actually proposing a State Department condoned policy. 
He could be an unofficial spokesman for State without ever admitting it, benefiting his and 
Dulles' causes. Nixon remained steadfast for the Secretary, until Dulles' final day. Yet, he 
did not put Dulles’ priorities before his own.34
It should never be concluded that the Nixon-Dulles relationship had any basis in 
equality. Dulles helped his friend when he benefited from the arrangement. If the Secretary 
anticipated detrimental results to State, he gave no aid. Nixon understood that Dulles would 
preserve his own position over Nixon's. And, if he did not, Dulles made it completely 
apparent in 1957.
One Saturday in February, the Secretary raised the subject of a proposal to appoint 
Nixon as Chair of the Operations Coordinating Board - a committee that organized foreign 
relations efforts throughout the government. Dulles disapproved of the suggestion. He
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candidly explained "I did not consider it compatible with good organization that someone 
speaking with the authority of the Vice President and presumably in the name of the President 
should go over my head to give directives to my subordinates in the State Department. . . .  I 
must oppose a step which seemed to be to be [sic] incompatible with my authority in the State 
Department." Dulles expected to be Eisenhower’s primary source in foreign relations 
decisions, and was not about to hand over some of that authority to his apprentice.35 While 
Nixon wanted to accept the promotion, he knew Dulles would not allow it. If he pressed for 
a determination from Eisenhower, he would lose the argument and in the process injure his 
relationship with the Secretary. Nixon preferred to fight battles less costly.
Dulles died eighteen months before the end of the Eisenhower Administration. He 
would have appreciated some of the events that occurred during that year and a half. Most 
obviously, Dulles missed the event on which he had advised Nixon during the final month - 
the Vice President's trip to Russia. Despite Nixon’s lack of concrete results, Dulles would 
have admired Nixon’s historic tour, highlighted by the kitchen debate with Khrushchev and 
the televised broadcast of a speech to the Russian people. The Secretary also did not live to 
see K hrushchev's reciprocal visit to the US or the invitation Ike received to visit Russia in 
1960.
On the other hand, almost a year after Dulles’ death a U-2 airplane piloted by Francis 
Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet airspace. Following American denials of 
wrongdoing, Dulles was spared the embarrassing Communist revelation that Powers was alive 
and his mission one of espionage. The Secretary also did not live to see the resultant 
breakdown of the 1960 Summit and rising tensions between the U.S.S.R. and America.
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The Secretary’s death left Nixon to fend for himself. During the next year, the Vice 
President worked alone to maintain his presidential prospects. Unfortunately for Nixon, as 
the end of the Administration approached, Eisenhower began asserting his own character. Ike 
wanted to bring peace to the world.36 He wanted his leadership skills to show.
The President publicized his international relations expertise by taking four overseas 
goodwill tours before the end of his term. Had the U-2 incident been avoided, Eisenhower 
would also have visited Moscow. Although Khrushchev manipulated the US government with 
great skill during the crisis, the President still handled the events with courage and 
determination. Despite his failure to bring a new understanding between the Capitalist and 
the Communist  worlds, Ike left office with much of his popularity and respectability intact. 
Nixon’s public forum was eclipsed. His foreign travel was restricted by Ike's actions and his 
own campaign. He lost the 1960 presidential election and had no obvious future prospects.
The Nixon-Dulles alliance was close both in terms of friendship and consultation. The 
previous chapter illustrated the amicability present between the Secretary of State and the 
Vice President. This chapter has shown the professional side of their relationship. Dulles 
frequently discussed his positions with the Vice President. He brought Nixon into his 
confidence, shared ideas, listened to advice and suggested tactics. The relationship affected 
both men in their official capacities.
But, Dulles' patronage had limits. He revealed them in October 1957, when he 
adopted the same stance Eisenhower had taken in December 1953. The Secretary valued 
Nixon's help on legislative matters above his friends’ desire for international affairs 
experience. The change confirmed that the Secretary would help his friend until their
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respective purposes contradicted. Then Dulles gently pulled rank, as in the OCB incident.
Nixon's relationship with Dulles was a determining factor in how the Vice President 
was able to present himself to the world. Dulles handed Nixon opportunities to enhance his 
image and increase his power that the President would not consider. Nixon made the best of 
Dulles' help, while still seeking to expand his role beyond what the Secretary offered. And, 
of course, he had always to contend with the limits that Eisenhower placed on his office.
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Chapter 4
Nixon's Search for a Role - The First Term
Richard Nixon’s vice presidential duties were considerable and varied. For the 
Administration as a whole, he acted as a congressional liaison, political advisor, roving 
ambassador, die hard campaigner, international relations expert and media target. Among 
those roles, however, Nixon sought to emphasize his expertise in foreign affairs. Although 
he did not shy away from political name calling or congressional wrangling, he yearned for 
the prestige and respect accorded a statesman. He also understood experience in international 
affairs could help him toward the Oval Office.
During his vice presidency, Nixon attempted to enhance his image as a foreign 
specialist publicly and in the Administration. Concurrently, Eisenhower envisioned a much 
different picture of Mr. Nixon. When they entered the White House in 1953, Ike assured 
Nixon a greater role in the Administration than any previous Vice President, and he was true 
to his word.1 But, that did not mean Nixon was informed of every decision or that he was 
consulted on each crisis. Ike valued the Vice President's political worth above all else. He 
emphasized Nixon's ability as a congressional advisor and negotiator for the Executive 
branch. Although a much less dignified job than foreign relations advisor, there was no 
question that Nixon managed this role well.
109
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Nixon's friend and patron Foster Dulles saw a combination of roles for the Vice 
President. He found Nixon's talents extended beyond congressional relations. He attempted 
to use the Vice President's skills wherever they could be applied. Hence, Dulles gave Nixon 
some of the foreign relations prestige he desperately craved, kept Nixon working on 
congressional problems and had the Vice President serve as an information source.
Although they had built a relationship by 1953, Dulles’ earnest mentorship of Nixon 
did not begin from day one. Nixon was without an ally at the start of the Administration, as 
he would be again after Dulles died. Of necessity, the Californian fended for himself.
Nixon's position in the Administration took most of the first year to solidify. As he 
sought to carve a niche out, Nixon responded to the personalities of Ike and Dulles. He 
attempted to make his responses compatible with theirs. Initially, he was unsure of how to, 
act. At the pre-inaugural cabinet meeting in the Commodore Hotel, Nixon manifested this 
insecurity. According to historian Stephen Ambrose, "Nixon limited his remarks to heartily 
endorsing whatever Eisenhower said" during the meeting.2 It was not a surprising reaction, 
given the circumstances. Ike exuded confidence and control. Nixon was unsure of his 
position in the Administration and of how to approach the situation. For all of his political 
expertise, he was out of his element, part of a meeting where everyone was his senior and 
most knew the President-elect more intimately than he did. He may even have been star 
struck by his close proximity to the commanding general of World War II.
The Vice President did not remain passive for too long. Following the inauguration, 
he began to carefully feel for his footing, taking exploratory steps to find where he could 
comfortably stand and where he hit quicksand. He would spend the entire Administration
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doing this to some extent. However, after his first trip abroad in the Fall of 1953, he adopted 
a more confident and assertive manner.
In Administration meetings Nixon made a point of being heard, even if his comments 
were ignored. When he had something relevant to add to the discussion he did, but he 
sometimes interjected remarks that only marginally concerned the topic at hand. This 
probably reflected his insecurity and his desire to be an active participant in the decision 
making process.
At one of the first National Security Council meetings Nixon revealed his discomfort 
as Vice President. The discussion dealt with Mohammed Mossadegh's reign in Iran. When 
Nixon spoke up he relied on his debating techniques and inserted a prosecutorial diatribe 
against Communist infiltration in Iran that was vaguely reminiscent of his verbal attack on L.
J. Cromie in 1947. As though on HUAC, Nixon predicted "greater rather than less hostility 
was to be expected from the Russians after Stalin's death. It was quite likely, therefore, that 
they would increase their presence in Iran to secure its control as rapidly as possible by a 
coup d'etat. "3 Nixon's reference to Stalin came without warning. His emphasis on Russian 
intervention had not been discussed. Finally, his analysis that the Soviets would become 
more aggressive, rather than less, did not reflect the general belief expressed at the meeting. 
Nixon's line of argument did not seem to convince anyone, nor did he again raise it in this 
manner. He realized the inappropriate tone of his outburst and adapted his anti-Communism 
to be less demagogic. The next time he spoke up, Nixon would be more analytical.
At the May 13, NSC meeting, the minutes recorded that "The Vice President again 
reverted to the view he had expressed at last week's Council meeting, that the decision which
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the Council must presently take, with respect to alternative courses of action in Korea in the 
event of a break down of the armistice negotiations, should be taken only in the context of the 
longer-term problem which would confront us when the Soviet Union had amassed a 
sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiatives 
in the area of foreign policy." Nixon's anti-Communism was still evident, but now he 
presented his argument in a more sophisticated manner. To his disappointment, Eisenhower 
explained that Project Solarium "was being initiated with this precise problem in mind."4 
Nixon appeared to be a step behind. Worse yet, he was excluded from the Solarium 
discussions.
Nixon continued trying to refine his comments to better mesh with the demeanor of the 
Administration. In the process, he also worked toward defining his own role as Vice 
President. He seemed naturally attracted to foreign relations policy-making. His interest 
arose from the anti-Communist reputation he had earned on HU AC and his European trip 
with the Herter Commission. Eisenhower did not believe these experiences endowed Nixon 
with special qualifications and expressed no interest in Nixon's foreign affairs appraisal. The 
Vice President, however, never stopped trying to advise the President.
Throughout the two terms as Vice President, Nixon made sure he said something in 
almost every Cabinet or NSC meeting he attended. He frequently waited until the last few 
minutes of the meetings to make any comments. This perhaps reflected his own interest in 
hearing everyone else's position before revealing his own. He may, however, have used this 
as a tactic to ensure his ideas were remembered. As almost the last part of the discussion, 
Nixon's remarks might be better recalled than comments heard earlier in the meeting.
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An example of Nixon's need to be heard came on June 25, 1953. The conversation 
centered on Japan. During the discussion the subject of anti-American feelings in Japan was 
raised. The President commented on how in his experience, almost universally, occupational 
forces earned the malignity of the native people in whose country they stayed. He noted that 
this very problem now afflicted American-Japanese relations. Nixon commented that he was 
disturbed by this aspect of occupational forces. Nixon's concern, however, did not come 
until several minutes after Ike’s original comment. In the interim seven different people 
talked. The conversation had drifted away from Eisenhower's aside, to Japan's strategic 
importance. By the time Nixon voiced his opinion, it was totally out of context in the 
conversation. He said nothing more in the meeting, which ended soon thereafter. It was a 
reasonable comment which showed an interest and respect for Ike's experience. But, the 
statement added nothing of consequence to the discussion. Nixon's response provoked no 
more reaction than that it was recorded in the NSC minutes.
As Nixon found his place in the Administration, he more often raised salient points, 
rather than disconnected comments. But the latter behavior sporadically reappeared for the 
duration of the Administration. Nixon wanted to be heard, whether or not his point bore any 
relevance on the conversation. The tactic ensured he had some voice in the Administration.
That first year Nixon seemed more comfortable at meetings Eisenhower did not attend. 
Left to preside over the Cabinet meeting on August 27, he stepped up to the role of leader 
without any hesitation. When in charge, Nixon had no problem querying the second most 
intimidating man in the Cabinet, Dulles. After the Secretary briefed the Cabinet on his recent 
trip to Korea, Nixon questioned him intelligently and with confidence. The Vice President
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asked about the possibility of reunification for Korea and learned of South Korean President 
Syngman Rhee's "desire for huge armaments which is inspired more by fear of Japan than of 
the Communists." Given these forces, however, North Korea would not consider negotiating. 
The Vice President knew by June 5 that he would be going to the Far East in the fall and he 
probably was researching his trip.5 Most of his itinerary was set by August, so he knew 
Korea was a stop. However, had Eisenhower attended the meeting, Nixon would not have 
pursued the topic as steadily.
The trip to the Far East helped Nixon move toward the role he hoped to play within 
the Administration. While he had established his interest in foreign relations years before, it 
was on this trip that he discovered how to explore this passion while serving a President who 
expressed no interest in furthering Nixon’s education on the subject.
Nixon admitted in his memoirs that his first overseas trip as Vice President had "a 
tremendously important effect on my thinking and on my career . . . .  it established my 
foreign policy experience and expertise in what was to become the most critical and 
controversial part of the world." During the trip he learned that Asia’s view of the US was 
based on European and Communist propaganda, and that these people, long dominated by the 
West, wanted independence from colonial powers. Beyond the tangible facts, the trip had a 
profound impact on the role he would play in the Administration. It gave him the ability to 
discuss a foreign region where neither Dulles nor Eisenhower had as much knowledge.6
It is not completely clear whether Eisenhower or Dulles first suggested the destination 
for Nixon's Fall trip. After the fact, Nixon claimed that Eisenhower offhandedly introduced 
the subject. In a 1965 interview, he reported that his trip was discussed just after Dulles had
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returned from a tour to the Middle East (Dulles visited eleven countries in May). The 
Secretary explained to Eisenhower and Nixon that "he had found a great deal of 
misunderstanding as to what our policy was. And he said that just sitting down and talking to 
these men had an immensely good effect."
Dulles' comment reflected his basic maxim that international incidents arose from 
misunderstandings. Garbled communication resulted in disagreements with allies and wars 
with enemies. To this end, Dulles built relations with allies and made it clear to enemies that 
the United States would not fold to their pressures or accept Communist infiltration. 
According to Roderic O’Connor, Dulles believed "you had to make sure that the enemy knew 
that if he made a move, you were going to move. If the enemy had any doubt that you would 
move, that could lead to the misunderstanding and miscalculation that would start a major 
war. "7 With allies, face-to-face meetings minimized misinterpretations and maximized 
solutions.
Perceiving Dulles’ direction, the President asked Nixon what his plans were for the 
Fall. Nixon responded "'Well, anything you like.' And he said, 'Well, why don't you take a 
trip to Asia.'" Nixon concluded, "It was Eisenhower's idea. He threw it out. Of course, 
Dulles then had to execute it." Nixon also cited Eisenhower as the originator in his memoirs. 
In fact, Dulles probably conceived of the trip, rather than Ike. The Secretary already had 
begun his mentorship, as well as his manipulation, of Nixon.
On June 5, Dulles and Nixon discussed the Vice President's plans to take a trip abroad 
in September or October. "The Secretary said he thought that the Far East (Korea, Japan, 
Formosa, The Philippines and possibly Djakarta) would be best. He has just returned from
s
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the Near East, Milton E. is going to Latin America, and everybody goes to Europe."8 If 
Eisenhower already had expressed his desire for the Vice President to go to Asia, Dulles 
would not have brought up the subject as he did. Dulles suggested the destination without 
any reference to Eisenhower. Had he obtained prior approval from the President, he would 
have made it clear to Nixon.
Dulles provided the Vice President with a rationale for going to Asia prior to the 
conversation Nixon remembered having with Eisenhower. He presented a case that appealed 
to Nixon's desire for a visible role in foreign policy, and sweetened it when he explained why 
Asia was the best place for Nixon to visit in terms of Nixon's image, not US policy-making. 
While Nixon always considered his public image, later in the Administration he became more 
adamant about the foreign relations substance of his trips.
His interests often wavered between enhancing public image and increasing policy­
making duties. But, when Ike reiterated the suggestion - probably spurred by Dulles - the 
Vice President had even greater motivation for taking the trip. He would need that 
motivation, since this trip lasted over two months.
Vice President Nixon and his wife Pat (brought along on the suggestion of Dulles) 
visited nineteen countries during their tour including, Taiwan, Korea, Indochina (Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia), Burma and Japan. The couple followed a pattern similar to the one 
Nixon developed on the Herter trip. They met and talked to the common people, visited 
families and shook hands. Nixon also consulted with the government officials of each 
country, asking about Communist influences, and listening to their concerns. He formed 
relationships with these leaders, while he assessed their abilities.
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Nixon came to resent goodwill tours, but in 1953 he was too excited. No tour of this 
sort had ever been made by an American President or Vice President. He was thrilled with 
the opportunity and anxious for the experience. Dulles had assigned Nixon the task of 
scouting out Asia.
The public announcement about Nixon's first international trip came on July 7, 1953. 
Early that day, the Vice President called Dulles to advise him to issue a press release about 
the trip. Nixon explained that journalist Robert Allen had already revealed it in his column, 
and if Dulles held off, Eisenhower would face questions about the trip at his press conference 
the following day. Nixon suggested that the announcement emphasize the fact he was "going 
as representative of the President and the State Department." By reaction Nixon sought to 
give his assignment the presidential seal of approval. Dulles replied he would make the 
announcement in the same way the notice of Milton Eisenhower's trip had been made. He 
issued a statement explaining "the purpose of the visit will be for the Vice President and his 
party to become acquainted with leaders of the countries visited, to hear their views, to gain 
firsthand impressions and to convey the sincere greetings of the people of the United States to 
the peoples of the areas visited and carry the personal greetings of the President." In short, a 
goodwill trip.
Who leaked the plans for a trip was not discussed. One could speculate it was Nixon, 
himself. He was the only person in the Administration who benefitted by making the 
inform ation public. He was also the person who suggested the leak be substantiated with an 
official announcement. Perhaps, the Vice President concluded that if the rumor was not 
confirmed, the media would not take notice. Despite the leak and the official statement,
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White House correspondents ignored the announcement at Eisenhower's next press 
conference.9 Nixon would have preferred it had come up, since without press coverage it was 
hard to promote his public image.
In some aspects, this trip shared similarities with the 1947 trip to Europe. As with the 
Herter Committee, Nixon received unsolicited advice from people about the regions he was 
scheduled to visit. A letter arrived from a Chinese businessman living in Saigon condemning 
Communist China. He told the Vice President "It happened like a bad dream that the whole 
China mainland - our home land - being devoured by the Communists." The exile claimed 
"we have come to know clearly by now that liberation is only meant for the Communists 
while we the real Chinese people are being oppressed and tortured out of our breadth [sic]." 
The letter confirmed every suspicion Nixon held about Communist regimes and reflected the 
typical conclusions reached by Anti-Maoists. For Nixon, it reinforced his view of mainland 
China. Following his trip, the Vice President would report that "Formosa is still a definite 
symbol to the many overseas Chinese communities. . . ."10 The letter provided him with a 
first hand critique of the situation in Asia, which he reconfirmed while on the trip. It 
illustrated, once again, that Communism had to be guarded against everywhere.
In 1947, Nixon was a Representative from California considering the Marshall plan.
Six years later he traveled from the United States as its second highest representative. With 
the new position, Nixon lost much of the scheduling flexibility that he had enjoyed as a 
Congressman. The State Department provided an itinerary instructing who to see and where 
to go. Nixon’s folder - labeled "Suggested Activities" - contained detailed plans on every 
aspect of the trip. If he hoped to repeat his adventurous approach of 1947, he would have to
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unofficially modify some of the State Department's recommendations.
One of the first liberties Nixon took was to mandate that, whenever possible, he would 
meet foreign dignitaries alone -with no additional staff. Writing about himself in third 
person, as he often did, Nixon instructed "On this trip unless there is a necessity to have 
somebody for translating purposes the V.P. does not want to have anyone with him when he 
talks with representatives of foreign countries. He does not want any of his staff, any state 
dept, personnel or anyone else unless it is absolutely necessary for him to have an 
interpreter." Nixon concluded with the order "I want to talk to as many controversial people 
as possible. The natural tendency is usually to discourage them but I want to see them all if 
possible."11 Still the risk taker, Nixon sought to gain control over how the trip progressed.
His directions assured him full credit for any diplomatic achievements reached during 
the trip. By prohibiting other American officials from sitting in on talks, Nixon created an 
opportunity to dominate the trip. He put himself in charge. He also gained prestige by 
conducting one-on-one discussions with world leaders, and ensured confidentiality. Plus, the 
Vice President guaranteed himself media attention. A final benefit would be that he could 
impress Dulles by performing well in talks.
Nixon's specific effort to meet with "controversial people" reflected his experiences on 
the Herter Committee. He had debated Communist party members in 1947. Now he hoped 
for the opportunity again. His interest arose out of the propaganda possibilities for the US, as 
well as the advantageous news coverage he could gain from such confrontations.
The President perceived a single objective for Nixon: he was to obtain a commitment 
from Syngman Rhee to support the armistice that ended the Korean war. But, State saw
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additional possibilities for Nixon's trip, in Korea and the other countries on his tour. Just 
before the Vice President left the United States, he received instructions from the State 
Department.
Dulles' people asked him to bolster the American Economic Coordinator in Korea by 
showing the man special attention in public. Privately, Nixon could relate to Rhee the respect 
Eisenhower had for the Coordinator. Essentially, this was a public relations ploy borrowed 
from campaign tactics and intended to improve the Economic Coordinator's position with 
Rhee. Here was a task Nixon could perform ins tine tually. He knew campaigning 
thoroughly. The more complicated assignment involved direct talks with Rhee.
State department advisors suggested Nixon serve as a negotiator, if he found the 
opportunity. In face-to-face discussions with Rhee "an idea might be hit upon for 
compromising the present deadlock over the hwan [won]-dollar exchange rate and related 
subjects, and in doing so, a formula might be found for dealing with the RK [Republic of 
Korea] President on other questions now and in the future." 12 These instructions presumed 
Nixon would serve as diplomat as well as goodwill ambassador. Nixon's coincidental 
directive to meet alone with foreign leaders, ensured he had the opportunity to test his 
diplomatic skills at every possible opportunity.
The first stops on Nixon's itinerary were New Zealand and Australia. Both countries 
were American allies and the vice presidential visits were simply courtesy calls. Nonetheless, 
Nixon received high praise from the American Ambassador to Australia for his performance 
there. The Vice President attracted large and admiring crowds. He impressed the Australian 
Prime Minister and the opposition leader. The Ambassador wrote, "as one member of the
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Cabinet expressed it, the visit fortified them in the desire of the leaders of both parties for 
increasingly close ties with America." The New Zealand/Australian portion got the trip off to 
a grand start, but Nixon found little of interest on these island countries. He expressed this 
indifference only after his return to America. The minutes taken during his State Department 
debriefing session stated "the Vice President merely described a few personal impressions of 
these countries but said little concerning our policies or the relationship between Australia and 
New Zealand with the other countries in Asia."13 Perhaps Australia and New Zealand were 
too civilized to appeal to Nixon's risk taking nature.
Several weeks into his trip, Nixon met the High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Gerald 
Templar. Discussions with Templar greatly influenced his perception of Communist tactics. 
On October 26, Templar wrote Eisenhower thanking him for the note delivered by the Vice 
President. About Nixon, Templar added "he’s so obviously a very fine man, and I am much 
looking forward to a long talk with him in my office before dinner this evening." It was from 
this talk that Nixon gained a tremendous respect for Templar and a new perspective on how to 
fight Communism in Asia.
The private meeting lasted an hour and a half. American foreign service officials 
complained that Nixon revealed few details about the conversation. But in his memoirs Nixon 
related some of the discussion.
Templar explained that the most effective method of fighting insurgent Communism in 
Asia was to enlist the natives. The indigenous people had to believe they were fighting for 
the independence of their country, not foreign colonialism. Nixon took the lesson as a truism 
and relied on it for his future analysis. During his post-trip debriefing, he stated the British
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had kept Malaya safe from Communism and "General Templar is thoroughly familiar with the 
entire problem."
Templar made enough of an impression for the Vice President to mention the Brit 
again at an NSC meeting in May 1954. During the discussion about the Geneva conference 
on Korea and Indochina that had begun some weeks before, Nixon suggested that Templar 
join the US delegation because the High Commissioner "had a keen understanding of the 
realities of the Communist threat to Southeast Asia."14 The Vice President considered 
Templar a foremost expert, otherwise he would not have made the comment.
Nixon found Templar's analysis compelling, if for no other reason than he placed 
great value in the support of the people. After three major campaigns, Nixon realized voters 
had to be convinced to elect candidates. He needed to offer them a reason to put him in 
office. A successful campaign against Communism had a similar element. If the natives 
grasped onto an inspiring cause - their freedom - they would vote, or in this case fight, for it. 
If Asians were asked to risk their lives to maintain a foreign regime, they would favor the 
alternative, Communism. In Italy and Greece, Nixon had seen how communism could mask 
itself in nationalist rhetoric and win support. It was a simple choice of which candidate had 
the more appealing platform.
Another reason Nixon latched onto Templar so quickly was that the High 
Commissioner’s interpretation verified conclusions the Vice President had already reached. 
When Secretary Dulles and he met with the Cambodian President six months before, Nixon 
concluded the problem in Indochina was "the fact that the native peoples were unwilling to 
fight Com m unism in order to perpetuate French colonialism."15 Templar applied the same
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reasoning to Asia in general. This confirmation from the field solidified Nixon's conclusions.
One other individual during this trip left a permanent mark on the Vice President. 
South Korean President Syngman Rhee affected Nixon's perception of Asia and his foreign 
affairs outlook. Ike wanted Nixon to obtain assurances from Rhee that he would not attack 
North Korea. The State Department hoped Nixon could convince Rhee to cooperate more 
with America. Rhee granted both of these and also espoused his personal strategy for dealing 
with Communists. As with Templar, this unsolicited advice taught Nixon a lesson he added 
to his analytical lexicon.
Rhee complained that the United States insisted on publicly limiting his options. US 
officials stated that America would not support Rhee if he resumed hostilities against the 
North. The US even implied it would keep South Korea from making any such assault. The 
Korean President understood he could not act without US aid, but admonished that it was 
"foolish for the U.S. to 'tie his hands' publicly." America would be better off to foster the 
image of South Korea's President as a loose cannon, uncontrollable and therefore 
unpredictable. That would keep the Chinese and the Russians guessing. It would create an 
unknown factor that could deter Communist forces from pursuing their own aggressive aims.
Rhee also wondered why the US failed to take advantage of his country as a resource. 
He described South Korea as a pawn that Washington could manipulate in order to weaken 
the Communists. Rhee complained "'Why doesn't the U.S. use me as the Russians use their 
satellites - India, North Korea and China?’ ” He wanted American planners to use South 
Korea as a proxy. Of course, if that led to an attack on North Korea, he would be amenable.
Nixon probably appreciated the role Rhee suggested for his country. He had a similar
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function, in microcosm, as Vice President. Nixon certainly valued the Korean's 
determination to keep the Communists guessing. He recalled in his memoirs, "Rhee's insight 
about the importance of being unpredictable in dealing with the Communists."16 He adopted 
this principle of doing the unexpected to keep his own enemies guessing. The idea appealed 
to Nixon because of his need to take risks and remain in the public eye.
For his immediate well being, Nixon obtained much more from this Asian trip than 
two concepts on how to fight Communism. He returned from the trip with a working 
knowledge of the political, economic and social problems that region faced, and an 
acquaintance with most of the pro-western Asian leaders. Most important, the tour illustrated 
to Dulles Nixon's effectiveness as a representative of the United States. Embassies 
throughout Asia reported on the tremendously positive reaction resulting from Nixon’s visits.
From Thailand came a telegram "Visit distinguished not (repeat not) only unusually 
helpful warm exchanges with Thailand leaders but also unprecedented contacts between Nixon 
and people. Visit did much further United States Objectives." An equally positive report 
came from Hong Kong. The visit was particularly successful in "increasing goodwill toward 
the United States among the people." The Vice President received special praise for meeting 
with the populace, in addition to leaders. "On every occasion Vice President went out of his 
way to shake hands with persons on fringes of crowds assembled to see him. When he raised 
his arms to greet crowds, they frequently responded with clapping and cheering, a reaction 
seldom witnessed in Hong Kong, where bystanders normally apathetic to visits of people in 
high positions." Nixon utilized tactics he had developed on the campaign trail and during the 
Herter Committee trip. The greatest change since 1947 was that as Vice President he had
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attained celebrity status in foreign countries.
During the trip, Nixon sent a telegram to State relaying his recommendations about the 
Philippines. He reported that Ram6n Magsaysay "combines two qualities needed for 
leadership in Asia: (a) magnetic appeal to all classes of people, (b) genuine regard for the 
people's welfare." Both attributes were desirable for any politician in the US. He suggested 
that the Filipino leader come to the United States once he had consolidated his power and 
address a joint session of Congress. Dulles penned "I agree with this" in the margin of 
telegram.17 Dulles’ agreement illustrated Nixon's utility to the Secretary.
Ambassador George V. Allen in India also sent accolades. Allen wrote the visit 
"contributed notably to our prestige in India and to better understanding of our respective 
points of view." Allen concluded "I do not believe we could hope for any more beneficial 
results to be obtained from single visit."
There was reason to praise the Vice President. Nixon's visit reassured the Indians that 
America considered India a world power. Allen explained, "Mr. Nixon's presence here. . . 
[has] fitted in admirably with Indian desire to be consulted on world and particularly oriental 
problems."18 Nixon's trip gave Asian countries the impression that the United States 
respected their opinions. His trip resulted in better communication all around.
Nixon performed beyond expectations in Pakistan. He was instrumental in clarifying 
the American position about Afghani claims on Pushtoonistan. He received instructions from 
the Department of State to discourage hostility and encourage direct talks between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. The United States would not act as a mediator. These positions, he 
explained, had the complete support of Dulles and Eisenhower. The American Ambassador
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to Pakistan reported that Pakistani officials believed Nixon's candid talks with Afghan leaders 
helped to develop improved relations between the countries.19 Nixon was proving his 
international affairs skills as both a representative and a negotiator. Could Dulles hope for a 
more effective goodwill Ambassador?
In Libya, Nixon's visit brought further achievement. There Nixon succeeded in 
moving forward negotiations for an American military base, where previous efforts had been 
stalled. Henry S. Villard, of the American Legation, noted that Nixon’s position in the US 
government gave him greater sway with the King. He "could speak in the name of the 
President and no higher authority could be cited to impress on the Libyans the need for action 
in this regard." Villard reported, "As concerns the base agreement, no more can possibly be 
done than was done by the Vice President of the United States to emphasize our desire to 
expedite the negotiations." The King assured Nixon that efforts would be redoubled after 
January 1, and an agreement reached soon there after.20 Nixon increased American prestige 
in Libya and helped move toward the establishment of a military base in that nation. Dulles 
had found a superior agent in the Vice President. Nixon's office gave him the authority of 
America and his persuasiveness got him results. The Secretary would deploy his protege 
again after this test run.
The experience Nixon gained in Asia was mainly one of acquaintanceship. In 1947, 
he had established a formula for such trips. He continued to follow it, whenever he could. 
This trip confirmed many of his suspicions and certainly increased his celebrity in the United 
States. It gave him the unprecedented opportunity for the Vice President to talk privately 
with most of the leaders of Asia.
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In terms of increasing Nixon's role in the Administration, the most important aspect 
was the overwhelming success of his trip. If Dulles harbored any doubts about the Vice 
President’s qualifications, he abandoned them, given the tremendous praise that followed each 
stop. Nixon performed flawlessly. Plus, Nixon provided his benefactor with first hand 
reports on relations with all of the countries he visited. Dulles rewarded Nixon for his 
efforts. Beginning in 1955, and continuing until Dulles' death in 1959, Nixon traveled 
abroad at least once a year. The Secretary of State could rely on Nixon to carry the message 
he had in mind and reconnoiter for him. In return, Nixon could expect positive press 
coverage and a boost in his national and foreign prestige.
This trip was a great triumph in Asia and America. When the Nixons returned to 
Washington on December 14, they were greeted by a delegation from the State Department, 
all the Ambassadors from the countries they visited and a number of Senators. Nixon went 
straight to the White House, where Eisenhower met him on the porch.21
Nixon's experiences gave him the first visible block to build his reputation as an 
international relations expert. He returned to America with a new sense of foreign relations 
proficiency, which he immediately attempted to apply. The Vice President hoped to share his 
many insights about the regions he had visited. But, Eisenhower's interest focused on 
whether or not he had curtailed Syngman Rhee's aggressive behavior toward North Korea. 
Ambrose noted that "All Eisenhower seemed to care about was getting Rhee to promise not to 
fight; the President was not interested in what Nixon had to say about the situation elsewhere 
in Asia." Ike's dismissal of everything else must have been a blow to Nixon. He probably 
took some consolation, however, in the fact that he did achieve the President’s primary goal.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 2 8
Before arriving in Korea, Nixon received a telegram from Dulles instructing him to 
convince Rhee that America would not support aggression on the part of South Korea. One 
day after his arrival, Nixon could boast that Rhee had verbally pledged he would not attack 
unilaterally, without first informing Eisenhower. He and the Ambassador to Korea viewed 
this as significant progress. Rhee's statement implied a measure of autonomy from US 
control, but implicitly acknowledged the importance of American support if South Korea were 
to attack.
By the time Nixon landed in the United States, he could state that Rhee was under 
control. The day after returning, he reported to the NSC on his talks with Rhee. He 
concluded his presentation by stating, "I do not believe that Rhee will take any action of the 
sort we fear without prior notification to the President. Nor will he take any action unless he 
is assured that the U.S. will go along."22 That was the reassurance Eisenhower, and Dulles, 
had desired.
Nixon hoped that after completing his assignment he would be rewarded with an 
expanded foreign affairs role. Toward that end, a week after his return, Nixon sought to 
underscore his status as an international expert. On December 23, he made a second 
presentation to the NSC on South East Asia. He adopted two tactics in an effort to catch the 
attention of NSC members. First, he couched his analysis of the region in terms of Europe. 
This might attract Ike's interest. Second, reflecting his frustration with Ike's sole concern 
about Korea, Nixon de-emphasized the importance of Korea and concentrated on Indochina. 
Drawing on his talks with Templar, he explained the contradiction with France wanting to 
keep South Vietnam in the French Union and the South Vietnamese desire for independence.
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Nixon closed, "I am convinced in my own mind that what happens in Indochina is more 
important, from the standpoint of strategic interests of Europe, than what happens in 
Korea."23 He disputed Eisenhower's conclusion. But his disagreement came in terms of 
European security, making it a well crafted position designed to intrigue, rather than upset 
Ike.
Nixon's talks were not limited to the Cabinet and National Security Council. On 
January 8, 1954, he made a presentation to the top 22 State Department officials, two CIA 
representatives and Defense department personnel. Certainly, Foster and Allen Dulles were 
among the attenders. Nixon reported for three and a half hours, and then answered questions 
for another one and half hours. The Vice President methodically noted his findings about 
each country. Emphasizing Communism, most of the remarks concerned which countries 
were in danger of infiltration (a theme prevalent in his Herter journal, as well). He generally 
concluded that Asians favored economic progress and independence, over Communism.24
The trip to the Far East got a foot in the international affairs door. After it, Nixon 
considered himself an expert in Asian foreign policy. Although Nixon’s experience on the 
continent in 1947 might have led him to emphasize his European knowledge, he never 
attempted to advise on that region. Nixon assessed the situation early in the Administration, 
perhaps when the Secretary explained why he could not go to Europe, the Middle East or 
Latin America. Eisenhower's primary concern and expertise was Europe. Ike had formed 
strong relationships with the leaders of free Europe during World War II. Dulles could also 
claim a proficiency in continental matters, and Ike's trust of the Secretary of State led him to 
consult with Dulles on European policy. Nixon had little hope of gaining any say in a region
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where Ike was so well versed, and already had a competent advisor.
Dulles' expertise also included Asia, and to a lesser extent Latin America, where he 
had traveled during his career as a lawyer. On the latter, Milton Eisenhower (the President's 
brother) had claims. Nixon could not gain a hearing there - not early in the Administration, 
at least. In 1953, Africa and the Middle East were still considered Great Britain's problem, 
so American interests there remained limited.
That left Asia. With Dulles' primary duty to advise Eisenhower on Europe, Nixon 
could begin building his reputation as an expert on the Far East. The Secretary had an 
interest in the area, but his time was occupied by higher priority issues. His grandfather had 
worked for the Chinese around the turn of the century and Dulles had acted as a translator for 
the Chinese delegation at the Second Hague conference in 1907. Additionally, in 1950 Dulles 
had hammered out the Japanese Peace Treaty.25 Nixon capitalized on the Secretary's 
experience in Asia. He used his interest in Asia to catch Dulles' attention and gain a voice in 
the Administration.
Besides the niche to be filled, Nixon had just returned from an extensive tour of an 
extremely contentious area. Among top officials he had the most up-to-date working 
knowledge of the region. Asia represented a perfect opening through which Nixon channeled 
his ambitions for a role in American foreign relations policy-making. First, he had all he 
learned on his trip to use in any analysis. Second, he could act as an advisor for Dulles, 
while not encroaching on Eisenhower's domain.
Foreign travel enhanced the Vice President's credentials, but he did not go abroad 
again until early 1955. In 1954, most of Nixon's time was split between campaigning for
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Republican candidates and dealing with Joseph McCarthy. Nevertheless, he pursued his 
foreign affairs inclination. He constantly sought to illustrate his Asian - and general foreign 
policy - expertise within the Administration. The best place for that was at National Security 
Council meetings. Through a combination of debating with Dulles, presenting of his own 
analysis and inserting arbitrary comments, Nixon did secure himself a minor role in the 
foreign policy aspects of the Administration.
At the January 14, 1954 NSC session, Secretary Dulles suggested that if France 
abandoned Vietnam, and allowed a Vietminh government to fill the vacuum, "we should be 
able to make as much trouble for this government as they had made for our side and against 
the legitimate governments of the Associated states in recent years." He proposed non- 
Communist natives could conduct guerrilla operations against the Vietminh regime. Nixon 
disagreed. "While Secretary Dulles' idea had merit, he was not clear as to where we would 
find the guerrillas." Jungle fighters did not spontaneously appear. The Vietnamese might be 
inspired to fight if the French withdrew, but they would not fight to preserve French rule. 
Nixon undoubtedly based his criticism on the lessons he mastered in South East Asia. But, he 
may also have been relying on his initial contact with guerrilla fighters to draw his 
conclusions. He had, in 1947, interviewed Communist guerrillas in Fiorina, Greece. To 
offer convincing testimony against Dulles might not have helped his relationship with the 
Secretary, but it went a long way toward proving his expertise. And, in fact, the Secretary 
probably respected Nixon more for arguing a good case against him.
Two months later, Nixon again raised his voice to comment at the end of a meeting 
discussing South East Asian policy. Much of the conversation concerned foreign aid to the
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region. Although the method of assistance had not been directly addressed, Nixon offered his 
opinion on how best to provide aid for South East Asia. US aid to Asia often carried 
colonialist overtones for those who received the aid. He therefore recommended the use of 
U.N. auspices to deliver American money, noting in Asia the United Nations was seen as "a 
bulwark against colonialism." Since US assistance was intended primarily to "build up these 
countries, would it not be sensible to emphasize the channel provided by the UN agencies and 
to put less emphasis on direct US assistance?" American interests would be served in either 
case. No one in the meeting responded to his idea, but he had been heard and made a viable 
point.
In May, Nixon again took Dulles on in debate and reiterated his position on Asian 
perceptions of colonialism. The Secretary advocated a Five Power Staff Agency to oversee 
problems within the region. Nixon claimed "in his opinion the five-power arrangement would 
be almost as bad for the United States as would be Unilateral U.S. intervention, since it 
would be interpreted by the Asian nations as sheer colonialism." The Vice President had 
confidence in his Asian expertise. Dulles responded that it would not be five white powers in 
charge. The Agency would be an organizing group, not one intended to dominate the region. 
Nixon accepted this explanation, although he may not have been totally persuaded by it.
Twice in June, Nixon voiced his opinion during top level meetings. In both instances 
his comments concerned Asia, the only foreign area he seemed comfortable discussing in- 
depth. First, Nixon was given an opportunity to lecture NSC members when both Dulles and 
Eisenhower left the meeting early.
As the ranking official, Nixon took charge of a meeting at which he had been silent up
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to that point. He immediately criticized the Administration decision to consult with allies 
before taking action, in the event of an attack by the People's Republic of China on a non- 
Communist country. He exclaimed "if the Chinese Communists moved overtly against any 
free country in the Asian area, and the United States, with allies or without them, did not 
move to resist such an aggression, 'the jig was certainly up.'" The remark brought to mind 
his off the record comment made in April about "sending in the boys" into Vietnam, if 
Communist forces were on the verge of victory - another effort to gain a voice in foreign 
policy decisions. Later that month, he complained that the United States "watched, hesitated, 
and didn't know what policy to choose; whereas our enemy knew his policy and proceeded to 
carry it out." He advocated a policy of action in Asia and he repeatedly called for it.
In August, Nixon's recommendations produced a tangible foreign policy step. A 
report dated the twelfth, mentioned a new Special Book Program in Asia. The program 
provided an additional $325,000 in aid. It was "undertaken as a result of Vice President 
Nixon's survey of the area. The funds have gone into an expansion of the USIA book 
program in the Near and Far East where Soviet activity in the field of publication is 
immense." While not a major policy initiative, it did prove Nixon's opinions had some 
influence. Nixon undoubtedly celebrated this minor triumph.
Another small victory came after eight months of harping on Asia. Nixon finally 
received some recognition of his knowledge from a peer on the National Security Council. 
Robert Cutler, the NSC staff coordinator, "pointed out the particular interest of the Vice 
President in the Asian area, and asked him to express his views." Unwilling to admit to his 
self-promotion, Nixon denied any expertise. He initially agreed with the conclusion Dulles
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had expressed, that there needed to be greater consideration of options for how to handle 
Asia. Nixon, deferential to his patron, claimed that Dulles was the authority. But, he could 
not contain himself. He added that "without any claims to being an expert, the Vice President 
said that at least he was convinced that China was the key to Asia." Dulles preferred not to 
make a blanket statement. Despite his disavowal, he considered himself proficient in Asian 
affairs. Cutler's request illustrated that other NSC participants agreed with him, or at least 
had an interest in hearing his opinions.26 Either way, the Vice President took the opportunity 
to unequivocally express his position.
Nixon parleyed his first lengthy excursion through Asia into a career path he would 
pursue for the entire Administration. Yet, he had to constantly work to maintain his position. 
Eisenhower did not view him as an international relations asset, and Dulles often chose to use 
Nixon as his foreign affairs agent, rather than allow him an independent role.
As Nixon worked to maintain an influential position, his goals expanded. He found 
that international travel provided opportunities to improve his reputation among world leaders 
and the American people. When abroad, he stepped out from under the shadows of 
Eisenhower and Dulles and shone in his own right. He met world leaders, became 
internationally recognized and learned about most regions of the globe. Nixon took six or 
seven major trips abroad as Vice President, visiting over 50 different countries before he left 
office in 1961.
Despite the associated benefits, he concluded before the end of the first term that his 
international tours carried little prestige with them. The first one was noteworthy because of 
its novelty, but subsequent trips lost their uniqueness. They did not provide him with the
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ability to set policy, or even enunciate it. Between his second and third international 
expeditions, he began complaining to Dulles about their inconsequence. In conjunction with 
his objections, he sought means to increase the prestige associated with this travel. Nixon 
recognized that even though he considered that the international inspections lacked substance, 
he could promoted them as important, and improve his foreign affairs reputation.
The Vice President did not fully realize the limited image attached to a goodwill 
ambassador until after he and Pat made their second overseas trip. During most of February, 
1955, the Nixons visited Central America and the Caribbean. Although Milton Eisenhower 
had made a trip to Latin America in 1953, Dulles saw need for another mission.
The trip was actually intended for 1954. Dulles proposed it in August, writing to 
Nixon, "I hope that later on, probably in December, you and your wife can take a swing 
through Central America for us." Circumstances kept Nixon from embarking until February 
6, 1955. Although the trip lasted only about one month, Nixon managed to visit ten countries 
and two territories, including Cuba, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic.27
The resulting praise from American embassies throughout Central America re-inspired 
Dulles' confidence in Nixon. From Mexico, Ambassador Francis White reported "The 
newspapers have devoted greater space to it than to any other visit or happening in the nearly 
two years I have been here." All the editorials praised the Vice President.
From Havana, Cuba foreign service officer, Arthur Gardner, commented on "the good 
effects of Nixon's trip to Cuba at this particular moment. . . . The basic fact is that in the 
most unequivocal manner the Vice President and his wife did a tremendous selling job."
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With such positive reviews, the Vice President earned Dulles' respect and gratitude. The 
only other Administration official who garnered that level of praise was Ike. The President 
would do just that in 1960, but for the moment, Dulles ensured that Nixon traveled and 
Eisenhower stayed in the Oval Office.
The accolades continued. On February 23, Robert Hill, Ambassador to El Salvador, 
reported "It is my opinion . . . that the prestige of the United States has never been as high as 
it is right now as a result of Mr. and Mrs. Nixon's visit." Nixon was the first American Vice 
President to see El Salvador and the natives appreciated him. He followed his usual format 
and talked with the populace, not just the leaders.
Regardless of whether it transferred to Nixon personally, the office of Vice President 
carried a good deal of prestige. Nixon's presence implied a level of US concern that had not 
been revealed earlier. Whether or not Dulles intended to increase State Department efforts in 
Central America, Nixon’s visit gratified, or at least placated, these Hispanic countries. It did 
imply a renewed interest in Latin American affairs.
Ambassador Hill also commented on the Vice President's visit to Guatemala. He 
noted the importance of the trip for increasing American prestige and "helping arrive [at] 
better understanding between our two countries."28 The goodwill aspect of the trip clearly 
succeeded.
At the time, Guatemala represented the most critical area in Latin America to the 
United States. The previous summer - with CIA and United Fruit complicity - Castillo Armas 
had overthrown the legally elected President Jacobo Arbenz. State Department analysts 
feared a connection between Arbenz and the Communist party. Armas, who followed
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American directions, could be trusted to appreciate US interests. The situation remained 
volatile in 1955. Nixon forwarded his assessment of Guatemala to Dulles, through the 
American Ambassador, Norman Armour. He recommended increased US aid and support of 
the Armas regime. Neither were alarming suggestions, nor did they reflect the insight of an 
expert. Any State Department analyst acquainted with Latin America would have given the 
same counsel. But, that Nixon had the opportunity was more important than that he offered a 
different perspective on US-Latin American relations.
As in Asia, the State Department hoped that Nixon could also help resolve a few 
minor international disputes. Cooling a simmering feud between Costa Rican leader Jose 
Figueres and Nicaraguan ruler Anastasio Somoza had priority. Somoza supported Costa 
Rican dissidents in their on going coup against Figueres. Although some historians have 
concluded that the United States sided with Figueres, Nixon's instructions were to encourage 
accommodation and peace on both sides. The State Department briefing about Costa Rica 
recommended that Nixon: "a. Suggest that they [Costa Rica and Nicaragua] live in peace in 
their own country, b. If possible, convey to Figueres that he cease blasting Somoza and other 
leaders." The briefing notes for Nicaragua simply reversed the names and hoped Somoza 
would "cease blasting Figueres." Nixon followed this course as best he could. After his 
return to the United States, the Vice President wrote to Figueres. He stated he believed Costa 
Rica favored peace in the area. He suggested that leaders in the area had "to eliminate 
friction wherever possible" and that "it is my belief that our conversations have contributed to 
that end.”29 Nixon did not resolve the feud, but he did attempt to end it. This was another 
step forward on the road to becoming a statesman.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 3 8
Nixon's letter to Figueres typically would be a State Department initiative. Nixon 
must have had Dulles' approval before sending it, and possibly received orders from him to 
do so. Whether Nixon or a State Department official was the impetus behind the letter, that 
Nixon sent it at all highlights how he and Dulles had modified the responsibilities of the 
office. Nixon was performing a diplomatic function for State. Such assignments transformed 
the vice presidency from a position with limited importance to the Administration, into one 
commanding domestic and international recognition.
Within the Administration, Nixon's trip did not make much of an impact. The one 
positive result for Nixon was that it provided him with another region of the world in which 
he could claim familiarity, if not expertise. He definitely gained an understanding of the 
region.
On March 10, five days after his return to the United States, Nixon reported his 
findings. Besides advocating increased economic aid - a standard recommendation for Nixon, 
almost without regard to where he traveled - he displayed a clairvoyant understanding of the 
consequences of Communist expansion in that area. Speaking at an NSC meeting, he warned, 
"what happened in Guatemala would have been much worse for the United States if it had 
occurred in Mexico or in Cuba. . . . We should never forget that once one of these countries 
succumbs to Communist  control, it would prove very difficult indeed to remove that 
control. ,,3° His prediction had no impact on policy, but proved accurate for Cuba a few years 
later.
When not traveling, Vice President Nixon continued his efforts to gain a more 
influential role in American foreign relations. During the summer, he tried, unsuccessfully,
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to impress his conclusions about Russian tactics upon Eisenhower. Despite Ike's lack of 
interest, Nixon presented his case. He was determined to voice his opinions to the highest 
power and in mid-summer sent the Commander-in-Chief a rambling letter explaining his 
concerns.
The letter initially recounted the events that prompted Nixon's analysis. The 
"extraordinary scene at the garden park [at the U.S. Embassy] [handwritten], taken in 
conjunction with the drunken hippodrome at Belgrade, suggests that it is part of a concerted 
effort by the Kremlin leaders to make the world think that they they [sic] are truly a changed, 
human, approachable hail-fellow-well-met bunch of characters with whom any reasonable 
man can orgue [sic] or bargain on a reasonable basis and that ANY FAILURE TO REACH 
AGREEMENT IS NOT THEIR FAULT." Nixon did not mask his disgust in the succeeding 
three paragraphs. He warned that the Soviet's new amicability could not be taken at face 
value. It was designed to swing world opinion to favor the Communists. These jovial 
displays were a public relations tactic designed to give the sense that America was to blame if 
diplomatic talks faltered. In Nixon's concluding words: "It must be the Wests [sic] fault if 
they can't do business with good old Nikita — that is the impression they seek to leave, in 
advance of the meetings." Here Nixon probably referred to the Geneva Summit, which began 
on July 18.31
The memorandum reflected Nixon's true concern. The document, far more emotional 
and informal than typical (for Nixon), probably came straight from the Vice President's hand. 
In style, it reflected his personal 1947 Herter report more than any other document from his 
desk during the intervening years. The preponderance of typos implies that Nixon himself
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dashed it off, without the benefit of secretary Rosemary Wood's typing skills.
Nixon considered this topic important enough that it could not wait. However, there 
is no evidence that his letter had any effect on the President. Nixon’s fears were not realized. 
Eisenhower out-maneuvered his adversaries with a plan for US-Soviet reciprocal aerial 
reconnaissance. Ike's "Open Skies" proposal was intended to protect against surprise attacks. 
His unexpected proposition, announced at the Geneva summit in 1956, put the Russians on 
the defensive. Despite this, the overall conference talks were amicable. Out of them came 
hopeful praise for the "Spirit of Geneva." Ike's capable handling of the Soviet Union made 
Nixon's analysis seem alarmist. If the President recalled the essay after the summit, it would 
only have reinforced his belief that Nixon was too reactionary and inexperienced to lead the 
nation. The summit went well and the Russians did not gain the upper hand.
Since Nixon’s efforts to advise Ike won him no points, his best means of advancing his 
foreign affairs reputation remained travel abroad. By July 1955, the Vice President was 
determined that his next trip would be important. Ideally, Nixon wanted US foreign policy to 
be affected by what he uncovered during talks with foreign leaders. He wanted the trips to 
have a greater significance than that of a friendly gesture by the United States toward some 
smaller nation.
At the end of July, the Vice President and the Secretary of State met for a morning 
conference. Responding to a request by Nixon, Dulles "expressed the opinion that it would 
be of doubtful wisdom for the Vice President to seek to make a trip to the Soviet Union at this 
time." Clearly Nixon had asked for Dulles' permission to go to the U.S.S.R. He understood 
such a trip would have astounded Americans and impressed Europeans. Nixon took the
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rebuff in stride. He switched to his auxiliary plan, and according to Dulles, explained "he 
would like to make this fall some kind of a further trip, if this would serve a useful purpose.
I [Dulles] suggested the Near East where he had not been." To Nixon, travel abroad meant 
greater independence and better press. Whether or not he went to Russia, he would go 
somewhere. Dulles concluded "that if we [he and Dulles] were together and had an 
opportunity at Gettysburg, we would speak about the possibility of the Vice President's going 
to the Near East and not going to the Soviet Union." The Secretary's reiteration that Nixon 
was not going to Russia made it clear, the Vice President was not to broach that subject with 
Eisenhower. But, Dulles accepted an expedition for Nixon to a less critical region. Nixon’s 
desire to travel would be satisfied and the Secretary might receive valuable intelligence.
One final comment in the conversation illustrated Nixon's careful effort to protect his 
role in the government, and simultaneously reinforce his relationship with Dulles. Before 
they ended the discussion, the Secretary "mentioned to the Vice President the invitation of 
[Jawaharlal] Nehru to the President to visit India. The Vice President was very emphatic as 
to the unwisdom of the President's undertaking good will trips. "32 Such travel represented 
one of Nixon's only outlets. If Ike began traveling to exotic lands anything the Vice President 
did would be less impressive. Coincidentally, Dulles believed Eisenhower's friendliness 
could lead to promises that had dangerous consequences for the US. Nixon advised against 
Ike going to India because it would both detract from his own role, and disturb Dulles.
In August, Dulles again suggested the Near East as a possible destination for the Vice 
President. The trip would include Turkey, but omit Iran and Libya. Nixon, silently invoking 
the adage "nothing ventured, nothing gained" asked again about visiting Moscow. Dulles
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reiterated his objections. According to Dulles, "there was danger of overdoing the 
sentimental side of our relations." Nixon agreed, knowing his chances of going to Russia 
were not high. He saw no reason to aggravate the Secretary.
As it turned out, the Vice President did not take his Fall constitutional. On September 
24, Eisenhower suffered a heart attack. With the President's sudden incapacity, Nixon's 
public role altered. Nixon found himself technically in control of the Administration, but 
politically unable to make independent decisions. He could not appear to take command 
without facing tremendous criticism for usurping the presidential powers. Through 
December, he, Dulles and Eisenhower's assistant Sherman Adams performed a careful 
balancing act. They maintained the illusion that the Administration could function normally 
without the President, while simultaneously anxiously awaiting Ike's return.
Nixon's well practiced political savvy accounted for his success in this role. He 
understood how his actions would be interpreted, and took great pains to avoid any negative 
press. His role as stand-in President, however, did not last. By the second week in 
November, Eisenhower was out of the hospital. Although his full recovery would take 
several months, the immediate crisis was over. Eisenhower could reclaim his position as 
Commander-in-Chief. Nixon resumed the roles he had been assigned and created for himself, 
expanding them when possible.
On December 13, Dulles asked Nixon if he could go to South America for the January 
31 inauguration of the new Brazilian President, Juscelino Kubitschek. Nixon wondered if the 
assignment was truly important. Dulles assured him it was, adding, "Brazil is a good friend 
and we would like to keep it that way." Nixon, however, would have preferred to keep his
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 4 3
January 30 dinner appointment with British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden. Dulles had asked 
him to accept that assignment three days earlier. Now he offered to sit in for Nixon. The 
Vice President had little real choice but to accept.
With his revised assignment, came a new dinner to host. Dulles had the Vice 
President entertain the president-elect of Brazil on January 5. The Secretary would not attend 
Nixon's dinner because he planned to host Kubitschek the following night. Undoubtedly 
disappointed about missing an opportunity to meet with Eden, Nixon resigned himself to the 
new task and performed it well. Even if Dulles reserved the prime international work for 
himself, he still gave Nixon more to do than did the President. Nixon accepted almost any 
duty, for the ability to work in foreign affairs.
He attended the inauguration, serving again as a quasi-goodwill ambassador, but he 
did not appreciate the chore. On the plus side, Eisenhower took an indirect interest in the 
trip. He had a friend involved in the oil industry who expected to talk with Kubitschek about 
a Brazilian bill that would attract US capital. He informed the Vice President of his friend's 
interest. Nixon commented "that Brazil’s greatest need was to get more capital." Their 
discussion of Nixon's international trip, however, went no further. The conversation drifted 
onto political topics. But, at least the Vice President had had the opportunity to discuss a 
foreign relations matter one-on-one with the President.33
On May 11, 1956, Dulles asked Nixon to make another trip abroad. This time Nixon 
would represent the United States at the tenth anniversary celebration of independence for the 
Philippines. To give an impression that the trip was presidential in stature, Dulles mentioned 
that Eisenhower would have gone, but India's President Nehru intended to visit Washington at
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that time. Appealing to Nixon's interest in Far Eastern affairs, Dulles noted the trip provided 
a forum to call for unity among non-Communist Asians. Speaking in a convoluted and 
cautious manner, Nixon discussed his reservations. "The VP asked the Secretary what he 
thought about the worthwhileness of the affair. The Secretary said he thought it very 
worthwhile." With that assurance, Nixon continued, "he certainly would not be 
unsympathetic to the idea. The Secretary said this would not be unhelpful to Nixon at this 
particular time." Dulles implied that agreeing to the task might result in some reward - it 
"would not be unhelpful to Nixon" - even if that amounted only to positive media coverage.
But, Nixon revealed his dissatisfaction with the role of goodwill Vice President. He 
added "the main thing he was concerned about was that it should be made clear this trip was 
in the interest of the country, not just a trip out there." Nixon wanted a real purpose for 
making the trip. He hated representing America abroad for show only, without consequential 
results coming from his efforts. By implication, Nixon had not been swayed by his status as 
surrogate President. In fact, had there been no conflict in scheduling, Dulles probably would 
have opposed Eisenhower's attendance anyway, and invented a reason for Nixon to go.
Three days later, Dulles and Nixon again talked about the proposed trip. Now, 
disregarding his implication that Eisenhower might have attended, Dulles revealed that the 
Manila affair probably warranted only the presence of the diplomatic corps. The celebration 
would not require someone of vice presidential caliber. Filipino leaders might upgrade the 
celebration if pressed, but Dulles saw no reason to ask them.
Nixon's response exposed his own interest in the affair. Rather than m iss the chance 
to go abroad - regardless of his capacity - Nixon suggested that the Secretary hint that Nixon
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would be willing to show up, if there was reason. Although the Vice President aspired to a 
higher function than the emissary of Ike or Dulles, he recognized that playing that part still 
carried more prestige than staying at home. On May 24, Dulles instructed Nixon to be in the 
Philippines on their independence day, July fourth. Nixon agreed to go. He left from Hawaii 
at the beginning of July.
Dulles was not without the means to reward Nixon for acquiescing without any 
argument. To satisfy Nixon's desire for a more important assignment, the Secretary approved 
an expanded travel itinerary. As usual, this advanced his purposes, as much as it appeased 
Nixon. The new route included Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey and the 
Balearic Island of Majorca.34 Nixon's trip provided for Dulles an updated report on Asia 
from a source he considered reliable. For Nixon, the trip served as another learning 
experience, and a chance to increase his domestic and international reputation.
Among other leaders, Nixon spoke with the Thai Prime Minister and his advisors. 
These officials expressed frustration with American economic aid and tactics. They 
commented that Washington had to "'do, don't just talk,' adding US should cut red tape and 
get things done to make Thailand 'showcase of Asia. ’" The Deputy Prime Minister 
complained that neutralist and pro-Communist countries were receiving more aid than anti­
communist ones like Thailand. Nixon had made similar complaints about his country's 
foreign policy, so he sympathized with the Thai grievances.
The Vice President also met again with Chaing Kai-shek. Chaing sent Nixon home 
with his standard message to Eisenhower. He claimed mainland China could never succeed 
as long as Taiwan and America continued their alliance. He also insisted that the US must
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not "yield any ground whatever on any front" because the "Communists will test our 
intentions by some aggressive action." The aggression Chaing feared, came two years later, 
when PRC artillery shelled the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
Nixon also met with the leaders of South Vietnam, Majorca, Pakistan and Turkey. He 
asked about their fears, listened to their advice, offered US aid where he could and reported 
all his findings back to Dulles.35 The Vice President served not only as a high ranking 
dignitary attending the Philippines celebration, but also as an assistant to the Secretary of 
State.
Nixon returned to Washington on July 11, having managed to take his aborted 1955 
Near East tour in condensed form. He arrived just in time to catch the beginning of the Suez 
Crisis. Although Nixon did not have much involvement in the events that followed, he did 
end up taking another foreign trip because of them.
Ostensibly, the crisis came about as a result of failed efforts to negotiate a loan 
between the World Bank and Egypt, to build the Aswan Dam. With US and U.K. backing, 
the World Bank developed a loan package for Egypt, that provided the capital to construct the 
dam The project was intended to increase crop productivity. Egyptian negotiators 
considered too severe the controls on their economy that World Bank officials demanded to 
secure the loan. They would not agree to the terms. While counter offers were made, 
Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser became increasingly anti-American in his rhetoric and bought 
weapons from Czechoslovakia. The lack of progress in negotiations, combined with the anti- 
Americanism and fraternization with a Soviet satellite, led Dulles to withdraw the World 
Bank's offer. Nasser took the opportunity to nationalize the Suez Canal, owned mostly by
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Britain and France.
Regardless of Aswan, Nasser probably would have expropriated the canal within the 
next few years. It represented a last vestige of colonial power. By seizing it, he illustrated 
his independence from Western powers and supported his pan-Arabic movement.
Nevertheless, Dulles weathered a great amount of criticism for what appeared to the outside 
world as an abrupt withdrawal of the loan offer. When strategic and economic concern 
inspired the U.K., France and Israel to hatch a scheme to retake the Suez by military force, 
Eisenhower condemned the attacks and forced the allies to end their assault.
Despite (or perhaps because of) the significance of these events, Nixon's role in the 
Suez crisis remained limited. The Vice President had a full calendar with the approaching 
presidential campaign. On top of that, Dulles fell suddenly ill with serious stomach cramps. 
The pains in his stomach turned out to be cancer. Thus campaign commitments monopolized 
Nixon's schedule, and his most reliable foreign relations source temporarily ceased to provide 
information. Nixon was cut abruptly out of the loop. It was not until after the election and 
the Suez crisis that Nixon and Dulles discussed future journeys for the Vice President. Then 
Dulles suggested the Vice President visit Austria.
The trip related to the recent debacle. Simultaneous to events in Egypt, a rebellion 
flared up against the Communist regime in Hungary. The Hungarians might have achieved 
success had Soviet military forces not intervened and crushed the insurrection. Because of the 
concurrent nature of these events, the United States faced a dilemma. Allied attacks on Egypt 
could be interpreted as similar to the Soviet aggression in Hungary. American officials felt 
unable to strongly censure the Soviet actions without either appearing hypocritical or publicly
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denouncing Great Britain and France. The former option might result in a loss of 
international confidence in the US. The latter could cause irreparable damage to America’s 
already weakened relations with Western Europe.
On Pearl Harbor Day, 1956, Dulles had few means to condemn the Soviet aggression 
without negative repercussions for the United States. His most promising option was to use 
the Hungarian situation against the Russians without actually criticizing their actions. The 
failed uprising forced thousands of Hungarians to flee to Austrian refugee camps, instantly 
formed to handle the emigr6s. Dulles decided to send a delegation to tour the Hungarian 
camps. That trip could illustrate Soviet harshness without actually mentioning Russian 
attacks.
Nixon's tremendous skill as a roving fact finder landed him the assignment. His visit 
was primarily humanitarian, not diplomatic. The Vice President initially resisted. He 
claimed he would go, "if Sec. thinks it is useful." Yet, the Vice President suggested that he 
might stay home and they could send an alternate delegation. He proposed that Mrs. 
Eisenhower or his own wife fly to Austria on Air Force One and pick up a plane load of 
refugees - as a "mission of mercy."
Dulles said he would consider Nixon's idea, probably a subtle hint that he had already 
dismissed it. Nixon then concluded he "does not want to go if it will be interpreted as a 
grandstand play." Dulles would not accept any excuses. Eleven days later Nixon was in 
Austria.
Before he left, however, Nixon made sure to obtain as much presidential sanction and 
authority as he could. He asked for letters from Eisenhower to President Koemer and
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Chancellor Raab. He also suggested Ike autograph a photograph for him to present to 
Koemer. The request reached Ike via Dulles. Nixon sought a more important assignment 
than that of official US refugee camp inspector. The letters afforded him a higher stature by 
making his trip "presidential."
An official announcement explained Nixon's trip. "The purpose of the Vice 
President's trip, concurred in by the Secretary of State, is to consult with American, Austrian 
and international officials as to problems relating to relief and resettlement of Hungarian 
refugees and to visit while there as many as possible of those who have recently escaped from 
oppression." Previous announcements named both Dulles and Eisenhower as authorities 
supporting Nixon’s trips.36 Perhaps, attempting to limit possible criticism of the President 
related to allied attacks in Egypt and almost no condemnation of Soviet offenses in Hungary, 
only the Secretary's prestige was invoked. And, while Nixon would have preferred Ike's 
name be mentioned, Eisenhower might not have agreed to let Nixon "consult" with 
international officials about refugee questions. Dulles gave Nixon the spotlight. The 
assignment worked well with Nixon's practice of meeting large crowds and international 
leaders, during a single trip.
As with the Brazil trip, after Austria the Vice President gained an audience with 
Eisenhower to discuss his findings. He informed the President that the refugees were a 
desirable "leadership type." He "emphasized that it is important that the United States not 
drag its fee t. . . that we continue to take [immigration] applications at the current rate." In 
conclusion, Nixon "urged that here was an opportunity to get needed flexibility into our 
Immigration laws." Eisenhower side-stepped the Vice President's recommendation to ask
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Congress for $30 to $40 million to alleviate the crisis. Instead, Ike suggested that these 
skilled refugees might be useful to Middle Eastern or Latin American countries. He 
authorized State to continue processing Hungarian applications even beyond allowable quotas, 
but took no other tangible action on Nixon’s specific advice.37
Nixon probably advocated an increase in Hungarian refugee emigres to America for 
three reasons. From a humanitarian perspective, the refugees would be better off in America, 
away from the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Such a move also represented an 
excellent propaganda opportunity to contrast the beneficence of Democracy to the cruelty of 
Communism. Lastly, Nixon recognized the refugees might be a source of intelligence about 
Communist methods. The three rationales were all connected by a common thread of 
advantage gained by America. Eisenhower, however, had little interest in his Vice 
President's counsel. Despite Ike's continued indifference, Nixon assumed every meeting in 
which he enunciated his viewpoint improved his chances of gaining a voice in foreign affairs.
Nixon's trip to Austria was his last of the first term and 1956. Although his efforts to 
gain a say in the Administration had not led to great success, he remained vigilant. Dulles 
continued to provide Nixon with travel assignments of varying importance. And, the 
unceasing struggle by the Vice President to expand his role during Eisenhower’s second 
presidential Administration, resulted in some of the desired recognition Nixon desperately 
craved.
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Chapter 5
Nixon's Search fo r a Role - The Second Term
The Vice President did not have to wait long after the new year for more orders.
Only two weeks after Nixon returned from Europe, Dulles phoned with a new assignment.
On Tuesday, January 8, 1957, at 6:30p.m., the Secretary "wondered what he thought about 
the Vice President heading the Delegation to the Gold Coast when it gets its independence." 
Dulles hoped to maintain positive relations with this "coming continent." Nixon refrained 
from a direct answer, explaining it depended on whether or not the congressional situation 
allowed him to leave. The irony was that Nixon invoked the congressional duties he typically 
wished to avoid, to evade a tour he liked even less. Three weeks later, Nixon proposed his 
conditions for making the trip. He gently demanded a presidential mandate. "N said that if 
the Pres asks him to go to Africa, he will." The Vice President repeated the tactic he used 
before going to Austria, in order to raise the diplomatic importance of the assignment.
Wednesday evening Dulles called Nixon to relay Ike's personal request that the Vice 
President go to Africa. The same day, Eisenhower wrote a memorandum asking, "could you 
[Nixon] find it possible to head the United States Delegation to the Gold Coast Independence 
Ceremonies, to be held on March 6, 1957."1 Regardless of this presidential directive, the 
Vice President continued to seek ways of attaching more importance to the trip.
In February, Nixon pressed the Secretary again for an expansion, during a Saturday
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lunch meeting at the Dulles home. The younger man turned the discussion to his Gold Coast 
trip. "He wanted to be sure we really felt this amounted to something and the President really 
wanted him to go." Dulles’ first draft report of the conversation revealed Nixon’s angst about 
traveling for openly self-serving purposes. Crossed out and guarded by hand written brackets 
Dulles wrote, "He said there had been gossip that Nixon himself promoted these missions and 
they did not serve a vital government purpose." By pointing out the lack of utility he 
believed others attached to these trips, Nixon expressed his own dissatisfaction. He needed to 
dispel any hearsay that his job was anything less than vital.
Dulles gave the Vice President all assurances that he and the President believed the 
trip was important. Not placated, Nixon suggested that he also visit Ethiopia and Liberia. 
Dulles agreed, and by February 28 the itinerary included Gold Coast, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Morocco, Ghana, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Italy. For Italy, Nixon convinced Dulles again 
to ask the President for a personal letter, this one to Pope Pius XU.2 As usual, despite his 
displeasure at being a messenger boy, Nixon played the role because it increased his domestic 
and international prominence.
Before departing, however, Dulles found an additional task for Nixon. On February 
21, 1957, the Secretary explained to him that the visiting Vice Presidents of Bolivia and Peru 
wanted to meet with their US counterpart. Nixon at first deferred, claiming he had only 
seven days before his African tour to master pertinent background materials. Dulles replied 
that he could not give lack of time as an excuse, but could inform the two Latin Americans 
that receiving foreign dignitaries devolved on the Secretary of State and President, not the 
Vice President.
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When presented in those terms, Nixon immediately changed his position and agreed 
to a meeting. Accepting his patron's explanation meant permanently closing himself off from 
an avenue of international relations work. The excuse would have set a precedent that 
blocked Nixon from seeing any foreign official. The argument challenged Nixon to accept 
the assignment, or lose the privilege for the future.3 Nixon met with the Vice Presidents and 
still managed to prepare for his upcoming trip.
The African travels expanded Nixon's international affairs resume by a continent. He 
mentioned in a letter to British Governor of Uganda, Sir Frederich Crawford, "I [feel that I] 
have a much better grasp of current conditions in East Africa. I am certain that this first-hand 
knowledge will prove beneficial to me in the months and years ahead, and will enable me to 
understand more fully the future developments in this great continent [Nixon's brackets]." 
Although an official thank you, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Nixon’s statement. 
He gained valuable experience on this trip. Each new country he visited, represented another 
notch in his foreign relations belt, and added to his public prestige.
While in Africa, Nixon acquired a taste for Middle Eastern relations. After returning 
from the trip, he wrote to Ambassador Donald Heath in Lebanon "my experiences and 
conversations during this trip put me in complete agreement with your views on the 
importance of the Arab refugee factor to the over-all problem of Arab-Israeli relationships." 
Nixon judged that no solution would present itself without a preceding resolution of the Arab 
refugee problem. Although the Vice President made little use of this information at the time, 
fifteen years later his reactions were tied to these early conclusions.
Unable to deny completely Nixon's success abroad, Eisenhower took advantage of it.
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Writing to the Sultan of Morocco, he noted that the Vice President’s discussions "have given 
new impetus to the further strengthening of the close ties which we have both worked to 
forge." The American Ambassador had been instructed to open discussions on US military 
operations in Morocco and Ike invited the Moroccan leader to come to America. The 
initiative for talks would have originated with Dulles, rather than Eisenhower. Probably, Ike 
wrote the letter at Dulles' request, or at minimum in consultation with Dulles. The important 
factor for Nixon was that his visit provided the opportunity to expand American-Moroccan 
relations.4 The trip again served the purposes of Dulles, while expanding Nixon's role within 
the Administration.
Nixon's badgering appeared to bring him some of the responsibility he craved. The 
expanded itinerary gave him the opportunity to write a 69 page paper containing his 
observations and recom m endations for US foreign policy toward Africa. In no way 
comparable to the personal report he compiled after the Herter Committee experiences, this 
document was official and reflected his expertise, not his curiosity.
To advertise his review of Africa throughout the Administration, he asked that the 
report be distributed among all "interested departments and agencies of the government."
Both Dulles and Eisenhower approved this request, despite the document's classification as 
top secret. Clearly, neither man believed the account was too sensitive.
Nixon's paper made sound policy suggestions, but contained no earth-shattering 
insights. Nixon recommended that France be gently warned to leave Algeria before it faced 
serious anti-colonial opposition there. He suggested that the US also encourage North 
African countries to pay less heed to Egypt and its leader, Gamal Nasser. On Israeli-Arab
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relations, he ambiguously advised that "we give new and careful attention to the Arab refugee 
problem with a view towards evolving a plan which at the appropriate time could form the 
basis for an equitable settlement." And he recommended increased American economic aid 
for Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan and Libya. In general, he called for the State 
Department to increase its attention and representation in Africa.
Interestingly, Nixon took his own report to task during the formal presentation on 
August 22. "He detected a tendency in the present report to underestimate the seriousness of 
the Communist threat in Africa." Augmenting the written document, he orally explained how 
the Red International might infiltrate Africa using the guises of Islam, racism and nationalism.
Nixon may have had two possible reasons to omit his Communist focused analysis 
from the report. First, it could have related to a lack of first-hand evidence of a threat. He 
discussed what had appeared the most important aspects during his in-country time. Prior to 
leaving the US, however, the State Department had stressed Russia's influence in Africa. 
Dulles' Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Robert C. Hill, wrote Nixon a 
memorandum about Communist  infiltration in Northern Africa. Hill concluded, "I need 
hardly emphasize the fact that your leadership of the United States Delegation is considered 
by the Department of State as extremely significant in demonstrating the American interest in 
Africa" and implicitly against Soviet penetration.5 To emphasize the importance of 
Communist influence in Africa, Nixon attended a State Department briefing on the topic, just 
three days before he departed.
After the trip, however, the report reflected his experiences, rather than the briefing. 
As he presented it, he realized the threat emphasized by State had not been thoroughly
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integrated into his report. Thus, he added it orally when he submitted the report.
Alternatively, Nixon may have excluded information on the U.S.S.R.'s potential 
intrusions under the direction of Dulles. Relaying his position verbally would put it at the top 
of every NSC member's thoughts, perhaps underscoring the threat more effectively. And, 
possibly Dulles wanted to keep those concerns out of the official record.
The paper did illustrate Nixon’s understanding of the problems found in North Africa. 
It also coincided with Dulles' basic foreign policy tenets. Within the Administration, the 
paper went far in advertising Nixon's newly gained expertise on Northern African policy. If 
he could not hold the President's ear, at least he could share his knowledge with the advisors 
to whom Eisenhower did listen.
In August, Dulles and Nixon were talking about Nixon's next trip. The Vice 
President expressed an interest in visiting Europe, as long as it was scheduled in conjunction 
with events he could attend, such as building dedications and honorary degrees. Nixon also 
expressed his interest in traveling to Poland. As with previous proposed trips to Eastern 
Europe, Dulles doubted it would be possible.6
Whether or not they intended to plan a Fall expedition events again prohibited any 
travel for the Vice President. The October fourth launch of Sputnik shocked the 
Administration and the American people. The implications such an accomplishment raised 
about intercontinental missiles terrified most Americans. In addition, Ike's minor stroke on 
Monday, November 25, meant Nixon could not leave the country. As Vice President, he 
might be required to step up to the duties of President.
Irrespective of a second 1957 trip, Nixon had now established himself as a foreign
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relations expert, outside the Executive branch, if not within it. In November, Nixon received 
a request from the editor of Foreign Affairs. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, to write an article.
He declined through Allen Dulles, probably because it would not be appropriate for the Vice 
President to express his foreign affairs analysis in such a public forum. Armstrong’s request, 
however, illustrated that Nixon's expertise was acknowledged by non-Administration 
international relations specialists.
That month, Morocco placed Nixon in the same grouping as Ike and Dulles.
Moroccan officials wanted to give the President the Order of Mohammed. Ike agreed to 
accept the medal and subsequently turn it over to the Department of State. Telling Nixon 
about the situation, Dulles noted that the Moroccans also hoped to decorate himself and 
Nixon. Without thinking, the Vice President stated, "if the President accepted he would too." 
Probably recalling his own visit to Morocco, Nixon believed he had as much right to the 
honor as Ike. But, Dulles discouraged that action and "explained the President was accepting 
in behalf of the country."7 Nixon was out of luck - one country, one leader, one Order of 
Mohammed. The Vice President agreed to decline the honor. Nonetheless, by implication, 
the Moroccans' tribute reflected their respect for Nixon and his foreign relations expertise.
In 1958, Nixon again went abroad. On February 8, Dulles asked him to attend the 
inauguration of Arturo Frondizi, the first nationally elected President of Argentina in two 
decades. Dulles explained that America wanted to show support for the new regime, because 
Latin Americans believed the US had been too close to Frondizi’s predecessor, dictator Juan 
Perdn. Nixon complained to Dulles that he did not want to act as the Administration's 
goodwill ambassador anymore. Contradicting what he had said six months before, Nixon
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now claimed that inaugurations diminished the prestige of his trips (in August 1957, Nixon 
requested that any trip to Europe be scheduled around events similar to inaugurations). 
Although he preferred not to travel just to attend them, he conceded to go to Latin America in 
the Spring for seven to ten days.
Nixon took the opportunity to again express his willingness to travel to Europe. He 
included one proviso, which reflected his unceasing desire to raise his stature. He would only 
take a European trip if allowed to visit Poland and Yugoslavia also.8 Nixon did not go to 
Europe in 1958.
He did go to Latin America, but Dulles did not insist he attend the inauguration. 
Instead, he had someone else recommend it. On March 6, Dulles officially asked Nixon to 
visit Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia. The Secretary added a handwritten note 
stating, "assuming you do not go to B.A. [Buenos Aires] inaugural this may be proposed by 
Chris Herter. F" One week later, Undersecretary Herter sent a memorandum to Nixon 
recommending that he attend the May 1 inauguration.9 Thus, the directive came from Herter, 
instead of Dulles. It was an intriguing illustration of Dulles’ efforts not to upset his friend, 
while maintaining control over his protege.
By the end of March, Nixon was preparing for the trip in earnest. He instructed a 
staff member, Robert Cushman, to find out the status of Ike's letters to the Presidents of the 
Latin American countries he was scheduled to visit. Nixon recommended "the desk officer -  
man in charge for each country — should write these letters and they should be started 
immediately as it takes quite a while to get them approved at State and then by the 
President."10 Enlightened self-interest worked to motivate the Vice President to ensure these
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letters were written. He greatly valued the authority carried by presidential notes - too much 
to leave their drafting to chance or carelessness.
Nixon's week to ten day trip stretched into twenty days. Ending with dramatic 
violence in Caracas, Venezuela, it was everything but a friendly visit. Ironically, the events 
proved Nixon's belief that he could accomplish more if allowed to go beyond the goodwill 
veneer attached to his travel.
The South American excursion emerged as a one of the most important trips for him.
It gave Nixon more public exposure than any previous foreign excursion. It also made him a 
symbol of courage and democracy, two extremely important characteristics for a man hoping 
to be the 1960 Republican presidential candidate. The journey served as an excellent example 
of Nixon implementing the touring formula he developed in 1947 - meet people, talk with 
leaders, debate controversial individuals and take risks.
The first half of the South American expedition went smoothly. Nixon received 
agreeable welcomes in his host countries, although American coverage of the events was not 
particularly high. He encountered limited anti-American - Communist inspired, he believed - 
demonstrations in several regions. Recalling experiences in Italy eleven years before, he 
seized the opportunity at the national university in Montevideo, Uruguay, to engage several 
"Communists" in a heated debate about American foreign policy. Nixon proclaimed himself 
the victor, and reaffirmed his belief in confronting Communists face-to-face. The exchange 
made excellent media fodder.
In Peru, the protests took a more aggressive turn. When he arrived at his hotel 
students shouted "Fuera Nixon" and reports stated Nixon's visit to San Marcos University
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
166
would be met by a large demonstration. Always willing to take a risk when traveling, Nixon 
went to San Marcos anyway. It was probably a mistake, as the intelligence proved accurate.
A mob awaited the Vice President.
To his credit, Nixon displayed courage and dignity. The students shouted anti- 
American slogans and threw objects at the Vice President. After a brief foray into the crowd, 
his party retreated and drove to a backup destination, Catholic University. There Nixon 
debated a group of unorganized anti-American students. In a situation where he retained 
much greater control, Nixon won the battle of words. Standing on the front table in a 
classroom, Nixon effectively fielded questions about American policy toward Latin America. 
The Vice President left this second school to cheers of "Viva Nixon!"
The supportive shouts were not to last. Returning to his hotel, Nixon found another 
mob. Instead of driving to the hotel door, he decided to walk through the mob. The hostile 
crowd shouted epithets, threw pebbles and spit on the American group. Nixon stood up to the 
abuse, carefully controlling his desire to respond, even when a student spit tobacco juice 
directly in his face.
For his trials, Nixon received praise from the media and his countrymen. It was a 
public relations coup. In American eyes, Nixon was unjustly attacked, both verbally and 
physically. His unwillingness to withdraw when faced with danger, or show fear in the midst 
of it, had made him an instant hero.
Besides the fantastic media attention that resulted from Nixon's adventure in Peru, the 
events earned him praise from the President. A soldier, Eisenhower had been impressed with 
Nixon's resolve. He sent a telegram exclaiming, "Your courage, patience and calmness in the
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demonstration directed against you by radical agitators have brought you new respect and 
admiration in our country."11 Nixon rarely received such accolades from Ike.
Nixon's success in Peru left him in a quandary. Having endured Peruvian protests, he 
could not back down if faced with additional demonstrations, in other countries. He had 
shown himself brave and strong. Now he had to maintain that image.
The day Nixon left Lima, Dulles received a warning about further demonstrations in 
Latin America. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William 
Snow, informed the Secretary that, "The incident in Lima may inspire similar ones in Quito, 
Bogota, or Caracas. Before the Vice President reached Lima, there had been small 
demonstrations also inspired by Communists, in Montevideo and Buenos Aires.” Whether or 
not Dulles responded is unclear. Certainly, Nixon would not willingly abort a trip that had 
brought him such attention, irrespective of the associated dangers.
Nixon's desire for press coverage guided the trip itinerary from the beginning.
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, R. Richard Rubottom, had recommended 
against visiting Chile and Venezuela. Rubottom explained that the Chilean President had just 
canceled a visit to the United States. Diplomatic etiquette thus prohibited a visit by the Vice 
President. Rubottom had no comparable reason to avoid Venezuela, so Nixon could not be 
deterred from going to Caracas. According to Rubottom, the Vice President pushed for the 
stop because Venezuela had the largest American colony in Latin America (besides Mexico) 
and numerous US investments. State Department staff experts pointed out that the 
Venezuelan dictator, Marcos Perez Jimenez, had been driven from power earlier that year and 
subsequently found asylum in the United States. Resenting the US protection of Jimenez,
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anti-American sentiment in Venezuela ran extremely high. In search of adventure and 
generally interested in an American audience, Nixon could not be dissuaded. His resistance 
to State Department advice also reflected his constant desire to make his own decisions, 
thereby establishing his independence in the Administration.
Since Nixon insisted on going to Venezuela, South American experts in State 
suggested Caracas be the first stop on the itinerary. They hoped to reduce the amount of time 
anti-American agitators would have to prepare for the visit. Nixon again refused. He 
believed the best send-off for his tour would come in Caracas, from its large American 
population. Their presence could also increase the media interest from home in a story. 
Rubottom recalled that Nixon "had in mind always what the newspapermen would be 
reporting. . ." He would not retreat, for fear of criticism in the press. Added to that, was the 
attractive chance to impress reporters further by taking risks and debating Communists.
Nixon stumbled into the adventure of his life in Caracas. He and his wife were 
greeted at the airport by a waterfall of saliva as they stood at attention for the Venezuelan 
national anthem. What followed was worse. The motorcade was stopped by a roadblock and 
a hostile mob specifically attacked Nixon's automobile. Mainly luck saved those in the Vice 
President's car from serious injury or death. Certainly, no other American Vice President has 
experienced anything similar to the Caracas attacks. Perhaps, that is because no one but 
Richard Nixon insisted on visiting such a dangerous environment.
Rubottom wondered whether Nixon's initial anti-American contacts in Montevideo 
resulted in the Caracas debacle. He implied that Nixon's successful debates in Uruguay 
fueled the reactions that followed. In effect, Nixon's quest for greater adventure became a
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self-fulfilling prophesy. The more Nixon succeeded, the more dangerous the altercations 
became.12
Nixon got his big send-off, but it was not the positive one he had imagined. His party 
left Venezuela for Puerto Rico the day after it arrived. Still, the humiliation and danger 
which he survived increased his hero status. He debated Communists and he stood up to 
mobs. By displaying his courage, he rhetorically defeated them.
Following this second trip to Latin America, Nixon freely offered his opinions on 
policy concerns in South America. He had nearly lost his life to Communist inspired mobs 
(as he saw it). If that did not give him the aura of Latin American expert, nothing could.
Upon returning, Nixon explained that his visits to the university in Montevideo and 
San Marcos confirmed the value of the impromptu calls. The element of surprise, claimed 
Nixon - doing the unexpected thing - had immeasurably positive effects. He had taken to 
heart the lesson Syngman Rhee taught in 1953.
Nixon also noted that he had shown the United States would not retreat from 
Communist aggression, whether in the form of a mob or something more nefarious. He 
believed only a demonstration of fortitude would convince the enemy. Of course, Dulles 
entirely agreed. His underlying goal was to avoid misunderstandings with the Communists. 
Dulles "felt that the most important thing for the Russians and the Chinese was to understand 
American foreign policy."13 A main element of that policy was US resolve. Nixon's 
forbearance in Latin America was just one method by which America illustrated its message.
The Vice President never doubted that a Communist insurgency had directed all the 
Latin American violence. On May 16, one day after returning to Washington, he addressed
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the Cabinet. Nixon stressed that "Communist inspiration was evident from the similarity of 
placards, slogans and techniques in all the areas in question. Particular items of American 
policy bearing on individual countries could not be considered the major cause." Similar 
slogans and signs across international borders indicated Red intrigue. He had learned that as 
a Herter Committee member.
Nixon absolved the US from responsibility for the attacks, but not from all the 
problems in Latin America. While the demonstrations were Communist inspired, he 
concluded the Administration's policy had resulted in an underlying hostility to America. He 
stated "that the political complaint against the United States for harboring refugee dictators 
was more important than various economic complaints. . . . "  Nixon suggested raising the 
standard of living in these Hispanic countries, thereby supporting the masses rather than the 
elite, would go far in winning their trust. He did not admit any direct connection between 
animosity in reaction to the US sheltering dictators, and the assaults made on his person.
Six days later, Nixon expanded his conclusions for the NSC. He still maintained that 
Communists orchestrated the attacks, but that Washington's relations with ex-dictators 
fomented distrust throughout Latin America. For the NSC, he offered additional analysis 
connecting these topics. The Vice President noted because anti-dictator fervor now 
"constitutes the most emotional issue in Latin American. . . .  we should accordingly in Latin 
America attack Communism not as Marxist economic thought but as a dictatorship and, worse 
from the Latin American point of view, a foreign controlled dictatorship. His suggestion 
displayed an understanding of US-South American issues, bounded within his bipolar world 
perspective.
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Nixon feared the hispanic governments to the south were naive in their understanding 
of Communism  and could not believe "they regard the Communists as nothing more than a 
duly-constituted political party." He advocated developing a pro-United States contingent of 
Latin American students. George Allen, head of the USIA supported the idea, but remarked 
"the real problem was what we were going to give them [the student groups] as a message to 
rally around and about which they could become enthusiastic."14 His comment illustrated the 
true problem America faced in Latin America - anti-Americanism. Communism was a 
cursory problem. Interestingly, Nixon had pointed out a similar contradiction in 1954 when 
Dulles proposed recruiting natives to fight a guerrilla war against the Vietminh, if US backed 
forces lost control of Vietnam. Nixon stated then that no Vietnamese would fight to help 
France maintain its claim on their country. The Vietnamese would sooner accept Communist 
rule than return to French subserviency. In the same way, the Latin-Americans had no reason 
to favor United States domination over domestically based Communist  rule. After four years 
under Dulles' guarded tutelage, Nixon no longer acknowledged the relevance of this 
argument.
Nixon's report emphasized Communist elements in Latin America, but also supported 
the policy changes recommended by State Department officials which stressed other concerns. 
A June memo from R. Richard Rubottom to C. Douglas Dillon - reiterating recommendations 
made to Dulles in April - illustrated the policy direction State experts advised. Rubottom 
suggested increasing economic aid, approving loans, improving the ability of those countries 
to borrow funds and deleting the "widespread belief in Latin America that the United States 
prefers dictators."15 This counsel paralleled that provided by the Vice President in May.
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Clearly, the Dillon/Rubottom proposal had merit. US assistance that benefited the populace, 
improved Latin America's image of her northern neighbor. Rubottom’s memo revealed the 
artificiality of Nixon's singular reliance on Communism. He and others did not discount the 
Communist  influence, but they stressed economic issues and socio-political resentment over 
Nixon's explanation.
Notwithstanding his Communist-centric analysis, Nixon held a more liberal assessment 
of the region, than might have been expected. During the June 19 NSC meeting, he 
advocated an increase in economic aid for countries friendly to America, but he also 
suggested the Administration go a step further. "Where funds are not available to support 
private enterprise in Latin America, the US would have to look at the situation as it is and not 
as we might wish it to be. Accordingly, we will have to be more flexible in regard to our 
views on aiding nationalized enterprises in several Latin American republics." Although a 
"revolutionary idea, ” Nixon claimed the aid was necessary to maintain good relations and 
prevent increased Russian influence. The Vice President warned "that we must be much less 
rigid than in the past in our definitions of what constituted 'democracy' or 'self-government' 
as these related to Latin America."16 The United States had to expand its relations with those 
countries, even if their governments tilted toward the socialist side.
Despite their difference in emphasis, Rubottom used the Vice President's basic 
agreement to enhance his own argument for a new foreign policy toward the southern 
continent. To his relief, events in Lima and Caracas had already made his case. The 
violence exercised against Nixon's party prompted a reassessment of US economic policy 
toward Latin America. The Administration approved an expansion of commodity agreements,
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vastly increased the USIA budget for Latin America and endorsed the creation of a 
development bank specifically associated with the region. And, the Administration actively 
reduced its fraternization with Hispanic dictators to increase its appeal to the more democratic 
regimes.
According to Rubottom, the Nixon trip had moved Latin America from the lowest 
interest to the first or second priority. The violent events were "interpreted as a symptom that 
US-Latin American relations were in some peril."17 It was the great irony of Nixon's 1958 
trip that it resulted in a major shift in US policy in reaction to Nixon's physical presence and 
activities, rather than because of his foreign relations expertise and advice. His method of 
campaigning and debating (essentially what he did in Lima) fomented the riotous behavior that 
the American delegation survived. Only that hostility - and it could have been enacted upon 
any high ranking Administration official - inspired the modifications in foreign policy. Thus, 
when Nixon finally managed to affect a major international decision, it was because he had 
been attacked, not because he was an expert. In feet, the President's brother, Milton 
Eisenhower, and Rubottom both advocated the policy changes Nixon presented. However, 
until the Latin American resentment manifested itself in tangible form, Washington ignored 
the signs of unrest.
Nixon, although battered, could not take direct credit for the change. No one would 
accept the idea that Nixon nearly sacrificed himself in Caracas knowing it would result in a 
shift in US attitude toward Latin America. He had sought adventures in hopes of attaining 
media attention and this he achieved. Only as a bonus - because Rubottom invoked the Vice 
President’s name in support of the new policy - did Nixon receive some indirect credit for the
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new initiatives.
Nixon's adventures helped him enhance his public image and reinforce his authority 
within the Administration. Only a proposed congressional investigation of the Caracas events 
detracted from the trip. Eisenhower advisors feared an inquest might prove embarrassing, 
especially to Nixon. On May 16, Dulles called Nixon about the partisan investigation. He 
recommended those involved "get our position coordinated here." Nixon said he would not 
attend the committee hearings, but would talk with the people giving testimony. They 
"agreed [Wayne] Morse is out to discredit all as much as he can." At that moment, Nixon 
was careful not to take too much credit for the trip and the planning of it. He noted threats 
had accompanied all his foreign trips, but none had ever been realized. Caracas was simply a 
matter of overestimating the ability of the Venezuelan government to provide adequate 
protection. He claimed that despite reports of possible violence in Lima and Caracas, "the 
govt still insisted the invitation was open and urged him to go."18
Nixon ignored his own role in inviting trouble. He had refused to cancel several 
engagements, insisting instead that the regimes admit it was too dangerous for him to attend. 
He did not want to be criticized for weakness. Of course, those governments could not 
rescind any invitations without embarrassment at their inability to provide adequate security. 
So, Nixon courted peril through his unwillingness to bare the onus of retreating. His claim 
that the Peruvian and Venezuelan governments urged him to venture onto unsafe campuses 
was a fabrication. To the relief of the whole Administration, the inquest did not result in any 
lasting harm.
The Vice President took advantage of the positive image he inadvertently had gained.
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Once the threat of an investigation passed, he wanted credit for the entire trip. In a 
memorandum he noted, "One thing the State Department did after my Asian trip — they put 
out some canard that everything I said was prepared by State and read by me. This is not true 
— also get out the word that virtually anything that we did on this trip that was worth anything 
we thought of ourselves." Nixon would not get much argument from Rubottom, who recalled 
the Vice President's order that all State Department suggestions be routed through his close 
advisors.19 Nixon avoided working closely with the State Department experts when possible, 
and he disregarded State advice when it inhibited his aims. He wanted both a measure of 
independence from Dulles, and a public image reflecting his presidential caliber.
In September, Nixon requested updated background material from his May excursion 
to use in conjunction with an upcoming Latin American Ministers' visit. He wanted the 
report to include recommendations for a Latin American agency, stabilizing programs for 
commodities and a more focused economic effort. His primary motivation for the revised 
information was to counteract criticism that no public report was made, and to emphasize his 
enduring attention to the subject. "My main interest is in getting action, and I am continuing 
to push through on these things."20 Nixon was laying the ground work for his presidential bid 
in 1960. He was a man who got things done. It was imperative that the public knew it.
While Nixon sought benefits from his dramatic experiences in Latin America, he also 
unceasingly demonstrated his global foreign relations expertise. His advice typically 
addressed whatever he saw as the latest Russian incursion. In an August NSC meeting, he 
counseled "it might be difficult to reduce US assistance programs in South Asia at a time 
when Communist activities there are increasing." Specifically, "It would be unwise to
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consider reducing assistance to Pakistan without remembering what the Soviets are doing." 
Pakistan was "the one solid pro-U.S. country" in that part of the world. Here Nixon revealed 
his affinity for Pakistan long before the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. He also implicitly drew on 
his Asian experiences to give the recommendation authority.
Nixon made one additional trip abroad in 1958. Just after returning from Venezuela, 
Dulles had asked the Vice President to visit Great Britain in November. The trip, purely 
ceremonial, was to dedicate the American Memorial Chapel at St. Paul's Cathedral. Upon 
arrival, Nixon made a statement at the Pilgrims Society. After listening to speeches given by 
one of the royal Dukes and the Prime Minister, he spoke in Guildhall. He even held a 
televised press conference. The Vice President received a warm welcome and high praise 
from the British during his four day tour. To be sure, it was not a trip he enjoyed. There 
was no opportunity to display his foreign affairs proficiency. It was a goodwill trip and 
Nixon could not manipulate it to appear as anything more substantial.
By December, the US-Soviet wrangling over Berlin again came to the forefront. 
Khrushchev sent a letter to Eisenhower proposing that West Berlin be made a demilitarized 
free city, with its own government. The Russian leader threatened that if the four powers did 
not withdraw from West Berlin in six months, his nation would accede its control of East 
Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. When officials gathered to discuss this new 
Berlin crisis, Nixon presented himself as a seasoned Communist expert. He suggested that 
Khrushchev wanted more than a free West Berlin. The U.S.S.R. "stirred up trouble as a 
device to lure us into a conference."21 None of the other participants at the meeting 
responded to the Vice President's remark. They favored alternate explanations for
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Khrushchev's statement. But Nixon's mentor, and primary ally, was not in the room. Had 
the Secretary attended the meeting, he probably would have agreed with Nixon's assessment. 
The concept of the Soviet Union willing to talk made a good impression on the rest of the 
world. By that time, however, cancer was depleting Dulles’ strength so he did not attend the 
meeting.
One of the final assignments Dulles gave to Nixon came on January 15, 1959. Dulles 
asked the Vice President to join him at a dinner given for Anastas Mikoyan, Nikita 
Khrushchev's deputy. Nixon was reluctant. But, "after discussion, the Vice President 
changed his mind and decided to attend the Sec's dinner for Mikoyan as the Sec said he felt 
he could contribute to the evening. N said he would see the Sec before the dinner to see if 
there is anything he wants him to needle Mikoyan about." Nixon’s initial unwillingness could 
have been related to Mikoyan's lack of a diplomatic agenda. He was in the United States to 
research and learn, not to negotiate. Stephen Ambrose was probably correct in concluding 
that Nixon accepted the invitation after he decided the event had a propaganda aspect to it.22 
International affairs was a passion with Nixon, but public relations also appealed to him.
And, propaganda against Communists did make a diplomatic statement. In addition to 
publicity, the meeting may have served Nixon well that summer, when he journeyed to Russia 
and met Mikoyan in the Kremlin. For his part, Dulles, fighting cancer, might have 
welcomed Nixon's support.
As the Berlin Crisis heated up, John Foster Dulles lost ground. He was in and out of 
the hospital starting in November 1958. In February, Dulles requested a leave of absence for 
another cancer operation, and time to recuperate after the surgery. Eisenhower immediately
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granted the furlough. Doctors tried radiation therapy. Meanwhile, Nixon continued his 
attempts to be heard. But, Eisenhower had taken the matter into his own hands and was not 
interested in Nixon's assessment. When the Vice President did get listened to about Berlin, it 
was as a liaison between the Executive and top Congressmen, not as an advisor presenting his 
own ideas. In March, Nixon briefed Representatives and Senators on the situation. That was 
as far as Eisenhower believed his subordinate’s role should go.
About the only influence Nixon had in determining Berlin policy ironically came after 
Christian Herter replaced Dulles as Secretary of State. Nixon suggested that Herter make his 
first speech on the Berlin Crisis. Until that time, only Eisenhower's March 16 radio/TV 
broadcast, discussing the Berlin situation, had received national attention. Some 
Congressmen had publicly broached the subject, but they did not spread the Administration’s 
message far. But, Secretary Herter's first speech could do just that. Ike approved the plan.23 
Nixon’s idea related more to domestic reaction, than foreign relations. The President would 
listen to Nixon's political assessments. Without question, to Nixon's m ind, it was crucial to 
maintain national support for the Administration. Unity behind Republican policies could 
translate into votes for Nixon in 1960.
Just before the end of Dulles' life, Nixon moved to shift his alliances. For nearly 
eight years, he had relied on Dulles as a patron. It was the Secretary who allowed him a role 
in international affairs. When Nixon approached Eisenhower with unsolicited foreign policy 
ideas, he generally received an indifferent response. But, with the passing of Dulles from 
power, Nixon needed to appeal more to the President. His relations with Chris Herter, 
although dating from 1947, were not nearly as close as they had been with Dulles. Nixon and
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Herter exchanged almost no correspondence once the latter was named Secretary of State.24 
Besides, when Dulles could no longer function as primary international advisor, Eisenhower 
tightened his own grip on American foreign relations. He neglected to take Nixon into his 
confidence.
Nixon reinvigorated his attempts to win Eisenhower's confidence in May 1959. At the 
NSC meeting on the twenty-first, Nixon heartily agreed with Ike’s proposal to unilaterally 
invite 10,000 Russian students annually to American universities. If the Soviets accepted, the 
US got to expose Soviet youth to the advantages of capitalism. If the offer was refused, 
America received world accolades for making the effort. Nixon also stated, that he had 
supported the idea two years before, when Ike first proposed it.
Such a plan appealed to Nixon's preference for bold policy initiatives. He claimed 
"the President’s statement caused him to think that the time might well be at hand to re­
examine the basic principles on which our policy with respect to East-West exchanges had 
been developed." He proposed an end to quid pro quo exchanges, in favor of US initiatives 
like the one Ike advocated. This idea contradicted Dulles' basic principles, but coincided with 
Eisenhower’s perspective.25 There was no surprise when Ike agreed with his second-in- 
command's analysis. Nixon, however, may have had a sense of dejavu, since he had 
resurrected his pre-inaugural role, created in the Commodore Hotel, as yes-man.
John Foster Dulles would not have leapt at the President's one-sided plan. He had 
opposed Open Skies, even though that initiative also benefited America regardless of the 
Soviet response. The Secretary wanted to be able to predict with a degree of certainty, the 
results of any diplomatic move. Despite apparent clarity, Dulles did not rush into anything
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without first analyzing all the ramifications. He would have advised greater caution, or at 
minimum, time to examine the proposition in detail. Seeking to win Eisenhower's 
confidence, Nixon had no such compunctions.
Since an alliance with Ike could not be relied upon, Nixon looked again to his travel as 
a means to expand his horizons. His 1958 tour of Latin America, because of its dangers, had 
reinforced his public image as the beacon of Democracy, indomitable in the face of 
communism . It was a perception the Vice President had worked hard to develop through all 
his trips. But, to out shine his life threatening expedition in Venezuela would be difficult.
The secret to success, however, is often timing. In 1959, Nixon was in the right place, at the 
right time. His final trip abroad presented him with a more spectacular opportunity than he 
had inadvertently found in Caracas.
The Vice President's grand finale was a trip to Russia and Poland in July and August
1959. His good fortune came out of circumstance, not persistence: Khrushchev was 
searching for an chance to visit the United States. The Russian Premier used the opening of 
an American exhibition in Moscow, as an excuse to invite Nixon to Russia. By having the 
Vice President as a guest in his country, he set himself up for a reciprocal offer to see 
America. If all went well, he would then extend an invitation to Eisenhower. The highly 
publicized trip offered Nixon an opportunity he had hoped for throughout his vice presidential 
career: to confront the Communists on their home territory. Previously, his requests were 
rejected by Secretary Dulles. Finally, on his death bed, Dulles favored it. The Secretary 
had several reasons to support the mission.
Although Khrushchev extended an invitation to Nixon for self-serving purposes, the
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gesture still constituted a friendly move toward the United States. It behooved the 
Administration to accept. Agreeing to the visit avoided criticism that Washington was not 
making an effort for peace. It also provided the State Department with Nixon's valued - at 
least by Dulles - assessment of Russia.
The Secretary of State generally took a dim view of 'personal diplomacy' with 
Communists, believing "more often than not these meetings were used by Communists, not to 
settle differences, but to exploit them and to gain propaganda advantage." One factor behind 
his opposition to meeting with the Soviets could have been his goal of limiting Soviet 
influence on the free world. Stephen Ambrose contended that, "Dulles could see no reason to 
reach out to the Russians. . . . "  Meetings with the West added legitimacy to the Communists, 
who already had been accepted into the international community. Dulles wanted to deprive 
Russia of its global respectability, in order to force peaceful change from within. However 
by 1959, he trusted Nixon not be manipulated, and supported the trip to Moscow. He also 
must have recognized the domestic public relations opportunity it presented to Nixon, just 
before the 1960 presidential campaign began.
Nixon claimed to have vigorously prepared for the trip to Russia. He "spent every 
spare moment studying reports and recommendations from the State Department, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the White House staff." Yet, the 
information preserved in his files did not reflect the extensive resources Nixon implied. His 
trip file for the Soviet Union contained only basic information from public sources. The State 
Department provided Nixon with American Automobile Association travel guides of the 
U.S.S.R., implying US analysts had few of their own sources. Additional information came
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from published booklets about Russia. There existed a tremendous disparity between the 
briefing materials available for other regions Nixon had traveled to and those provided about 
Moscow, illustrating just how little interaction occurred between the US and the U.S.S.R. 
during the 1950s. Undoubtedly, Nixon received more information than the file contained - 
especially in the form of talks with Dulles - but how much more would be impossible to 
judge. It appeared that he received fewer research materials from the Administration on this 
trip, than he had received on his previous vice presidential goodwill journeys.
Nixon relished the relative freedom of action that resulted from State's inability to 
brief him. A few days before departure, he revealed that he would observe his standard 
audacious style in Russia. Nixon used a conversation with journalist Paul Nevins to 
emphasize his desire to meet the people of Russia, not just the leaders. Nevins recommended 
that Nixon "from time to time try to duck us [the media] and spend some time with the 
people." The Vice President concurred. He instructed his staff to remember "I cannot 
always have all of the press with me. There will be times when we will slip out without 
anyone from the press at all. ',26 That would give Nixon an opportunity to talk directly with 
the people, and the pleasure of deceiving the media. In addition, one can surmise, Nixon 
expected somehow the story would end up in the newspapers. There was no public relations 
advantage to sneaking out to speak with the people, and not having it reported to American 
constituents. He had never done that before, he would not start in the Soviet Union.
Despite the invitation, American-Russian relations remained tense in 1959.
Khrushchev renewed threats on West Berlin immediately before Nixon's departure, making 
the Western world uncomfortable. The same week Nixon left on his trip, Eisenhower
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responded to the annual congressional passage of a "Captive Nations" resolution by 
encouraging Americans to pray for an end to totalitarian rule over Eastern Europe. In 
essence, the declaration called for an end to all Communist regimes. Moscow's leadership 
would berate Nixon unmercifully for the timing of this resolution. Other tensions were 
unspoken. The Central Intelligence Agency continued to launch U-2 flights over the Soviet 
Union, despite Russian protests. Also, the space and arms races were quietly accelerating.
In this atmosphere, Nixon finally made his way behind the Iron Curtain.
Even without State Department directives, the Vice President had to contend with 
Eisenhower's unwillingness to allow him an official policy making role. Although the Vice 
President had proven himself, Ike would not budge. Before Nixon left the United States, 
Eisenhower informed the presidential staff "the Vice-President is not part of the negotiating 
mechanism of government." Nixon was fully aware of Eisenhower's position. With Milton 
Eisenhower chaperoning the trip, he did not attempt to negotiate - at least not when Ike's 
brother was watching him.
True to his word, one of Nixon's initial maneuvers in Russia was to slip away from 
the press. The morning after his arrival, he left the American Embassy with Secret Service 
agent Jack Sherwood, who had accompanied him to Latin America as well. Nixon and 
Sherwood made their way to the Danilovsky market, giving the Vice President his chance to 
meet with the local people. Some in the crowd asked if Nixon had extra tickets to the exhibit 
he was scheduled to open. Nixon misunderstood the question and offered 100 rubles to pay 
for 100 tickets. There were no more tickets available.
Nixon guessed he would be under Soviet surveillance and probably expected some
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mention of his generosity in the Russian newspaper. The story was not what he anticipated. 
To Nixon's consternation, the following day Pravda carried a photo of him giving money to a 
Moscovite and accused the Vice President of offering a bribe. That the Soviets obtained the 
photo, in addition to the story, illustrated how closely they were watching his movements.
The Vice President learned from the incident. After it, he did not attempt anything more than 
conversation with the common people. No gifts. Despite Russian efforts to provoke him, 
Nixon did not again provide the Communists an opportunity to twist his actions or words in 
order to embarrass him and the United States. At the same time, he faced down hecklers 
planted in the crowds, who asked questions about America's racial inequalities and aggressive 
military stance.
The Vice President spent almost two weeks talking with Soviet leaders and touring 
parts of Russia. Khrushchev put on a good show. Nixon and the Premier matched wits 
repeatedly. At the American Exhibition, they debated the respective merits of Democracy 
and Communism . First, they were filmed on camera in the section promoting American 
television technology. Nixon and Khrushchev defended the accomplishments of their 
particular countries. They moved on to a life-sized model American kitchen. There the 
debate continued, with loud exchanges and finger pointing. Although the dialogue almost 
degenerated into a shouting match, Khrushchev seemed to enjoy it.23 And, Nixon had the 
satisfaction of knowing he had stood up to the most powerful Communist in the world.
Stephen Ambrose claimed that Nixon learned a new lesson from his exchanges with 
Khrushchev. On his return to the states, he would warn Eisenhower not to "expect to change 
Khrushchev's mind by arguing with him about the merits of the two competing systems."
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According to Ambrose, "it was a lesson he learned so well that he never again, in all his 
dealings with Communist leaders, made the mistake of trying to do so."28 Of course, this was 
a lesson Nixon had actually absorbed over a decade before, dealing with Giuseppe De 
Vittorio. Like Khrushchev, the Italian refused to concede his point.
Nixon never believed he would change Khrushchev’s mind by engaging him in debate. 
He primarily hoped to win over those watching, and display his stalwart defense of the 
American-way. Khrushchev was not about to give into Nixon's arguments. The best 
outcome of the dispute either one could expect was a stalemate. When they managed it, each 
man claimed victory.
Eisenhower had not authorized the Vice President to negotiate with the Soviet 
representatives, but when Nixon found the opportunity, he tried anyway. In his private 
meetings with Russian leaders, he made every attempt to fill the role of plenipotentiary 
statesman. Nixon emphasized the need for a thawing in relations. Khrushchev had 
previously called for diminished tensions also. An early version of Detente, he probably 
reasoned that neither country benefitted from their ongoing rivalry. The diplomatic effort, 
however, was as self-serving as it was altruistic. A tangible improvement in US-U.S.S.R. 
affairs would enhance Nixon's reputation among American voters in 1960.
On July 25, Nixon had two meetings in the Kremlin. His first meeting was with 
K hrushchev's deputy, Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan complained that the United States waged 
an economic war against the Soviet Union, and deprived Russia of needed goods. Mikoyan 
probably made a valid charge, since the US discouraged its allies from trade with non- 
democratic regimes. Nixon replied that trade could only increase after political relations
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improved. "He [Nixon] could not agree that trade agreements must precede political 
settlements." The talks with Mikoyan ended at 10:15am. Soon thereafter, Nixon found 
himself face-to-face with the Deputy Premier, Frol Kozlov.
The Vice President explained to Kozlov that diplomatic breakthroughs could only be 
made by cutting through the bureaucratic red tape inherent in the large governments of 
America and Russia. Nixon remarked those impediments "should be cut where important and 
far reaching decisions are to be made. The purpose of high level diplomacy is precisely to 
cut red tape. ”29 Nixon, the constitutional second-in-command of the United States, was 
talking to the number two man in Russia. They were thus engaged in the highest level talks 
going on between their nations. The Vice President's statement implied he could be a part of 
the tape removal process - expressly ignoring Ike's orders. Nixon did not assume that Kozlov 
had the authority to reach any agreements, but everything said to Kozlov, Khrushchev was 
certain to hear also.
Nixon had met with Khrushchev on July 22. That first exchange exposed Nixon to the 
Russian leader's bluster, as Khrushchev railed against the "Captive Nations" resolution. In 
subsequent talks, however, Nixon attempted to make headway. Foster Dulles had insisted 
that the U.S.S.R. could not expect to intervene in the non-Communist world without allowing 
the free world do the same in Russia's satellite countries. The Secretary had explained that 
Khrushchev "should be told that until he puts a stop to such activities, his call for reducing of 
tensions and for peaceful co-existence will have a completely false and hollow ring." Nixon 
might have listened to this strategy in May, but Dulles was two months in the ground by the 
time Nixon was in Eastern Europe. And, it was perfectly clear from his public discussions
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with Khrushchev that this line of reasoning would be rejected.
Nixon's tactic actually seemed to be more conciliatory. He informed Khrushchev that 
respect for the military power of each country could replace the unceasing race for military 
and economic superiority. The debate about which nation was stronger only created tensions 
and fear. Nixon's perspective actually was more enlightened, and realistic, than what Dulles 
suggested. He understood Khrushchev would not back down unilaterally, but hoped the 
Soviets would mirror US steps away from confrontation.
When given the unprecedented opportunity to address the Russian people via a 
televised speech, Nixon again disregarded advice he had received from his mentor in May. 
Dulles suggested the main objective should be to put "the responsibility for peace upon 
Khrushchev's shoulders." In 1955, Nixon had decried the Premier's efforts to place the onus 
of peace on America, so it was conceivable he would reciprocate, as Dulles recommended. 
Instead, Nixon responded to complaints raised by hecklers, denied Pravda's bribe story and 
gently explained that the West would not allow Communism to overrun the world. Nixon 
knew the speech was not as hard-line as conservatives back home wanted. But, hoping his 
words might be believed by a few of the Russians, Nixon stopped short of a harsh 
condemnation of the Soviet system.
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson wholly praised the Vice President's performance.
He claimed Nixon's foreign relations experience had served him extremely well on the trip. 
The Vice President succeeded in "getting our story across and at same time not upsetting 
bigger game we are playing by provocative statements." Thompson remarked that Nixon's 
radio/TV address may have sounded soft to US citizens, but it was "extremely effective with
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Soviet audience. "30 In fact, the Russian people probably were not affected by Nixon's words. 
Most importantly, he had presented the United States positively and the Soviets less so, and 
from Moscow no less. Concurrently, he checked his vitriolic anti-Communism throughout 
the entire speech. Both details were undeniable accomplishments.
After twelve days in Russia, the American group flew to Poland. In terms of media 
attention, the Polish segment of the trip surpassed the Russian. Nixon received a much 
warmer welcome from the citizens of Warsaw than the Moscovites. Personally, however, the 
Vice President must have been dissatisfied with his time there. Unlike Moscow, he did not 
manage any private meetings with the Polish officials. Instead, Milton Eisenhower attended 
his conference with President Wladyslaw Gomulka. With Ike's brother in the same room, 
Nixon could only inform Gomulka that he was a messenger, not a negotiator. He repeatedly 
explained to Gomulka "that under his constitutional position as Vice President of the United 
States he does not originate foreign policy nor does he engage in negotiations. He would 
report folly to the President and to the Secretary of State the views expressed by Mr.
Gomulka of this subject."31 Obviously, this was not the role Nixon had so often attempted to 
make for himself. Constitutionally acceptable or not, Nixon aspired to be a statesman. In 
Moscow, he had removed this yoke. In Warsaw, Milton reasserted that control.
On the whole, both parts of the trip were triumphant for the Vice President. It was an 
historic visit because of the precedent it set, and the publicity Nixon gained. Here was 
another great media success for the Vice President. In September, however, Nixon was not 
given an opportunity to again boost his image when Khrushchev made his reciprocal trip to 
America. Eisenhower gave the job of tour guide to US Ambassador to the U.N., Henry
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Cabot Lodge, Jr. Although the highest ranking official to have spent time with Khrushchev, 
Nixon was not considered for the assignment.
In August, the Vice President had claimed that he should not be the person to 
accompany the Russian party because it would be "improper since he had not done so with 
any other head of state."32 Eisenhower did not bother to contradict the Vice President, 
despite obvious counter-arguments. First, Khrushchev had accompanied Nixon on some of 
his trip in Russia. Second, as leader of the America’s greatest opponent, Khrushchev was a 
person who required special attention. Lodge's position carried prestige, but Nixon's 
probably carried more. It was Eisenhower's decision, and the President held more faith in 
Lodge, than in Nixon. Perhaps, Ike wanted to avoid another confrontation between the Vice 
President and the Premier.
Acting as a host to the Russians would have increased Nixon's exposure and his 
foreign relations reputation. Regardless of whether the visit had any diplomatic negotiations 
attached to it, talking one-on-one with the head of the Soviet Union gave official stature to the 
guide. Nixon had gained some from his visit to Moscow. He would not have declined the 
opportunity to debate the Soviet Premier again, had Ike dismissed the "improper" argument. 
Possibly, the Vice President raised the idea with the hope that Eisenhower would discount it. 
Nixon miscalculated, as no one else offered arguments in favor of the Vice President showing 
Khrushchev the US. Dulles was gone and could not intervene on the Vice President's behalf. 
Nixon had lost any chance of participating in the Russian leader's visit.
Whether or not Nixon hosted Khrushchev was less important than that he had gone to 
the Russia. He could add to his credentials that he had established a relationship with the
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Soviet government unrivaled by any other American political figure. James Reston admitted 
the trip was a superb way to launch a presidential campaign.33 Nixon was hailed for his 
stalwart defense of capitalism and his firmness in dealing with the communist leadership. He 
returned home to showers of congratulatory letters and high praise from the American press.
The tour behind the Iron Curtain brought the Vice President's overseas traveling to an 
end. By the time he returned from Poland, Nixon had built an impressive foreign affairs 
resum6. He was a Vice President with fantastic name recognition who, through his trips and 
efforts in the Administration, constantly displayed his experience and competence. By the 
summer of 1959, Nixon had created an image of himself that was quite presidential in 
character. He achieved something no previous vice president had managed. He turned his 
position into a viable jump-off point for a presidential campaign. In so doing, he transformed 
the office for all those who followed him.
Nixon's main obstacle to maintaining his unprecedented position was Eisenhower. Ike 
refused to see Nixon as anything more than a political hatchet man. Although the Vice 
President consistently worked to expand his role in the Administration, Ike was steadfast. 
While Dulles was alive, Nixon had an advocate who could help in his efforts to attract 
responsibilities beyond political jobs for the Administration. Without the Secretary of State, 
Nixon's international role shrank each day the election came closer.
Ambrose accurately described the position Nixon found himself in after Dulles’ death. 
"Eisenhower in his last two years was going to put the long-term good of the country ahead of 
all other considerations, and would not gear his actions or his ideas to the immediate problem 
of electing Dick Nixon in I960."34 In fact, Ike's plan included boosting his own image,
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rather than Nixon's. He hoped to leave a legacy of peace and action. To attain his goal, 
Eisenhower supplanted Nixon as goodwill ambassador. World peace would be his crowning 
achievement and ensure him an enviable global reputation. Given the President's authority, 
and Nixon's growing need to concentrate on his campaign, it was not difficult to lock the 
Vice President out of the foreign policy picture. This was a frustrating end to a hard fought 
battle to increase his exposure and reputation.
Until the second half of 1959, Nixon had made slow but steady progress in his quest 
for an extended role in the Administration. At National Security Council and Cabinet 
meetings, Nixon displayed his foreign affairs competence. After each of his international 
voyages, he presented a detailed analysis of his findings. He offered a considered opinion on 
any topics for which he could claim the slightest knowledge. And, in such regions as South 
East Asia, he spoke with authority and confidence. His input in high level meetings and 
briefing sessions earned him some of the respect and rank he thirsted after. Because it was 
largely a behind the scenes role, however, it could never satisfy his goals.
The public opportunities to portray himself as an international relations expert came 
most often when the Vice President traveled abroad. His expeditions made him a global 
figure. Yet, throughout the Administration he tried to mutate the goodwill ambassador image 
into one of statesman. He did not avoid these assignments for fear of injuring his relationship 
with Dulles, and reducing his role in the Administration. But he did attempt to elevate the 
relevance of each overseas assignment. He sought presidential directives to improve the 
stature of excursions and endeavored to convince Dulles to expand his assignments beyond 
bringing good wishes to foreign dignitaries. Nixon craved a prestigious mission.
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Despite his reservation about goodwill trips, Nixon used them as much to his 
advantage as he could. In foreign countries, he could hold press conferences that received 
media attention because of his exotic location. He could project himself as a decision-maker, 
without being tied directly to Eisenhower or Dulles.
In addition, Nixon worked to modify the public perception of his travels. Since the 
trips were not statesmanlike in nature, Nixon promoted his travel as more important than he 
actually believed it to be. In such an effort, the Vice President once wrote three pages of 
notes about the merits of goodwill trips. His scribbles included the phrases "There will be 
peace - if people can know people and "good will is essential to good relations." Nixon 
ended up with an eighteen page speech justifying goodwill visits as important for assuring 
positive communications with allies, learning and sharing respective cultures and determining 
the thoughts of governmental leaders.35 Nothing he said was inaccurate. He simply believed 
his untapped diplomatic talents could be used more effectively, to benefit his country and 
him self. Not a man afraid of manipulating public perceptions, he promoted the importance of 
his trips, disregarding his own doubts about their utility.
Nixon's tours between 1953 and 1960 did not possess the level of foreign policy 
importance that his 1947 excursion had. But, they were significantly better than no 
international role at all. Through surveys abroad and participation in foreign policy 
discussion in the Administration, the Vice President achieved some of his goals. He gained 
an expertise in foreign relations and a reputation as a risk taker. International relations was 
probably his most admired quality among the populace. Certainly, his vicious partisanship 
did not endear him to the majority of voters, although it did win him allies among grassroots
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Republican organizations. And, Nixon's role in the Administration was larger because of his 
efforts - efforts which included maintaining a patron/protege relationship with Dulles - than 
would otherwise have been possible.
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Chapter 6
Down to Earth: The Eisenhower-Nixon Relationship
While the Vice President worked hard to expand his foreign policy role in the 
Administration, President Eisenhower's authority remained supreme. Regardless of how 
Nixon proved his worth, he was Limited to the roles Ike assigned or Dulles devised. Herbert 
Parmet commented that Nixon's "activism as Vice President, however much a landmark in 
the evolution of the office, also carried with it the penalty of subservience that galled and 
humiliated Nixon and others who held the position." Another historian explained, Nixon 
rebelled against the notion that Eisenhower was his mentor, "for he felt personally that he 
owed nothing to Eisenhower except the memory of uphill struggles and political martyrdom."1 
Ike did not pave the Vice President's way with gold, or even asphalt. He used Nixon only as 
a political workhorse and congressional contact. Any exceptions arose from requests made by 
Secretary Dulles, who had his own agenda for Nixon. From the start, Eisenhower reserved 
judgment on Nixon's character. In 1952, Ike effectively forced his runningmate to make 
public his personal finances in order to disprove media charges that he had accepted illicit 
campaign donations. Eisenhower told reporters Nixon would have to show himself clean as a 
hound's tooth to prove his innocence. The result was the famous "Checkers speech" in which 
the Californian disclosed his finances, but also melodramatically announced he would not give 
up the family dog Checkers - a gift from an admirer - regardless of what anyone said. Nixon
199
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stayed on the ticket, but resented the embarrassing invasion of his privacy, and Eisenhower's 
unwillingness to lend him more support. The President never became close to Nixon.
Nixon's assignments from Eisenhower typically fell into two categories: election 
campaigner and legislative advocate.2 Through all the elections of the Administration - 
congressional, gubernatorial and presidential - Nixon campaigned for Republican candidates. 
Eisenhower kept his hands clean, while Nixon hurled political accusations and insults. This 
was a task with which Nixon already had great familiarity, and he performed it well. He 
knew how to play a crowd, how to deliver a catch phrase and how to praise an ally.
His second job was as executive liaison to Congress. Nixon's work on Capital Hill 
was tied to his position in the Administration, rather than to the Republican party. Because 
he presided over the Senate, he had constitutional authority to work with the Senators and the 
Representatives. Ike recognized that and used it.
Both of these assignments were essentially political in nature. In the President's mind, 
that was the main purpose of a Vice President, or specifically of his Vice President. Nixon 
had no choice but to accept these two roles and perform them to his utmost ability. His 
successful expansion of the vice presidency, in terms of foreign relations, came about only 
through skilled opportunism. Eisenhower's vision of the position, although more extensive 
than previous presidents, did not include a globe roaming second-in-command.
By the first election of the new Administration, Nixon already had his marching 
orders. During the March 5, 1954 Cabinet meeting, Nixon recommended that the attendees 
keep speaking calendars open for September and October. Although an off year election, they 
might be called upon to lend support to Republican candidates before the vote. High ranking
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officials made excellent celebrities for campaign podiums.
At the first Cabinet meeting after election day, Eisenhower called on Nixon for an 
analysis of the results. The Vice President explained that the Republican party had lost some 
seats, but not an astounding number. He claimed the election had been a "dead heat. ” To 
conclude his presentation, he wound up a mechanical drummer boy and released it across the 
conference table. With that he noted "that the Administration must continue to 'beat the 
drum' of achievement."3 Unfortunately for Nixon, Eisenhower liked the effect. The Vice 
President's proven political skill assured that he received these domestic assignments.
By its nature, the vice presidency included a domestic collar. Nixon never abandoned 
these duties, although he continued to work to increase his international role. The Vice 
President supplied political advice and analysis to Eisenhower through the entire 
Administration.
Ironically, Nixon’s reluctant work in domestic politics helped his presidential 
aspirations as much, or more, than his aspired role as statesman. Through his campaigning, 
he gained a national reputation among Republicans of all ilk. Nixon helped small time 
politicians running for county seats, just as he sat on podiums with congressional candidates. 
Before the end of the Eisenhower Administration, he had used his position to build a loyal 
grassroots support network.
By Fall 1953, Eisenhower had determined the Vice President's primary duty. While 
Nixon was still traveling through Asia, Dulles recommended the additon of Saudi Arabia to 
the itinerary, but Ike would not agree to it. Although Dulles wanted an updated report on a 
region he had visited in May, Eisenhower preferred that Nixon manage congressional
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relations.
Dulles noted on November 21 that the President "is not disposed to recommend it 
[expanded itinerary]. . . .  he is very anxious that the Vice President should get back as soon 
as possible to participate in meetings scheduled in early December with congressional 
leaders."4 Implicitly, Ike exposed his own insecurity about addressing the Congressmen 
without Nixon's experience to support him. Perhaps, another reason Ike vetoed the detour 
was that he was uncomfortable with the young Vice President representing the United States 
overseas.
One of the most important congressional liaison/advisor assignments the President 
delegated to Nixon, came about in December 1953. At that time, Eisenhower put Nixon to 
work on a major challenge - dealing with Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Nixon 
and McCarthy had been colleagues on HUAC and Eisenhower hoped that the Vice President 
could reason with the unmanageable Senator. On Ike's orders, Nixon met with the powerful 
anti-Communist demagogue, and seemingly convinced him to cease his indiscriminate attacks 
on the Republican Administration. Nixon's immediate success with McCarthy was short­
lived. The Wisconsin native soon abrogated the agreement and renewed his charges of 
Communist  security risks in the government. For the next year, Nixon attempted to control 
McCarthy. To reduce his potency, Ike used Nixon as an anti-Communist spokesman and 
drew attention away from McCarthy. In the end, it was committee hearings involving an 
Army dentist that brought McCarthy's reign to an end.
Once a national audience witnessed the sloppy, abusive, cruel methods employed by 
McCarthy, he lost his credibility.5 Without an audience, he had no power. Although Nixon
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did not contain McCarthy's attacks as Dee wanted, he did make every attempt. He completed 
the assignment as well as possible.
More characteristic of Nixon's role under Eisenhower was recruiting congressional 
support for Administration initiatives. May 1954 brought a crisis requiring the Vice 
President's persuasive skiUs. As the agonizing defeat of a French garrison at Dien Bien Phu 
approached, Eisenhower assigned him the task of reconciling the Republican right wing to the 
President's middle of the road approach. Conservatives called for immediate military support 
of the French. Ike refused to intervene unilaterally. Nixon’s lobbying succeeded and serious 
right wing opposition to Eisenhower’s plan never materialized.
After Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, Nixon again 
stepped into his congressional liaison role. He recommended that top senatorial leaders of 
both parties be fully briefed on the crisis. The Vice President expected to mute reaction from 
the Hill by giving the Senators enough information to make them feel apprised and consulted. 
Eisenhower reacted to the suggestion as though the Senators might try to limit his actions. He 
warned "he won't stand by and let our nationals be abused." He implied any legislative move 
to block an aggressive response would be side-stepped by the Executive branch. Within a few 
days, however, Egyptian actions made it clear that US nationals were safe and canal traffic 
would sail smoothly. Ironically, the Administration condemned the aUied attack on Egypt, 
instead of partaking in it. How much Nixon's briefing helped to control the reaction from 
legislators is unclear, but by keeping the Congressmen informed the session must have 
benefited executive-congressional relations.
Eisenhower repeatedly handed Nixon the Administration's Capital HiU problems. The
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legislature was the only issue on which Eisenhower consistently consulted Nixon. Ten days 
before his stroke in November 1957, Ike wrote Nixon a memorandum. "Will you carefully 
read the enclosed documents, both of them directed to the subject of establishing good 
relationships with the Congress." There were two letters, one addressed to US Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and the other to White House staff 
congressional liaison, General Wilton B. "Jerry" Persons. To protect the Administration 
from recriminations, the President ordered Nixon to personally destroy the notes after reading 
and approving them. He sought to avoid leaks about "any concerted effort along this line. . .
. "6 Ike assumed the media would publicly criticize a White House that deliberately tried to 
obtain congressional conformity. It was thus imperative that secrecy be maintained. Nixon 
undoubtedly followed his instructions and obliterated the documents once he had read and 
commented on them.
When Washington was presented with a foreign crisis, Nixon usually arranged for the 
briefing of Congressmen by White House officials. He also acted as a middle man when 
Eisenhower met with Representatives and Senators. The Vice President presented the 
situation and responded to questions, while Eisenhower listened. Occasionally the President 
would add some comment, but Ike left the wrangling with individual legislators to Nixon.7 
While the Vice President resented this work - as he did campaigning - it again eased his path 
toward the presidency. Nixon formed relationships with powerful Congressmen whom he 
called on for support in 1960, and again in 1968.
Unexpectedly in the spring of 1959, Nixon almost found himself performing an 
international task solely at the President's behest. On March 31, Eisenhower asked him to
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head a delegation to the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires. The request was 
conditional on Dulles not being able to attend the Foreign Ministers Conference beginning in 
six weeks. Ike explained "if Foster was not able to go to the Foreign Ministers Conference 
on May 11th, he [Ike] was in quite a jam for someone to head the delegation to Buenos Aires 
for the Conference beginning April 27th. Dillon has to go to the SEATO Conference." 
Eisenhower continued that "he did not want to add a burden to the Vice President, but 
wondered if he would consider this and in a day or two call Acting Secretary Herter. . . . 
[Instead of sending Milton Eisenhower], he thought it would be more desirable to have the 
highest possible ranking official of government [attend]. . . . "  The President did not wish to 
offend the Latinos. Implicitly, if Dulles could not go to the Foreign Ministers Conference, 
the President would take his place. Otherwise, Ike would go to South America and Dulles to 
Geneva. One can surmise that Ike asked Nixon to cover in Buenos Aires because the latter 
had experience there. Eisenhower would go to Europe, his area of expertise, and probably 
the more important conference. But, the President carefully appealed to Nixon’s own sense 
of importance by mentioning he wanted the highest level person available to attend the 
conference in Latin America. The request came only because Ike envisioned a lack of top 
personnel for the events he listed. However, such a shortage never actually occurred, so 
Nixon did not attend the Buenos Aires conference.8
From his clean as a hounds tooth pronouncement onward, historians concur that Ike 
maintained a respectable distance between himself and the Vice President. The ambivalent 
attitude became apparent early in the Administration. For example, during a September 1953 
NSC meeting, Nixon commented on some leaks that had appeared in the newspapers that
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morning. The story discussed the Council’s consideration of continental defense issues. 
According to the Vice President, "What really concerned him was the problem of public 
reaction to the present continental defense problem in view of the great hullabaloo in the press 
on the subject." Nixon's comment did not seem unreasonable.
Ike, however, trivialized the younger man's concern, in a less than complimentary 
way. The President responded: "it was unwise for the members of the Council to let 
themselves get so excited about what the columnists reported, as to fail to use common sense 
in reaching a decision. He said he was inclined to order Council members in the future not to 
read the newspapers on mornings before meetings of the National Security Council 
(Laughter)." The only member who appeared "excited" was Nixon and thus the laughter was 
at his expense. Although not an overt insult, Ike's comment was demeaning, in implying the 
Vice President had overreacted. And it undoubtedly embarrassed Nixon.
Eisenhower routinely belittled worries that Nixon brought before the National Security 
Council. On August 12, 1954, Nixon expressed apprehension about making decisions 
without adequate discussion time. He told the Council "He thought it unwise to make final 
decisions on the Far Eastern Policy on the basis of an hour’s discussion." Eisenhower 
responded that in principle he was correct, but after all, "it was necessary to reach decisions 
and that this was the place to reach them."9 The comment had a humiliating aspect to it, as 
though the President were speaking to a child, and not a seasoned professional. It must have 
stung the Vice President and certainly reflected Ike's notion that Nixon was inexperienced and 
immature.
Although careful not to openly voice his ambivalence to Nixon, Eisenhower did not
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effectively hide it when he talked about the constitutional second-in-command. His public 
pronouncements about the Vice President often hinted at his true aversion. Responding to a 
letter from Clare Francis praising Nixon, Eisenhower could not completely hide his 
discomfort. Ms. Francis lauded Nixon's performance at the Union League Club. "He not 
only sold this group of 'moss-backed' Republicans on the actual position of the Republican 
party and the need of their active and enlightened support, but in so doing he sold them on 
Dick Nixon right down to his heels." Eisenhower accepted the compliment to Nixon in 
stride, while himself responding with a back handed compliment to the Vice President. "Dear 
Clare, I am delighted — but not astonished — at your report of Dick Nixon’s talk to the 
members of the Union League Club. He has a remarkable and enviable ability to adjust his 
remarks to the mood and background of his audience."10
That Eisenhower actually envied his subordinate's aptitude for deceptive speaking is 
improbable. Ike valued honesty and integrity. Nixon’s uncommon gift for tailoring his 
words to his audience was the mark of a consummate politician, not necessarily a model 
citizen. Tne Vice President could change the topics he emphasized and modify his position 
just enough to please any specific group of people. It did not reflect an undying commitment 
to truth, but his artifice. So Ike's comment, while an accurate reflection of Nixon's skills, 
was not the compliment it might have appeared to be to a casual reader.
The President's doubts about the Californian were most public during the 1956 
Presidential campaign. At the March 7 presidential news conference, a main topic of 
discussion was Nixon's place on the ticket. Eisenhower explained that he would not condone 
any maneuver to remove Mr. Nixon from the ticket. However, he claimed "I have not
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presumed to tell the Vice President what he should do with his own future. . . . "  Ike 
continued that his second-in-command was a "comer” in the Republican party who "so far as I 
know . . .  is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that I am." Then the 
President made the comment that would find its way to newspaper headlines. "The only thing 
I have asked him to do is to chart out his own course, and tell me what he would like to do 
[italics added]." Regardless of what Eisenhower claimed, his statement carried with it 
negative connotations. Political analysts, pundits and the Democratic opposition interpreted 
the statement to mean Ike did not support Nixon's candidacy. The Vice President took it the 
same way. He immediately wrote a letter of resignation, which he only destroyed after 
Republican National Committee Chair, Leonard Hall, convinced him to wait.
The President's public comments not only revealed his skepticism about Nixon as a 
candidate, they labeled the Vice President only a comer and indirectly cast doubts about 
Nixon's political integrity. Although not much remembered, Eisenhower also noted "so far 
as I know he [Nixon] is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that I am."
Ike was not sure. He knew Nixon was "vigorous, healthy, and deeply informed on the 
processes of our Government," but would not unequivocally endorse the man who would 
replace him in the event death or disability.11 It was another subtle sign of Eisenhower's 
ambivalence about the Vice President.
Eisenhower’s 1957 New Year's well wishing to Nixon also showed how he felt. In a 
formal note, Ike thanked Nixon for his indispensable help. The note came across as cold and 
Eisenhower added the post script "In view of the intimacy of our friendship, this letter may 
seem to you a bit on the formal side. It is not meant to be. I am simply trying to make of
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record an expression of my grateful thanks."12 When Eisenhower wrote a letter that reflected 
the intimacy of his relationship with someone, there was no mistaking it. He did not see 
Nixon socially, nor did he banter with the Vice President. The card did establish, for the 
record, Eisenhower's official gratitude. It did not, however, confirm their close relationship. 
The President considered Nixon distasteful for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was 
Nixon's political aspirations.
In a December 1954 letter to childhood friend, Everett "Swede" Hazlett, Eisenhower 
wrote a denouncement of politically motivated men. Presumably, the elections of November 
brought the subject to mind. He told Swede, "so great is the politician's thirst for power and 
personal prestige that philosophical and doctrinal differences are unimportant to partisans 
seeking office." The remark seemed to describe someone like Nixon and perhaps provided a 
hint about why Eisenhower doubted his runningmate's principles of government in 1956. It 
was not until later in the Administration, however, that Eisenhower directly complained about 
the Vice President’s political expediency.
On June 11, 1959, Ann Whitman, the personal secretary to the President, recorded an 
incident involving Ike and Nixon. She noted Nixon had joined the President for breakfast that 
morning. After the Vice President left, Eisenhower made a remark she felt compelled to 
record. He commented "’it is terrible when people get politically ambitious — they have so 
many problems'. He did not elaborate." In fact, he did explain a little by adding that Nixon 
had urged the President to "take some of his [Nixon's] friends for a weekend on the Barbara 
Anne [the presidential yacht], playing golf at some of the nearby courses such as Quantico."13 
Given the context - Eisenhower's preceding comment and the approaching 1960 presidential
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campaign - "friends" probably referred to Nixon's political backers.
The General did not respect motives derived from a craving for personal power, rather 
than national duty. Ike might understand a desire to enhance one's prestige, but "political 
ambitions" were distastefully Machiavellian. His own goal to bring peace to the world before 
he left office, was motivated not only from a desire for personal recognition, but also from an 
altruistic need to save the world from itself. Nixon's request, however, was too political and 
self-centered for Ike to entertain.
During the final year and a half of the Administration, Nixon's political aspirations 
began to surpass his sense of duty. To help win election, the Vice President hoped to appear 
to wield more power than commonly perceived. He wanted to demonstrate his leadership 
skills. He needed to display at least a competency in dealing with the Communists. All 
would improve his reputation among the voting public. Eisenhower found exactly this 
behavior disagreeable. Intellectually, he understood that some of the maneuvering was 
necessary. He did not, however, respect the practice of selling one's image for public 
consumption, or respect Nixon for doing it.
Even after his trip to Russia, Nixon could not command the respect he yearned for 
from Eisenhower, or for that matter, the president's staff. At the Cabinet meeting on August 
7, Nixon presented an hour and a quarter briefing to the assembled officials. Just before he 
began, the President excused himself but invited Cabinet members to remain. They all did. 
Nixon explained that he had already "informed the President and the Secretary of State in 
detail on those aspects of his discussion with Mr. Khrushchev which bore upon substantive 
issues; he did not recount these discussions in the Cabinet." According to the hand written
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notes of the meeting, Secretary Herter stayed for Nixon's talk, even though he had already 
heard the pertinent information. Whatever Nixon said, it could not have been too interesting. 
L.A. Minnich, who took the minutes, made no more mention of the lecture than that the 
presentation occurred.14 One can assume also, that Minnich concluded Eisenhower had no 
interest in preserving a record of Nixon's remarks. Ike's departure reflected his priorities. 
Listening to the Vice President pontificate about Russia ranked lower than most any other 
business.
In a way, the performance was a repeat of one in 1953, after Nixon returned from his 
first Asian trip. At that time, the President only expressed an interest in assurances that 
Syngman Rhee could be controlled. Once the Vice President confidently stated this was true, 
Ike's attention went elsewhere. Even this late in the Administration, Nixon could not gain a 
serious hearing from the President. His position degraded further when Eisenhower usurped 
his most impressive foreign relations credential, travel abroad.
During the summer, Eisenhower decided to make a series of international tours before 
he left office. He had already visited Europe that August. In December, the President 
embarked on a trip that took him to Greece, India, Italy, Pakistan, Spain and Turkey (among 
others). On December 8, from Karachi, Pakistan, Eisenhower sent a telegram to Nixon. 
Except for a message following Latin American confrontations in 1958, Ike had not 
communicated with Nixon when either one of them was abroad. This bulletin described the 
throngs of adoring crowds that met Eisenhower at each stop. While public reaction in Rome 
was dampened by poor weather, the "reception in Turkey was colorful and outstandingly 
warm. Here in Karachi, however, I was literally overwhelmed by the sheer number of people
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on the street." Ike mentioned in a few sentences the basic foreign policy goals of the 
countries he had visited. These were simplistically stated and Nixon undoubtedly already 
knew these fundamentals.13
The point of this telegram was not clear. Ike might have sent it because he was 
visiting a region in which the Vice President claimed expertise. It was as close as the 
President ever came to informing Nixon of the foreign policy situation, the way Dulles had. 
Unlike Dulles' messages, Eisenhower reported little of substance. Rather, Ike, ebullient 
about the welcoming crowds and unable to contain his excitement, wrote Nixon this note to 
describe the events. If Eisenhower enjoyed spite, he might have written the note to illustrate 
his popularity, in comparison to Nixon's. Certainly, the public effect of Ike's trips for the 
Vice President was to highlight Eisenhower's achievements, skills and expertise over those of 
Nixon.
It is doubtful, Eisenhower wrote to keep Nixon informed about the world situation. 
Even after the international trips taken for the Administration and the competence the Vice 
President showed in foreign policy analysis, Eisenhower did not see the his second-in- 
command as a foreign relations expert. It was perhaps in this respect that the President and 
his Secretary of State differed the most. Ike and Dulles saw foreign relations in particularly 
similar terms. They agreed on most aspects of policy. But, on Nixon's foreign relations 
skills, they were near opposites. Dulles respected the Vice President's international affairs 
expertise and sent him to Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe on State Department 
business. According to Herbert Parmet, "[international] travel, all coordinated with Secretary 
Dulles, became a more prominent function of his office than any previous Vice President. . .
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." Nixon served as "an adjunct to the Secretary of State, doing those things that Dulles 
thought he should not do for himself."16 Dulles’ aid helped empower the vice presidency with 
new importance domestically and internationally. This modification of the office became a 
standard after I960.
From 1959 until the election in November I960, Eisenhower provided few 
opportunities to Nixon. Although the President preferred Nixon over John F. Kennedy, he 
could not suppress his discomfort about Nixon. Ike believed the Vice President was not yet 
ready to be President - "immature. ” He found the media's concentration on the campaign, 
and consequent inattention to his Administration, infuriating. This combined displeasure led 
to one of the most damaging remarks about the Vice President that Eisenhower ever made.
August 24, 1960, marked Eisenhower's one hundred and ninetieth presidential news 
conference. As it closed, newsman Charles H. Mohr asked about Richard M. Nixon's role in 
the Administration. It was a question that had been rephrased several times that day. Mohr 
wanted Eisenhower to "give us an example of a major idea of his [Nixon's] that you had 
adopted. . . . "  Eisenhower, feeling besieged and frustrated, replied "If you give me a week, I 
might think of one. I don’t remember. ” Annoyed, he ended the session immediately after the 
comment. The President's closing answer nearly set in stone the image of Nixon as un- 
influential in the decision making process. Eight years of effort evaporated with that single 
phrase. The Vice President must have seethed with anger.
The response made headlines and in doing so overshadowed Eisenhower's positive 
comments about Nixon's role in the Administration. A few minutes before the Mohr 
question, Ike had noted that the Californian took an active role in the advising process in the
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government, "the Vice President has participated . . .  in all of the consultative meetings that 
have been held." Nixon had "a full part in every principal discussion. ”17 These remarks 
were ignored by the papers. "If I had a week" was the lead story.
In addition, the President's position that Nixon should only serve as perennial 
campaigner, election advisor and congressional liaison, immeasurably hurt his ability to 
further his foreign relations reputation. Without Ike's permission, the Vice President could 
not gain the active role in government he constantly worked to attain. At the same time, 
Eisenhower's ambivalence was as great an obstacle to Nixon's goals as his active efforts to 
restrict the vice presidential role. Eisenhower was Nixon's nemesis.
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Conclusion:
A Limited Role - Nixon Assessed
During his tenure as Vice President, Nixon logged more international miles than any 
member of the Administration, except perhaps Dulles. He visited at least 50 countries and 
took every opportunity to learn. He was an avid student of foreign relations.
His interest germinated from the 1947 Herter Committee trip. In Europe, Nixon came 
face-to-face with Communism. As he explored foreign lands, he followed his instinct and 
savored risk filled adventures. He observed and talked with the leaders of the free world, 
gaining a first hand awareness of the European situation, as the committee had been 
instructed. In the process, Nixon acquired his obsession with international relations and a 
body of knowledge on which he developed his foreign affairs expertise.
The Herter Committee did more than provide Nixon with information. It provided 
him with connections to influential people. The most beneficial association grew into a 
sincere friendship with John Foster Dulles. The Nixon-Dulles relationship fundamentally 
shaped Nixon's role in the Administration. Their first introduction, no doubt, came through 
Foster's brother Allen, whose acquaintance Nixon made on the Queen Mary. By the time 
both joined the Eisenhower Administration, they were well known to each other.
Dulles and Nixon shared a mutual respect that blossomed into admiration and 
friendship. As Ike's influential Secretary of State, Dulles used his position to help the Vice
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President expand his foreign relations knowledge and reputation. The elder man also 
understood and sympathized with the political goals of his friend. If Dulles had anything to 
say about it, Nixon would be President in 1961. Without his friend to champion his cause, 
Nixon had few opportunities to display his foreign relations expertise.
The Vice President and the Secretary created a complicated and intriguing 
relationship. Dulles was friend, mentor and superior to Nixon. Although he acted as a 
patron, he acted simultaneously out of enlightened self-interest. Foster Dulles benefited from 
the help he gave to his protege. He used Nixon directly as an adjunct, field researcher, 
unofficial spokesman and loyal supporter. The Secretary's good auspices brought to the vice 
presidential doorway trips abroad, an unsanctioned advisory role and additional efforts to 
enhance Nixon’s status. In doing this, Dulles assured Nixon's gratitude and indebtedness. 
Each assignment made the Californian a better aide to the State Department. Each success 
increased his reputation and his expertise.
Although Nixon needed Dulles' support, concurrently he hoped to create an 
autonomous role for himself. Repeatedly, the Vice President insisted that the President 
supervised and commanded him, not Dulles. He demanded that Eisenhower issue his orders, 
often pressing for a directive from the President, before he would undertake a project. While 
Nixon underscored that his authority emanated from Eisenhower, his overseas assignments 
originated from Dulles. And, when it came down to the line, Nixon owed his allegiance to 
Dulles. Whoever sponsored his travel, however, Nixon pressed for prestigious international 
trips instead of unglamorous foreign presidential inaugurations and goodwill tours.
In addition, the Vice President hoped to impress his colleagues with his foreign
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
220
expertise. In meeting after meeting, Nixon demonstrated his vast international affairs 
knowledge. He analyzed Soviet actions, discussed Africa and Latin America and openly 
pontificated on Asian policy. The efforts to convince fellow Administration members were 
intended to gain him a greater role in the decision-making process. Eisenhower, however, 
maintained a firm hold over who, when and how foreign relations policy was determined. 
Nixon's efforts, and those of Dulles, frequently had no tangible results.
The President never gave Dulles the latitude to grant his second-in-command a more 
important role in American foreign policy. Ike knew Nixon was politically motivated. The 
Vice President was a perennial campaigner, Republican partisan and anti-Communist 
demagogue. Thus, Ike assigned Nixon tasks that he thought best suited to the office of Vice 
President and the skills demonstrated. Also, Eisenhower had to consider his own reputation 
as a foreign relations expert. By the end of the Administration, the General was looking to 
posterity. His concerns turned to his own image as world leader and peace maker. Nixon's 
political ambition led him to attempt to project an aura of statesman that outshined the rest of 
the Administration. But, Ike would not allow his own reputation to be dulled by Nixon's 
growing image as world diplomat. Finally, Eisenhower refused to modify his international 
affairs formula to include Nixon, just to benefit the Vice President's political prospects. In 
short, Eisenhower did not sympathize with Nixon's goals.
Stephen Ambrose concluded that Nixon established his foreign policy tenets by 1954.1 
Ambrose may be correct in his general assessment. Nixon formed a basic formula as a Herter 
Committee member, and his experiences on the 1953 trip to Asia had a profound impact on 
him. But, in terms of international relations education - experience that colored his policy
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ideas - Nixon expanded his vision with each expedition. While the 1947 Herter Committee 
trip afforded him a taste of international subjects, the vice presidential tours allowed him to 
gorge. Nixon learned new lessons about foreign relations, and applied older models to new 
situations. These trips abroad represented a primary means by which Nixon attempted to 
expand his role in the Administration and build a presidential resumd.
Nixon reinvented his position in a way none of his predecessors had managed. In 
1956, Nixon disregarded Dulles' advice to abandon the vice presidency (in favor of a Cabinet 
position) because it was not a good jump off point for a presidential campaign. Nixon applied 
his political skills, and infinite ambition, to keep his name in the public eye. Unlike his 
forerunners, he established a global reputation while Vice President. That fact altered the 
role of the second-in-command for those who came after Nixon. By making the position an 
active one, Nixon revolutionized the vice presidency. Nevertheless, the role Nixon managed 
was not all he desired.
Nixon’s efforts to portray his international travel as important were only partially 
successful. And, his role within the Administration never grew as encompassing as he 
wanted. He scratched a carefully crafted niche that gave him some say through Dulles and 
the NSC. He concentrated his advice on South East Asia, with forays into Latin American 
and Africa international relations. With Eisenhower primarily interested in European affairs, 
Nixon took the opportunity to fill a void. His best option for a policy making role was in 
Asia, where he stayed off of Ike's turf, but still in an area of US interest.
There is a good deal of irony to Nixon's efforts in the Eisenhower Administration.
The Vice President, primarily held back by the President, was also entirely beholden to him.
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The opportunities that Nixon took advantage of, or tried to exploit, appeared because he was 
swept into office with Eisenhower. Those openings were restricted because of the same man. 
No matter what he tried, regardless of how much Dulles helped, Nixon could not overcome 
that obstacle.
Once in office, Eisenhower allowed Nixon a greater role in the Administration than 
any previous Vice President, and many since. That role concentrated on domestic politics.
As much as Nixon longed for an international reputation, his political fortune was made 
because of his domestic wrangling. His work as primary Republican campaigner through the 
1950s represented a new kind of vice presidential role, as well as a valuable asset during his 
own presidential bid. Nixon's annual campaigning supplied him with political allies in all 
parts of the country, allies that made a greater impact on his 1960 presidential bid, than his 
international relations reputation.
Nixon longed for a substantive role in American foreign policy. His education in 
international relations was motivated by both personal inclination and professional aspirations. 
In 1947, he developed a taste for foreign policy. As Vice President, he focused his attention 
on the subject whenever possible. And by 1956, he saw it as a political tool to bolster his 
image. Nixon constantly sought to expand his role in the Administration through foreign 
relations work. His success had its lim its. His level of direct influence may not have been 
vast, but he clearly maintained a greater role than Eisenhower had anticipated, and any 
previous vice president had imagined . While that role did not bring him the presidency in 
1960, its legacy did play an important factor in 1968.
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